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"He who hopes to grow in spirit 
will have to transcend obedience and respect. 
He'll hold to some laws 
but he'll mostly violate 
both law and custom, and go beyond 
the established, inadequate norm. 
Sensual pleasures will have much to teach him. 
He won't be afraid o f the destructive act: 
half the house will have to come down.
This way he'll grow virtuously into wisdom."
Constantine P. Cavafy (1863-1933 AC)
IV
Abstract
Prior studies suggest that theories on equity offerings applicable to the US are not 
always applicable to the UK. Further, to my knowledge, little evidence exists on pure 
UK private placings and, no evidence on blocks o f already listed shares (secondary 
offers). This study considers this lack o f evidence and contributes to the extant 
literature by investigating these two types o f equity offerings. More specifically, the 
study focuses on three main themes: the placing offered discount or premium, the 
long-run abnormal performance surrounding the offers and, whether the US puzzling 
reversal of private placement abnormal returns (AR) is also valid in the UK.
With regards to the first theme, OLS analysis suggests that information costs and 
liquidity costs are the main determinants o f the discount o f private placements. 
Concerning the secondary offerings, they are also mainly priced at discount. 
However, the secondary offering discount appears to reflect uncertainty about the 
stock value. The findings contradict the US evidence that imply stonger monitoring 
costs, especially for the secondary sample. Premiums reflect extraction o f private 
benefits, regardless o f the offer type.
Regarding the second theme, the performance of private placing firms peaks at the 
offer year and turns negative few years later. The findings suggest the firms time the 
offer when the stock is overvalued and indicates high selling growth opportunities. 
While the findings for secondary offers suggest post-offer underperformance, the 
firms also engage into downwards earnings management the year before the offer. 
These factors explain the post-offer underperformance.
Finally, concerning the third theme, the reversal is also observed in the UK. 
However, when liquidity and pre-event momentum risk factors are taken into 
account, the post-offer underperformance disappears. The findings strongly suggest 
that the traditional models used to measure long-run AR  are misspecified. They are 
unable to adjust for reduction in liquidity risk which changes the risk factor loadings. 
Hence, the reported AR  are downwards biased.
As a conclusion, the study adds to the body of knowledge within the equity offerings 
area. It also contributes to theories such as signalling, agency and market efficiency. 
Finally, it provides methodological suggestions.
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Chapter 1 :  An Overview o f  the Study and its Contributions
1.1. Motivation
The current study is about Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). It focuses on 
placements o f equity by UK listed companies, when existing shares do not maintain 
pre-emptive rights to subscribe for the offer prior to its public announcement. Two 
non pre-emptive equity offering samples are used, i.e. private placements and 
transactions with blocks o f already listed shares. The motivation o f this study derives 
from the lack o f (adequate) evidence with regards to the two particular equity 
offering types. In addition, different implications are associated with the UK SEO in 
comparison to the US, which provides additional interest to identify whether the 
theories developed mainly based on US models are applicable in the UK.
More specifically, evidence suggests fundamental differences between the two 
countries, in terms o f SEO institutional settings, market reactions and participant 
incentives. Although the two countries are Anglo-Saxon and considered as developed 
with similar regulatory systems (La Porta et ah, 1998), they have significant 
differences in their equity offering regulations and institutional settings. A few 
differences are listed as follows.
Equity offering methods in the UK are subject to pre-emptive rights which protect 
the stakes o f existing shareholders from dilution. In fact, under the Companies Act 
1985, a company is ‘not permitted to offer shares without firstly making the offer to 
existing shareholders, on similar or more favourable terms, on a pro-rata basis.’ 
Disapplication of pre-emptive rights is now allowed under certain conditions. 
Contrary, in the US, a new issue is first bought by an underwriter who subsequently 
resells the shares at a higher price to investors, without a pro-rata offering (i.e. firm 
commitment offers). Firm commitment offers are the main issue method in the US 
(Eckbo et ah, 2007; Slovin et ah, 2000; Armitage, 1998) while the main UK offer
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method is an open offer accompanied by a placing (Armitage, 1998; Slovin et ah, 
2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006). Few right issues also exist.
Second, the process o f offering shares is different in the two countries, with the US 
setting to allow for more flexibility from the companies point o f view. In particular, 
the offered price and characteristics in the UK are set at the evening prior the 
announcement day and cannot be altered, regardless o f the subsequent market 
reactions (Slovin et ah, 2000; Armitage, 1998). Contrary, in the US, the underwriter 
has the opportunity for a road-show. During the offer period, the offer price and size 
can be adjusted according to the demand and market reactions (Eckbo et ah, 2007). 
Thus, the underwriter risk in the US is lower.
Moreover, the disclosure requirements in each country are also different. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting companies in the US are required to 
publish the placing agreements which include all placing characteristics. However, 
the UK firms conducting private placements are not obliged to publish a prospectus 
or other official placing agreement, unless the offered size is above the 10% of the 
shares outstanding (according to the 2000 Companies Act). It is thus plausible to 
argue that not only the UK provides less flexibility but it also allows for higher 
asymmetric information.
Because of the lack o f flexibility when arranging the deal characteristics in the UK, 
different market reactions to the issue types and different needs for underwriting are 
implied (Slovin et ah, 2000; Armitage, 2002). The analogous signals sent by US 
offerings are opposite (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992), e.g. negative market reactions for 
commitment offers in the US but positive for UK open offers and placings. This 
strongly suggests that the implications deriving from signalling and agency theories 
differ in the two countries. The models developed by the US literature are not always 
applicable in the UK (Slovin et ah, 2000; Kotweger and Reneboog, 2002; Armitage, 
2002).
Finally, the US literature provides evidence on pure private placements (Wruck, 
1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Hertzel et ah, 2002; Barclay et ah, 2007; Wruck and 
Wu, 2009) and on placements with already listed block o f shares initiated by existing
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shareholders (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989; Bethel et ah, 1998; Allen and Philips, 
2000; Allen, 2001). Contrary, UK findings on non pre-emptive offers are in fact at 
elementary stage. The majority o f the articles examining SEO in the UK, mainly 
focus on the market reactions around rights and open offers (see Slovin et ah, 2000; 
Barnes and Walker, 2006; Armitage, 2002). Extensive research has been aiming the 
understanding of the choice among the equity offer types and resolving the right 
offer paradox, i.e. why open offers and/or firm commitments have been replacing 
right issues (among others see Hansen, 1988; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Slovin et ah, 
2000; Armitage, 2007). Yet, to my knowledge, evidence on UK placings o f blocks 
with already listed shares is non-existent.
Thereby, the lack o f adequate evidence on non pre-emptive equity offerings and the 
different settings and implications o f the UK market, raise questions on whether the 
US patterns and theories on these two offering types (private placements and 
transactions with blocks o f listed shares) are also applicable in the UK. These issues 
provide a motivation for deeper investigation o f these two samples in the UK.
1.2. Aims of the study and research objectives
1.2.1. Aims of the study
The main purpose o f the current study is to reduce this gap into the literature. The 
study seeks to understand the UK market with regards o f these types o f equity offers 
and to investigate the validity o f arguments derived from the US literature in terms of 
the offered price, announcement reactions and abnormal performance. It also 
examines whether there are differences between the two UK offering types. The two 
samples are referred by this study as primary and secondary placings, respectively. 
Four main research objectives are examined, as follows.
1.2.2. Research objectives
Obj.l: To identify the main determinants o f  the offered discount or premium o f  UK 
non pre-emptive equity offerings.
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Evidence suggests that SEO are offered at large discount to the prevailing market 
price prior to the event. This holds for various SEO types across countries such as 
US commitment offers and private placements, UK SEO, Swedish, Greek, New 
Zealand, Japan, Netherlands and others (see section 2.3.3 for relevant literature). 
Contrary, US evidence on existing block o f shares report that investors might be 
willing to pay premium to gain private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991) or to 
be active and improve firm value (Barclay et ah, 2007).
There is no doubt that the discount (or premium) has a significant impact on the cost 
o f issuing shares. In fact, the discount o f SEO consists o f one o f the largest indirect 
costs for an issuing firm (see Armitage, 2002; Hansen, 1986), if  not the biggest 
indirect cost o f selling equity (Eckbo et ah, 2007). This pinpoints the need to 
understand the relevant implications in more depth. Additionally, there is large 
heterogeneity in UK SEO valuations (Armitage, 2010). Examining the discount or 
premium o f the UK offers (where inadequate evidence exists and different settings 
lead to frequent inapplicability o f the US models) facilitates in understanding the 
pricing techniques which have substantial impact on firm value.
Obj.2: To assess the long-run abnormal performance surrounding non pre-emptive 
equity offerings and explain its potential driving factors.
Evidence suggests that SEO firms underperform their benchmarks few years after the 
event. This is consistent across countries and SEO types, e.g. US public offers and 
private placements, UK rights and pre-renounced rights, UK open offers and offers 
accompanied by placings, Dutch rights, Korean SEO, Japanese right issues and 
private placings (see section 2.3.5 for relevant literature). At the same time, the 
placing firms document over-performance the years before the offer (e.g. Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997; Teoh et ah, 1998; Hertzel et ah, 2002; Iqbal et ah, 2009).
Contrary, evidence about transactions with existing blocks o f shares in the US 
reports post-purchase overperformance (e.g. Bethel et ah, 1998; Allen and Philips, 
2000). These studies, however, document past-performance which is not towards 
specific direction. Firms chosen by active investors underperform prior the event
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(Bethel et al., 1998) whereas those chosen for corporate alliances and joint ventures 
overperform (Allen and Philips, 2000). Thus, different incentives are involved.
The reason to investigate the long-horizon abnormal performance the years 
surrounding the two non pre-emptive placing samples is twofold. Similar 
investigation for UK non-preempitve offerings is sparse, whilst the UK settings on 
investor activity do not hold (see Armitage, 2010). Hereby, different AR  paths 
associated with different incentives are plausible.
Obj.3: To review the long-run abnormal performance methods and assess whether 
including (il)liquidity as a risk factor facilitates in improving the method o f  
measuring expected returns.
The intuition behind the third research objective is related to prior literature which 
debates about the proper approach of measuring long-horizon abnormal returns. The 
asset-pricing model designed to identify mispricing (Fama and French, 1992; 1993) 
cannot precisely value the cross-section variation o f expected returns (Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000). It appears that it overestimates the average returns during the 
sampling period, mainly for small, low book-to-market securities. This, along with 
the several econometric problems that abnormal returns are subject to, consists o f the 
known bad model problem (Fama, 1998).
Considering the interest o f this study to examine the long-run abnormal performance 
surrounding the two events, the bad-model problems stress out the need to 
understand the various issues related to each approach. If possible, the third objective 
aims to suggest new methods or solutions on how to improve the extant literature.
Obj.4: To examine whether the announcement and long-horizon abnormal returns 
fo r  the UK private placements reverse, similar to the US evidence. I f  so, to 
examine potential explanations.
The fourth research objective builds upon prior findings for private placements. 
Evidence suggests that the market reacts positively to the announcement (Wruck, 
1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Barclay et al., 2007) but turn negative few years later
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(Hertzel et al., 2002; Barclay et al., 2007; Sheehan and Swisher, 1998; Kang et al., 
1999). The main explanation provided is that investors overreact at the 
announcement (Hertzel et al., 2002). However, this interpretation implies systematic 
miss-valuations and market inefficiency, i.e. investors are not able to understand the 
real implications of the private placements and overreact.
Additionally, such evidence is unclear for the UK market. UFC studies examining UK 
placings such as Slovin et al. (2000, p. 18) clearly state that ‘placing is not private 
placement but a form of public securities issuance comparable to firm commitment 
offering in the US’. Therefore, it is confusing whether their samples constitute 
bought-deals, firm commitments or pure non pre-emptive placings. The market 
indeed reacts positively to the announcement. Positive reactions are also documented 
by Barnes and Walker (2006) who extend the Slovin et al. (2000) study and by 
Balachardan et al. (2009) for UK placements accompanied by open offers and for 
accelerated book-builds. Regarding their long-run post abnormal performance, 
relevant evidence refers mainly to placings accompanied by open offers (Ho, 2005).
As the evidence on UK private placements is limited, the fourth objective focuses on 
the AR reversal, as observed by the prior literature other than involving the UK. This 
study follows the suggestion of Fama (1998) for investigation of an observed 
anomaly (that rejects market efficiency) in a different market and different time 
periods. It examines the validity o f the reversal and tests alternative interpretations.
1.3. Contributions and research questions related to equity offerings 
area, theory and methods
1.3.1. Contributions to equity offerings literature
1.3.1.1. Contributions to the general literature o f equity offerings
The first, apparent, contribution o f this study is the use o f samples for which little or 
no evidence exists. The study uses manually collected samples for two non pre­
emptive equity offerings in the UK, i.e. placings within the SEO setting and 
placements o f already listed shares (primary and secondary placings, respectively).
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Secondary placings consist o f offerings initiated by one or more existing 
shareholders, contrary to SEO that the transaction is initiated by the company.
Additionally, the samples involve data from relatively recent years (1998-2006). 
Since 1996, UK firms have had more discretion to their offering choices. Firms could 
conduct private placements and offer more than 5% of their share capital (which was 
prohibited before). Additionally, they were allowed to waive the pre-emptive rights 
in advance and, it was no longer a requirement to publish a placing prospectus unless 
the offer exceeded the 5% of the share capital. In 2000, the size restriction for the 
prospectus requirement increased to 10%. Hence, the study provides a thorough 
investigation on the implications o f the primary placings in the UK, following the 
deregulation o f 1996, and capturing the regulation changes o f 2000. In general, there 
is only little evidence for private placements in the UK (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes 
and Walker, 2006; Ho, 2005; Balachandran et al., 2009; Armitage, 2010) and no 
evidence for UK secondary placements.
It is worthwhile that the current study does not try to extend prior studies that use UK 
placings. The samples used by the above previous studies are similar to the US firm 
commitment offers (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006) or they are 
accompanied by open or right offers (Ho, 2005; Balachandran et al., 2009). The 
primary placing sample used by the current study consists o f pure non pre-emptive 
offers that either are first bought by the underwriter or accompanied by pre-emptive 
offer. Although pure placings are also examined by Balachandran et al. (2009) and 
Armitage (2010), these studies investigate the signals sent by each flotation method 
and investor identity, respectively. Therefore, the present study focuses in answering 
different research questions.
In addition, the study adds to the body o f knowledge by exploring the implications o f 
transactions with existing blocks o f shares, about which similar prior UK evidence is 
sparse. Finally, the study contributes to the literature by comparing the findings 
between the two samples as well as by examining whether US models and arguments 
are applicable to the UK.
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1.3.1.2. Contribution to the literature on the SEO discount or premium
Regarding the offered price (Obj.l), prior studies attempt to provide an explanation 
on why a discount is necessary for SEO. Among the most acceptable explanations is 
that investors need to be compensated to buy a relatively overvalued stock (Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1992). This is in the spirit o f the Myers and M ajluf (1984) adverse 
selection problem. The various issue types convey different costs and benefits, which 
should be reflected by the discount. However, according to Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
undervalued firms can distinguish themselves by choosing private placements. Still, 
new investors will need to acquire the necessary information before investing, for 
which they need to be compensated with discount. Wruck (1989) and Barclay et al. 
(2007) argue for agency explanations, such as monitoring and entrenchment costs 
occurred by the new private investors, respectively.
Nevertheless, in the UK, investors are mainly existing shareholders rather than new 
(Annitage, 2010). Thus, it is unlikely that discounts are mainly driven by these 
factors. Although this study examines the certification and monitoring arguments 
using UK pure placings and secondary offerings, it mainly contributes by deviating 
from the above arguments. It additionally investigates the impact o f illiquidity on 
non pre-emptive offerings.
It is generally accepted that SEO stocks are mainly illiquid with downward sloping 
demand curve (Scholes, 1972; Loderer et al., 1991). The high transaction costs and 
subsequent price impact create the need to compensate investors (see Barclay and 
Litzenberger, 1988; Kothare, 1997; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003 for 
US SEO; Annitage, 2007; 2002 for the UK right, pre-renounced right and open 
offers). However, to the best of my knowledge, the liquidity argument is disregarded 
with regards to private placements. Only little attention has been given, mainly to 
sale-restricted stock (Silber, 1991 and Maynes and Pandes, 2008 for restricted US 
and Canadian private placements, respectively).
Hence, liquidity seems a common driving factor in the US, Canada and UK, while 
the general applicability o f other arguments such as manipulative short-selling and
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monitoring are less apparent.1 Thereby, the present study contributes by testing new 
possibilities for the discount o f UK non pre-emptive offers. Furthermore, to the best 
of my knowledge, explanations about the discount or premium o f secondary offers 
have not been provided by the literature, apart from the possibility o f buying at 
premium which is likely to signal private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989) or 
monitoring incentives (Barclay et al., 2001). Answering the first research question 
Q1 meets the first objective:
Q l: Are factors such as certification, monitoring, liquidity and/or private benefits 
able to explain the offered price o f  UK non pre-emptive equity offerings?
1.3.1.3. Contribution to the long-horizon abnormal performance literature
Within the second research objective (Obj.2), the study contributes by identifying 
whether the US pattern o f overperformance the years before the private placement 
but underperformance afterwards is documented by UK private placements. To the 
degree I am aware of, relevant evidence on UK private placements is limited.
Attempting to explain any relevant observed pattern, this study questions from where 
the implied growth in prices prior the offer comes. Is it because the firms identify a 
window of opportunity to sell overvalued equity (Lee, 1997; Hertzel et al., 2002; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997)? Or is it because the firms manage earnings the year 
prior the offer (Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998; Iqbal et al., 2009; Yoon and Miller,
2002)? Could it be both? Both o f these hypotheses imply that investors are not able 
to recognise the overvaluation o f the particular stock at the time o f the offer. This 
implies miss-pricings and the signals received by investors are wrong.
Nonetheless, contrary to the US evidence that new investors participate and affect 
firm policies, investors in the UK equity offerings are mainly existing rather than 
new investors (Armitage, 2010). This provides additional potential interest to 
investigate the long-run abnormal perfonnance paths and/or their determinants
1 M anipulative short-selling activities o f  specific investors during the offer period (Kim  and Shin, 
2004; Sarrieddine and W ilhem , 1996; G erard and Nanda, 1993) cannot be applicable in the UK. This 
is because o f  the different procedures in the discount setup (see section 2.2.2). S im ilarly, argum ents 
referring to new  investors acting as external m onitor factors (W ruck and W u, 2009; K rishnam urthy et 
al., 2005) are likely to have less w eight in the UK, due to the identity o f  investors being existing 
shareholders (Arm itage, 2010).
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following UK non pre-emptive placings. In line with this, Hellier (2010) calls for 
further research in the context of earnings quality for the UK market.
This study contributes by reporting the pre- and post-announcement AR surrounding 
the two placing types. It additionally performs fundamental ratio analysis, reports 
operating performance and controls for agency costs (Jung et ah, 1996). Expanding 
prior literature that explicitly advocates for a ‘window or opportunity’ hypothesis, 
the study takes the UK settings into consideration and argues for a different version 
o f ‘timing’. It argues that investors are over-optimistic about the future firm 
performance rather than knowingly sell over-valued stock (as they are mainly 
existing shareholders). In the context o f earnings quality they study argues that false 
signals based on other accounting items byond earnings enchance over-optimism and 
temporary boost the market prices. It also controls for the probability that the 
reported earnings are subject to managerial discretion, as well as agency costs.
To the degree I am aware of, prior studies have not examined whether firms 
conducting UK non pre-emptive placings opportunistically manage earnings. Similar 
findings are reported only by studies examining other SEO types such as public and 
open offers (see Teoh et ah, 1998b; Iqbal et ah, 2009; Yoon and Miller, 2002 for 
earnings management and Jung et ah, 1996 for agency).
Moreover, this study contributes by examining arguments with regards to the 
secondary placings which are different from the common US tests. US studies 
generally argue that investors in secondary offers are active, which manage to raise 
firm value (Bethel et ah, 1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Philips,
2003). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such theories are valid in the UK. The 
majority o f transactions with existing shares involve buyers that are already 
shareholders. Additionally, the offers are initiated by the seller rather than the buyer. 
Thus, the US arguments on value creation because o f higher monitor o f external 
investors are unlikely. On that basis, the current study provides alternative 
interpretations for the patterns observed. The study investigates whether the sellers 
have the knowledge and bargaining power to time the offer and mislead the buyers. 
To the best o f my knowledge, these tests with regards to the transactions o f existing
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blocks o f shares had had the least (or no attention) by prior studies. Answering the 
second research question Q2 meets the second objective:
Q2: Can timing and/or earnings management (partly) explain the long-run abnormal 
performance fo r  each o f  the two samples?
1.3.1.4. Contributions to the literature on abnormal return reversal o f private 
placements
The fourth research objective (Obj.4) contributes to the literature by re-examining 
the arguments suggesting that private placing investors overreact at the 
announcement. Contrary to Hertzel et al. (2002) who interpret the reverse signs of 
the announcement and long-run abnormal returns (AR) as investor overreaction, this 
study investigates alternative hypotheses on why AR are likely to reverse. First, as 
prior literature refers to the US and Japanese findings, this study investigates whether 
this pattern is also observable in the UK. Intuition suggests this reversal is also a UK 
phenomenon, due to the ‘trend' o f the issuing firms to underperform. At the same 
time, the announcement market reactions o f UK open offers accompanied by private 
placements is positive (e.g. Slovin et ah, 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006).
The current study primarily contributes by challenging the common overreaction 
hypothesis. It adds knowledge by providing a thorough investigation about potential 
explanations of the puzzle. In particular, although few of the ‘stories’ tested by this 
study have been examined by the general SEO literature, to the best o f my 
knowledge they have not been examined with regards to private placements. Such 
possibilities include model misspecifications o f the long-run AR  (Fama, 1998; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Brav et ah, 1997), other information released at the 
announcement (Korajczyk et ah, 1991; Antweiler and Frank, 2004) and investor 
speculative activities. Additionally, the study investigates other ‘stories’ such as the 
pseudo-timing hypothesis (Schultz, 2003; Dahlquist and De Jong, 2008; 
Viswanathan and Wei, 2008) and changes in risk factor loadings not captured by the 
benchmark used (Eckbo et ah, 2000; Boechme and Sorescu, 2002; Eckbo and Norli, 
2005). Answering the third research question Q3 meets the fourth objective:
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0 3 : Could 'stories ’ beyond the common overreaction hypothesis such as pseudo­
timing, liquidity and model misspecifications, other information and investor 
speculative activities justify this pattern?
1.3.2. Contributions to theory
1.3.2.1. Contribution to signalling theory
Without doubts, the SEO convey a great amount o f asymmetric information between 
the firm and market (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Information asymmetries might 
explain the reported discount and/or cause significant impacts on market prices. 
Investors tend to interpret firm decisions as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, according to how they 
perceive a particular corporate decision. They thus react accordingly. The most 
classic and controversial for its time article, ‘Market for Lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970), 
characterizes the sellers as ‘lemon owners’ who sell a product whose quality is lower 
than an uninformed investor believes. Thus, adverse selection problems are 
associated.
The SEO literature has its intuition behind the ‘market for lemons’, suggesting 
arguments along similar lines. It is suggested that firms conducting SEO face adverse 
selection problems. They sell new equity when the intrinsic value o f the issue is less 
than the benefits o f the proceeds, implying relative overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Thus, the market reacts negatively. While the 
signals sent by the US and UK firms are associated with adverse selection problems, 
the market reacts differently or the adverse selection problem is less onerous for the 
same issue types in the UK (Slovin et al., 2000). This suggests different investor 
perceptions about the implications around the SEO.
With regards to private placements (not SEO in general), the signals sent to the 
market are positive. A widely accepted argument is the known certification 
hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). This advocates that the reactions to private 
placements are positive as the signals received by the market assume the particular 
stock is undervalued (contrary to public offers). Elence, the choice to privately place 
new stock facilitates firms to communicate their identity as ‘non-lemons’.
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Nonetheless, the fact that AR reverse few years later might imply that the signals sent 
were wrong after all. As UK evidence on private placement signalling is sparse, this 
study contributes by examining these arguments.
1.3.2.2. Contribution to agency theory
The SEO evidence associate the signals sent with arguments derive form the agency 
theory (Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007; Barclay and Holdemess, 1989). Agency 
theory deals with the conflict o f interests that arises from the relationship between 
the owner (shareholders or principals) and control (agents or managers) parts o f the 
corporation (Jensen and MecKling, 1976).
As far as the private placements and secondary offerings are concerned, prior studies 
suggest the new investors act as external monitoring factors to the incumbent 
management (Krishnamurthy, 2005; Wruck and Wu, 2009; Bethel et al., 1998). This 
will lead to potential value improvements. Opposite arguments are also suggested. 
The new investors will actually entrench the incumbent management rather than 
monitor it (Barclay et al., 2007). The new investors are also likely to target the 
extraction of private benefits at the expense of the minority interest (Barclay and 
Holdemess, 1989; Duck and Zingales, 2004). This study contributes by examining 
whether the sale of equity is subject to agency problems. In such case, the new funds 
will lead to reduction of firm value, implying investment into negative NPV projects. 
Extraction o f private benefits will also reduce firm value, regardless o f the offer 
being primary or secondary.
1.3.2.3. Contributions to market efficiency
Corporate finance and market based accounting models have a fundamental 
assumption that the market is efficient. Nonetheless, testing whether the market is 
efficient is not easy. It is ‘jointly tested conditional with some model o f equilibrium, 
an asset-pricing model’ (Fama, 1991, p. 1589) which attempts to answer whether the 
knowledge is properly reflected in prices. The corresponding model o f equilibrium is 
also subject to a joint-hypothesis test: that the market is efficient and that it is able to 
describe the cross-section variation o f expected returns properly. Unavoidably, all
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models are subject to market efficiency, while it is argued that none model can 
actually tell a perfect economic story (Fama, 1998, p.299). The ‘line’ between 
efficiency and the 'bad model’ problem is ambiguous. This study contributes to the 
market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1970; 1991) in several ways.
First, the study provides a detailed review on the debate o f long-horizon abnormal 
performance studies, as long-horizon AR  estimation is sensitive to the methodology 
employed (Brav et ah, 2000). Unlike prior review studies that focus on short-event 
windows (e.g. MacKinlay 1997; Campbell et ah, 1997; Armitage, 1995; Strong, 
1992), this study contributes by gathering the most recent and practical issues related 
to the long-horizon abnormal performance approaches and the rationale behind their 
research design (Obj.3). It attempts to explain the several problems o f each approach, 
as well as solutions suggested by the literature. Having synthesized the contributions 
o f prior articles, the study also recommends ways o f how to expand the extant 
literature. Moreover, as it is common within the corporate finance literature to 
examine the stock and operating performance (e.g. Hertzel et ah, 2002; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997), the study also explains the accounting performance approach, 
which involves fundamental ratio analysis (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1986; Barber 
and Lyon, 1996).
The second contribution on market efficiency derives from the fourth objective o f the 
study (Obj.4). A systematic reversal in AR  around private placements strongly rejects 
the notion o f market efficiency. It raises questions on whether there is consistency to 
the AR reversal, i.e. whether this ‘anomaly’ persists. Do private placement investors 
systematically fall into the same mistakes and wrongly react positively at the 
announcement, regardless o f the negative post-event abnormal performance? Is the 
market unable to understand the real implications o f private placings? Such anomaly 
implies that systematic excess returns can be achieved by informed investors.
This study investigates whether this pattern is robust. First, Fama (1998, p.300) 
advocates that 'an anomaly is real when it is observed in different sample periods’. 
Thus, if an anomaly is no longer observed in future periods, it is probably erased due 
to the 'knowledge of its existence’ (Fama, 1991, p .1593). Similarly, Malkiel (2003) 
and Schwert (2003) note that several predictable patterns disappear after they
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become publicly known by the finance literature. One explanation for this is that 
■practitioners are likely to learn quickly about any true predictable pattern and 
exploit it to the extent that it becomes no longer profitable’ (Malkiel, 2003, p.63). 
Alternatively, new methodologies control for several known or potential biases over 
a specific sample and help in explaining the reported patterns.
Following these statements, an out-of-sample analysis is conducted. The sample 
period helps in examining this investor (ir)rationality, as it is recent and has not been 
examined yet (1998-2005). Additionally, the study contributes by using a different 
market (UK) in case the puzzle is market specific. It applies several long-run AR 
methods and controls for known problems and biases, avoiding the model 
misspecification problem (to the extent that it is possible).
It additionally examines several other competing stories that could potentially 
explain this reported anomaly (e.g. other information, pseudo-timing, changes in 
cost-of-equity that the benchmark model cannot control for). Finally, it also 
investigates whether specific investors that have private information regarding the 
upcoming private placement speculate on the market prices. This later test falls 
within the strong-form of efficiency. In other words, answering the third research 
question Q3 contributes not only in understanding this particular phenomenon which 
puzzles the equity offering literature, but also contributes to market efficiency 
evidence.
1.3.3. Contributions to methodologies
1.3.3.1. Long-run abnormal performance methods
To estimate long-horizon AR, two competing approaches dominate. The known buy- 
and-hold AR method and the calendar-time AR  method. The difficulty in choosing 
between the two is related to the fact that each approach has its own pros and cons, 
while it is subject to several problems (see Chapter 3 for details). Thus, they could be 
seen as complementary rather than competing models. The buy-and-hold approach is 
less susceptible to the ability o f the model to explain expected returns, however it is 
subject to more severe econometric problems (Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Lyon et
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al., 1999). Contrary, calendar-time AR  are less sensitive to econometric problems, 
but more sensitive to the model used (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).
Thus, an opportunity for further research and the use o f new tools in assessing long- 
horizon AR is provided (Lyon et al., 1999). New methodologies might control for 
several known or potential biases over a specific sample which help in providing 
'norm al’ inferences, consistent with market efficiency (Schwert, 2003).
Building upon these propositions, this study makes a step beyond the conventional 
event-study methods. It contributes by applying a different asset-pricing model 
which has its intuition on a parallel set o f literature. In particular, several articles 
published into well established finance journals advocate that liquidity-adjusted 
pricing models have high predictive ability to forecast stock returns via liquidity 
strategies (e.g. Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 
2005; Gallmeyer et al., 2004; Chordia et ah, 2008). This literature suggests liquidity 
risk affects stock returns, in a time-series manner.
Motivated by this literature and arguments supporting that the reported AR are 
actually manifestation of the methodology (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997) rather than market inefficiency, the current study applies a liquidity- 
adjusted asset pricing model. A two-factor model is employed (Liu, 2006) which 
captures the market premium and a liquidity premium.
This study contributes to the ongoing long-run AR  debate by applying not only the 
traditional methods, but also an alternative model advocated that it is able to capture 
better the cross-section variation o f expected returns. This application is also 
consistent with the implications o f Eckbo et al. (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) 
that the common asset pricing models ignore illiquidity, as well as with the view that 
an observed anomaly might be explained by different asset pricing model (Fama, 
1991, p. 1589). A fourth research question Q4 responds to whether such deviation 
from the event-study methodologies is beneficial or not, and facilitates in meeting the 
third research objective.
0 4 : Is there any benefit to deviate from the existing literature and assess long-run 
abnormal performance by applying a liquidity-adjusted asset-pricing model?
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1.3.3.2. Liquidity as a factor affecting expected returns
In a vein similar to the long-horizon AR methodology, it is common to apply a 
‘traditional asset-pricing model’ to examine the cost o f equity capital and changes in 
the risk factor loadings (e.g. Boechme and Sorescu, 2002; Grullon et al., 2001). An 
acceptable pricing model estimates the implicit discount rate used to value the firm 
equity (higher expected return implies a riskier firm). Other approaches such as 
abnormal earnings growth valuation models (e.g. Code and Mohamam, 2003), 
residual income models (e.g. Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001) and/or 
others are also applicable. The estimated cost o f equity is subject to the risk factors 
o f the pricing model, such as the stock beta, the market premium, size premium, 
growth, profitability, and/or other. Therefore, the traditional models indeed fail to 
account for any changes in cost o f equity attributable to liquidity risks.
Considering the growing literature which refers to the ability o f the liquidity 
premium to predict and explain future returns, as well as the evidence that illiquidity 
and high transaction costs raise the cost o f issuing capital (Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic 
and Hansen, 2003; Gao and Ritter, 2009), investigation, or at least control for, the 
(il)liquidity component o f the cost o f equity o f SEO firms is needed. On that basis, 
this study contributes to the extant literature by testing the impact o f corresponding 
component on UK placing firms. It tests how this might affect the reported AR.
The study expands prior literature by testing whether the factor loadings o f the Liu 
(2006) liquidity-adjusted asset pricing model change after the event. Hence, the 
analysis captures changes in the risk factor loadings that might affect the reported 
post-underperformance. Boechme and Sorescu (2002) adopt this approach by 
applying the Fama and French three factor model following dividend initiations and 
resumptions and Grullon et al. (2001) following increases in quarterly dividends.
To the best o f my knowledge, this is the first study that applies a liquidity-adjusted 
pricing model as a cost o f equity tool. Whether such deviation is beneficial, it is 
tested in comparisons with the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models 
that capture the size, book-to-market and momentum factor changes. A fifth research 
question Q5 addresses this issue.
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0 5 : Is there any benefit to deviate from the existing literature and capture the 
(il)liquidity component o f  cost o f  equity?
1.4. Structure o f the study
The study consists o f seven chapters in total. Following this introductory chapter, 
two chapters discuss prior literature and existing knowledge in terms o f SEO settings 
and evidence (Chapter 2), and in terms of long-horizon AR  methodologies (Chapter 
3). These two 'review ’ chapters are followed by three ‘empirical’ ones which are 
seen as standing alone smaller studies that mainly pursue one (or more) o f the 
research objectives o f the study. Each one develops testable hypotheses based on the 
most relevant literature, applies a research design accordingly and, reports its own 
findings. On that basis, the remaining of the study is structured as follows.
Chapter two briefly describes the SEO area. It portrays the institutional settings, 
procedures and implications in the UK and US. It reviews the existing evidence 
including arguments o f prior studies that US models are not applicable into the UK. 
The chapter helps in understanding the UK market, emphases the gaps in the 
literature and indicates the broader motivation o f the study.
Chapter three illustrates the techniques o f assessing long-run abnormal firm 
performance following a corporate event, i.e. the first part o f the third research 
objective (Obj.3). It reviews the ongoing debate on stock and operating long-run 
abnormal performance. It provides a brief guidance on how to choose among the 
alternative methodologies and, suggestions o f how to expand the extant literature.
Chapter four  examines the first research objective o f the study (Obj.l). It focuses on 
the discount or premium of non pre-emptive equity offerings in the UK and attempts 
to define their determinants. It examines four testable hypotheses and provides 
answer to the first research question (Q l). This chapter also provides a detailed 
description of the sample collection process.
Chapter five explores the second research objective (Obj.2). It assesses the long- 
horizon abnormal performance (stock and operating) for the six years surrounding
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the offerings. To explain the reported patterns, the chapter tests two non-mutually 
exclusive hypotheses, namely the timing hypothesis (or window o f opportunity) and 
the earnings management. It provides answer to the second research question (Q2).
Chapter six investigates mainly the fourth research objective (Obj.4). It focuses on 
the announcement and long-run abnormal returns o f private placements in the UK. It 
attempts to contribute to the extant literature by focusing on the puzzling reversal o f 
AR. While it challenges the common overreaction hypothesis, it tests four additional 
alternative hypotheses. Moreover, it expands prior literature by employing new long- 
ain AR and expected cost o f equity methods, i.e. the second part o f the third research 
objective (Obj.3). It provides answers to the remaining research questions (Q3 - Q5).
Finally, chapter seven concludes. It summarises the testable hypotheses and main 
finings. In other words, it describes ‘what we learn from this study’. It additionally 
identifies limitations o f the study and provides suggestions for further research.
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2.1. Introduction
This chapter describes the SEO area and attempts to communicate the UK settings, 
existing evidence and gaps in the literature. It additionally highlights the main 
differences between the UK and US SEO procedures. It does not aim to develop 
testable hypotheses. Instead, it emphasises in understanding the market, relevant 
theories and findings.
It has been a long tradition in the UK that existing shareholders are automatically 
offered any new shares in proportionate to their holdings, before the shares are 
offered to any outside investor. This ‘clawback’ procedure is mandatory. Only since 
the mid-1980s British firms were allowed to waive the pre-emptive rights, under 
certain circumstances. To protect the parties involved, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) issued official guidelines about non pre-emptive offers in 1987. Since then, 
UK non pre-emptive placings have begun to rise.
In particular, three SEO types are common in the UK market i.e. the rights issues, 
open offers and placings. The most common method is now an open offer with a 
placing (Barnes and Walker, 2006). Contrary, in the US, there is no requirement for 
pre-emptive rights and the main issuing methods are firm commitment offers and 
private placements. Firm commitment offers are public offers first bought by an 
underwriter who resells the shares to the ultimate investors.
The two markets have further essential differences in terms o f the placing types and 
procedures, direct and indirect costs o f raising capital, disclosure requirements, 
investor identity and incentives. These differences lead to different SEO implications 
which make models and arguments advocated by the US studies not applicable into 
the UK (Slovin et al., 2000; Korteweg and Reneboog, 2002, Armitage, 2002).
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Additionally, while the majority o f the UK evidence refers to right and open offers, 
US evidence also examines private placements and transactions with blocks of 
already listed shares for which limited or no evidence is reported for the UK. 
Thereby, the non-applicability o f the US models and the lack o f (adequate) UK 
evidence on private placements and existing blocks o f shares, raises the need to 
investigate deeper these two types o f offers in the UK.
The structure o f the remaining chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
institutional settings in the UK and US and, identifies the most significant differences 
between them. It illustrates the incentives and implications in the two countries. 
Section 2.3 reviews the main existing evidence and indicates gaps in the literature 
that the current study attempts to fill. The last section 2.4 concludes.
2.2. Institutional settings and equity offerings procedures
2.2.1. The issue types in the UK
2.2.1.1. Pre-emptive rights
It is compulsory for the firms to offer any new shares issued firstly to existing 
shareholders in proportion to their holdings on similar or better terms. Once existing 
shareholders decide whether they will buy their entitlements (or not), the shares not 
taken up are offered to outside potential investors. Conversion of securities into 
ordinary shares must also be offered to existing shareholders in proportion o f their 
holdings. The existing shareholders maintain this right o f ‘first refusal’ in various 
European countries including the UK, Norway, Netherlands, Greece as well as in 
New Zealand and Japan. The purpose o f this so called ‘pre-emptive right’ is to 
protect the stakes o f existing shareholders from dilution. They are automatic and 
mandatory imposed in any new share issue. Pre-emptive offers are also commonly 
known as 'placements with clawback' or ‘on pro rata basis’.
Pre-emptive rights have been contained in the European Community Second 
Company Law Directive since 1977. Although pre-emptive rights were mandatory 
for UK public companies long ago, the provisions on shareholders’ pre-emption 
rights were combined by UK Companies Act 1980, to implement Directive
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77/91/EEC. According to the UK Companies Act 1980, a placement without 
clawback was not allowed by the LSE at all.
Nevertheless, since 1975, non pre-emptive offers have begun to be acceptable by the 
stock exchange rules (Armitage, 1998). An Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) 
resolution had to state that existing shareholders voluntarily waive their pre-emptive 
rights though. This was the beginning of placings. Formal relevant regulation was 
first provided by the Companies Act 1985 s.89 (see Barnes and Walker, 2006) which 
permitted disapplication o f pre-emptive rights under certain circumstances. Non pre­
emptive placements were applicable only for specific number o f the firm shares. 
They were not allowed to exceed the 5% of the shares outstanding and an EGM 
resolution was necessary. Publication o f the placing prospectus was also compulsory.
Since 1986, the disapplication of the pre-emptive rights could also be approved 15 
months in advance, without EGM resolution for every issue. However, the in 
advance disapplication was still subject to conditions o f cumulative offered size and 
value (to be up to 5% o f the shares outstanding). This made the placing procedure 
faster. General pre-emption guidelines were issued by the LSE in 1987, to protect the 
several parties involved. In sequence, in 1996, the LSE listing rules removed the 
relative offer size restriction o f 5%. Firms could place as many non pre-emptive 
shares as they wished, as long as shareholders approved the offer. Moreover, a firm 
could waive the pre-emptive rights 12 months in advance, while the publication of 
the placing prospectus was no longer compulsory for placings with size up to 5% of 
the firm share capital. In 2000, the listing rules ‘relaxed’ the prospectus requirement 
further to 10% of the capital. This allows British firms to have more discretion to 
their issue choices (see Listing Rules, 2007). Further on pre-emption can be found at 
Myners (2005).
2.2.1.2. Equity offering types and issue process
The most common method to issue capital in the UK and the rest o f Europe had been 
the right issues (RI) method until the year 1994, when open offers (OO) started to be 
very famous (Armitage, 1998). Both methods are placings with clawback, contrary to
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the mentioned placings that disapplication o f the corresponding pre-emptive rights is 
required. These are the three main forms of issuing shares in the UK.
r  Right issues (RI)
RI involve new shares issued and offered first to existing shareholders in proportion 
o f their holdings. The rights have the form o f provisional allotment letters (PALs) 
which are sent to the existing shareholders at the time o f the RI announcement. A 
prospectus approved by the LSE accompanies the offer. In general, when a UK 
equity offer takes place, the LSE regulation requires the publication o f the placing 
prospectus, which is approved by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). FSA 
serves as the competent authority o f the issuers’ home State (s.85(7)). An application 
for admission of the securities to trading is also required.
The offer o f rights starts immediately after the announcement or after an EGM 
meeting (if necessary) and lasts for at least three weeks. At the end o f the offer 
period, the new shares are issued. During the offer period, the right (PAL) is tradable 
to the market. The PAL is a European call option which starts trading after the 
announcement (or EGM) and matures at the issue day. Its exercise price is the offer 
price and underlying asset the share. The offer price o f the new shares is agreed at 
the evening prior the announcement day and becomes public at the announcement, ft 
is at discount to the market price compared to the day prior the announcement. The 
offer price remains fixed during the whole offer period and cannot be altered. Thus, 
the risk of the offer to be unsuccessful is high, i.e. if  the market price falls below the 
exercise price, the option will be left unexercised at the maturity, as the option 
holders will have no positive payoff. On that basis, the level o f the discount could 
vary according to the riskiness o f the offer, stock liquidity, demand elasticity or other 
reason (details are provided in section 2.3.3).
RI are usually underwritten. The firm hires an investment bank or a broker to 
organize the issue, known as the underwriter or the underwriting syndicate (a group 
of underwriters or investment banks). The underwriter commits to subscribe for the 
shares not sold at the end of the offer period and place them with other investors.
-24-
Chapter 2: Understanding the UK market, background on equity offerings and motivations 
Actually, it has been common practice in UK that SEO are underwritten. The main 
responsibilities o f the lead-underwriter are to advise the company, to coordinate the 
prospectus writing procedure, to sponsor the issue in terms o f marketing and finding 
investors. The broker or lead underwriter guarantees the gross proceeds o f the issue, 
by committing that the syndicate will place with institutions or other investors any 
unsold shares at the end o f the offer (Armitage, 2000). This is the so-called standby 
underwriting which appears to be the common underwriting method in the UK.
Shareholders wishing not to take up their entitlements can either sell the rights during 
the offer period or renounce the rights by the ex-rights day (the day after the 
announcement or EGM). The pre-renounced entitlements are placed with the 
underwriter or an institutional investor (Armitage, 2007). Obviously, the decision to 
pre-renounce or trade the right to the market is based upon the expectation on how 
much investors can earn by selling the right in the secondary market, and by pre­
renouncing their entitlement before the trading starts. Armitage (2007) documents 
evidence about pre-renounced rights, arguing that selling large blocks o f shares along 
with rights at the market entails large costs (rights and the shares are very illiquid). 
Thus, pre-renouncing might provide higher revenues. Unsold shares (rights not 
traded during the offer period or not exercised at the maturity) and rights not taken- 
up (pre-renounced) are sold by the underwriter to the market with the proceeds 
distributed to the existing shareholders.
In case that an EGM is necessary to approve the new issue, further two or three 
weeks are required after the announcement before the beginning o f the offer period. 
This postpones the start o f the PALs’ trading, which cannot commence before the 
resolutions o f the EGM are passed. After the EGM approves the offer, the PAL 
trading begins and lasts again for approximately three weeks until the share issue. 
Thus, in this case, the share issue delays. It needs approximately five or six weeks 
from the announcement day.
r- Open offers
Regarding the open offers (OO), they are similar to RI in the sense that existing 
shareholders are invited to subscribe for the new shares on a pro-rata basis. However,
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three significant differences in the procedures between the OO and RI exist. First, the 
shares in OO are placed privately with institutions before the announcement 
(contrary to a stand-by underwriting o f RI). They are then offered to existing 
shareholders on clawback.
Second, the rights (PALs) are not tradable to the market and cannot be sold to other 
investors. Thus, there is no compensation for the dilution experienced by existing 
shareholders that do not take up their entitlements. PALs not taken up by the end o f 
the offer period are bought by the investors (institutions) already arranged in the first 
place (Annitage, 2002). Although PALs are not tradable and cannot be sold during 
the offer period, the shares are not issued until the close o f the offer period, 
approximately three weeks after the announcement day, similar to the RI.
Finally, in case an EGM is necessary to approve the OO, it is held immediately after 
the end o f offer period, but before the new shares are issued; authorisation is not 
needed until the shares are issued and since the PALs are not tradable, the EGM 
resolutions do not delay the offer period for two-three weeks as in RI (that the rights 
need to be issued). Once the EGM resolutions approve the OO, the new shares are 
issued the following day. Similar to the RI, OO are usually offered at discount to the 
prevailing market price prior the announcement.
'r Placings
The last SEO method is known as placing. Unlike the right and open offers, new 
shares are issued and placed with specific investors without the existing shareholders 
to maintain pre-emptive rights to subscribe for the new shares, on a pro-rata basis. 
The right o f 'first refusal' does not exist. Contrary, the shares are sold to investors 
after direct negotiations with the firm.
Similar to the right and open offers, the offer price is agreed ex-ante the 
announcement and becomes publicly known at the announcement. When the shares 
are issued (i.e. about three weeks to one month afterwards), they are allocated to the 
private investors to the agreed price. An application for admission o f the securities to 
trading is required. Again, it is common for the placing to be underwritten.
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Additionally, the firms are required to have EGM resolutions for the pre-emptive 
rights disapplication and publish the placing prospectus approved by the LSE (as 
explained in section 2.2.1.1). Recall that after the change in the listing regulation in 
1996, firms can privately place shares with ex-ante disapplication o f the pre-emptive 
rights and without publishing the prospectus for placings up to 5% o f their capital. 
According to the 2000 Act, firms participating into placements are not obliged to 
publish the prospectus or an agreement contract, unless the offer exceeds the 10% o f 
their issued share capital. This assumes the pre-emptive rights had been waived in 
advance or they are not subject to the issuance (e.g. the placing does not accompany 
a RI or OO). However, it is common practice for firms to publish a prospectus for 
placements over the 5% of the shares outstanding (disclosure requirements and other 
cases that exempt from the prospectus requirement are described in section 2.2.2.3).
Nowadays, very few firms issue RI (approximately 20 per year, usually by large 
companies; Armitage, 2007). Contrary, the common perception is that OO 
accompanied by a placing is the most frequent share offer method (Barnes and 
Walker, 2006), which is subject to the requirement o f a prospectus publication.
2.2.1.3. Further issues and definitions
In addition to the above descriptions o f the UK issue types, Barnes and Walker 
(2006, p.48-51) provide a detailed description o f the UK issuance mechanisms and 
the definitions as provided by the 1998 listing rules o f the LSE. In fact, they describe 
six methods: right issue, public issue, offer for subscription, placing with institutions, 
open offer and placing with open offer. While right and open offers are as described 
above, public issues and offers for subscription are defined as invitations to the 
public by a third party or by the issuer, respectively, to subscribe for new shares. As 
Barnes and Walker state, the public issue usually has no restrictions to the investor 
characteristics while the offer for subscription mainly targets small number o f 
institutional investors.
Nonetheless, due to the automatic pre-emptive entitlement o f the existing 
shareholders in the UK, both o f these mechanisms require disapplication of the pre­
emptive rights. Thus, these two categories fall under the umbrella o f placings as
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described above (without specification on the identity o f the new investors). 
Likewise, according to the UK exchange listing rules, the "placing with institutions’ 
could also be defined similar to a placing. The new shares are offered to one or more 
investors, private or institutional, without pre-emptive rights.
Additionally, Barnes and Walker (2006) interpret underwriting as the procedure o f a 
sponsor purchasing the shares and placing them with institutions, in exchange o f a 
fee. This is the so called bought deal or firm commitment offer. However, according 
to the listing rules, there is no requirement for the placing to be bought by the 
underwriter in advance. Thus, it could fall again under the general definition of 
placings.
Classifications are also made by the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSAMA) 
in 2000. The forms o f new issues are known as follows: (i) public offer for 
subscription, which includes a general invitation to the public; (ii) placing, which 
involves a small number o f investors approached privately; (iii) an intermediaries 
offer where the new shares are offered to a number o f brokers and professional 
investors, (iv) RI, and (v) OO.
Overall, when the new issue is not a right or open offer, the remaining offer types are 
subject to disapplication o f the existing shareholders’ pre-emptive rights. The three 
mechanisms are usually underwritten, whilst the identity and the number o f investors 
are subject to changes. The current study uses the general definition for placements 
as being equal to a non pre-emptive offering o f new shares issued.
2.2.2. Differences from the US
2.2.2.1. Placing types in the US
While pre-emptive offers exist inter alia in Canada, several European countries, 
Japan, South Africa, New Zealand, the most common method o f issuing shares in the 
US is the so called public offers or firm commitment offers. In contrast to the 
standby underwriting in the UK, a US public offer is first bought by an underwriter 
or merchant bank, who place it with investors (for this reason they are also called
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bought deals, BD). The underwriter resells the stock to investors at a higher price 
without first offer it to existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis. Additionally, 
although nowadays very few firms in the UK still issue rights, in the US they have 
almost disappeared long ago, around mid-1980s (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).
More specifically, a US issuing firm appoints an underwriter or the underwriting 
syndicate to manage the issue. While listed firms usually have long relationships 
with commercial banks and/or at least one underwriter, sometimes competing 
underwriters make presentations to the issuer as part o f a process o f choosing the 
correct lead underwriter (Eckbo et ah, 2007). The lead underwriter is responsible to 
register the new shares with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Then, the 
offer is announced and the subscription (offer) period begins. It lasts for about one 
month until the issue day.
Although the above underwriting actions are similar to the UK, in the US the 
underwriter ‘markets’ the offer during the offer period. A road-show takes place. The 
underwriter presents a preliminary prospectus or red herring to potential investors 
and clients. The underwriter observes the market reactions and investor demand, 
whilst all negotiations with potential buyers as well as offers to new and existing 
investors are not binding. The offer price and size can be adjusted according to the 
demand and market reactions. It can even be withdrawn. In other worlds, not only the 
new shares are not offered first to existing shareholders in proprietary to their 
holdings as in the UK, but also the offered price is not definite at the announcement. 
Thus, the underwriting risk is lower due to the flexibility in setting the price.
At the end o f the offer period and after the SEC approves the share issue, the firm 
meets with the underwriter and set the offer price, using the information gathered 
during the subscription period. It thus takes the market reactions and investor 
response into account (contrary to the UK that all characteristics are set prior to the 
announcement). After the price is set, the shares are issued usually at the following 
day and investors can buy from the underwriter, without dealer fees, brokerage 
commissions or taxes (Hansen, 1988). The underwriter gains the difference in the 
prices that bought the share from the firm and sold it to the investors. This
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contradicts the UK procedure, that investors buy directly from the company and 
underwriters receive a fee from the issuer.
Moreover, private placements (PP) also exist in the US. The new issues are placed 
with specific investors (not placed with several unknown investors as in firm 
commitment offers) and, without first being bought by a syndicate. It is worthwhile 
to emphasize that UK (private) placings could be bought deals (as Slovin et ah, 2000 
argue). However, there is no regulation to impose this and they are usually subject to 
standby underwriting. The main characteristic o f UK private placing is the 
disapplication of the pre-emptive rights while the offer is placed with specific 
investors (mainly institutions; Armitage, 2010).
2.2.2.2. Underwriting fees
To provide the above services, underwriters impose fees such as the underwriter fee 
and fee for each sub-underwriter. Precisely, in a standby underwritten issue, the 
subscription period begins when the prospectus is declared. The syndicate secures 
the issue for which a fixed standby fee is charged (the charge includes the services 
for advising the firm, marketing and registering the issue, commitments for unsold 
stock). The fee is distributed to all parties involved, i.e. to each sub-underwriter. If 
shares are left unsold at the end of the offer period, the underwriter buys the unsold 
shares and resells them to institutions or other investors. In such case, the firm is 
additionally charged with a take-up fee for every unsold share. In case that an EGM 
resolution is required, a RI delays for two-three weeks. This entails additional 
underwriter fees per week. Finally, the risk that the offer will be cancelled or 
withdrawn also entails (direct and indirect) costs.
The amount charged also covers additional costs such as registration and listing fees, 
fees for solicitors, accountants and printing costs (see Armitage, 2000, p.61-62 for 
breakdown of costs. See also Eckbo and Masulis, 2000; Smith, 1977; Hansen, 1988; 
Singh, 1997 for US RI). When the offer is first bought by the underwriter (in a BD) 
the fee covers the standby fee plus a take-up fee for each share sold at loss (Slovin et 
al., 2000. p. 162). The fee is expressed as a percentage o f the gross proceeds o f the 
issue.
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Hence, issuing entails large direct costs. Yet, a substantial difference between the UK 
and US fees exists. In the US, the costs of issuing are measured as the underwriter 
spread i.e. the spread between the price the firm sells to the underwriter and the price 
investors buy from the underwriter (which is usually at discount to the prevailing 
market price). However, UK firms pay in cash the underwriting fee and sell to 
investors at a distinguishable price (again, usually at discount; Armitage, 2000; 
2002). Thus, in the UK there are two distinguishable costs (the underwriter fee and 
the discount) but only one cost in the US (the spread which also covers the discount). 
Thereby, the UK provides a setting to examine the discount separately from the 
underwriting costs.
2.2.2.3. Disclosure requirements
Differences in the disclosure requirements o f SEO in the two countries are also 
apparent. They result to different levels o f asymmetric information in relation to 
(private) placings in the two countries. SEC reporting companies (in the US) are 
required to file exhibits on private placings and to report the original placement 
agreement. The contract provides detailed information on the offering date, names o f 
purchasers, number o f shares purchased, offer price (see Wrack and Wu, 2009).
However, such contracts are not available for UK private placements. Contrary, the 
overall offering requirements provide a relative opacity in the UK. While firms 
conducting placings are not required to publish a prospectus if  the offer does not 
exceed the 10% of issued capital (see section 2.2.1.2), an announcement to the 
market should be made. The firm needs to disclose its intention to place new shares 
via a news report.
•>
It is argued that econom ies o f  scales are associated w ith the issue value, as the underw riter 
fee/spread is decreasing over the value o f  the issue (see A rm itage, 2000 and Lee et al., 1996 for UK 
and US evidence, respectively). O verall, the level o f  underw riter fee or spread and further flotation 
costs could vary across firms based on the value and type o f  issue (Eckbo and M asulis, 1992; Singh, 
1997; Lee et al, 1996; A rm itage, 2000), firm size and return volatility (A ltinkilic and H ansen, 2000), 
stock liquidity (Altinkilic, 2006; Butler et ah, 2005), issuer accrual quality  (Lee and M asulis, 2006), 
underw riter com petition (Chen and Ritter, 2000; H ansen, 2001; M ullineaux and Roten, 2005). 
Evidence also relates the underw riter spread with the level o f  underpricing and the tim ing o f  the offer 
(Kim et ah, 2005). Eckbo et ah (2007, Table 7) provides detailed relevant literature and sum m arizes 
pertinent studies.
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According to the Directive 2003/71/EC (under FSAMA 2000, s86(7)), further 
exemptions from the prospectus requirement are entitled. This is when the offer: (i) 
is made to qualified investors,3 (ii) is offered to fewer than 100 persons (apart from 
qualified investors), (iii) has small value o f placements less than €2.5 millions 
(within 12 months), (iv) has minimum payable consideration by each investor o f 
€50000, (v) involves substitute or conversion shares, (vi) is in connection with a 
takeover or merger, (vii) constitutes bonus or script dividends (viii) the shares are 
admitted to trading to another market.
Although the cases (i) -  (iii) allow for exemption o f the prospectus requirement, an 
application for admission of the securities to trading on a regulated market requires a 
prospectus, unless the application is exempted by the provisions o f (iv) -  (viii). As a 
conclusion, more discretion in the equity offerings is provided to UK companies in 
comparison with those in the US. Pure placing is the only SEO type that might fall 
within the above exempted categories for the UK market. This might justify the 
limited relevant evidence.
2.2.3. Transactions with blocks of already listed shares
Beyond the offer o f new shares, it is also common to offer already listed shares (or 
blocks o f existing shares) to investors. The shares could be offered generally to the 
public or to specific (existing or new) investors at fixed price. These transactions are 
initiated by the owners, the existing shareholders who wish to sell their stake or 
portions o f it. It is likely that the shareholder contact an underwriter to help for the 
sale procedure. While selling via an intermediary increases the direct cost o f the 
offer, it reduces the risk of an unsuccessful transaction. These offers are defined as 
secondary offers.
3 Q ualified investors are: legal entities authorized or regulate to operate in the financial m arkets w ith a 
purpose to invest in securities, governm ents, central banks or other sim ilar international organizations, 
not sm all and m edium -sized entities, or small and m edium -sized entities if  they are on the register o f  
qualified investors m aintained by the FSA  under s87R. A sm all-m edium  sized enterprise is defined as 
the one which meets at least two o f  the follow ing criteria: average num ber o f  em ployees less than 250, 
balance sheet total not m ore than €43 million and net turnover no m ore than €50 m illion (Directive 
2003/71/EC).
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Few secondary offers are subject to accelerated book-build. The investors negotiate 
their bid with the underwriter and no pre-emptive rights exist. No prospectus is 
submitted to be approved by the UK listing authority and the commitments o f 
placées are based on the information contained in the offer announcement (see 
Balachandran et ah, 2009, p. 2). Similar to the private placements, the identity of 
investors is subject to changes.
The US literature provides evidence, with reference to transactions o f blocks o f listed 
shares, arguing that this offer type involves very different incentives from the new 
share issues. US evidence document premium with secondary offers (Barclay and 
Holdemess, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007) and argues that the new investors 
significantly improve firm value after the sale (Bethel et al., 1998; Barclay and 
Floldemess, 1991). Nevertheless, evidence on UK secondary offers do not exist at all 
(to the degree I am aware of).
2.3. Review of the main existing evidence
The vast majority o f articles investigating SEO focus on themes such as the choice of 
flotation methods between the SEO types, the demise o f right issues and their 
replacement by open offers (UK) or bought deals (US), underwriting and other 
flotation costs, the discounted offer price, market reactions and long-run abnormal 
performance around the announcement. The implications on corporate capital 
structure, corporate governance, earnings management and incentives about SEO 
choices and performance are also investigated.
For the UK, the area o f interest is mainly the right and open offers, whilst articles 
examining the US SEO additionally investigate the implications around non pre­
emptive equity offerings such as pure private placements and secondary offerings. 
This section briefly reviews the main existing evidence.
2.3.1. Choice of issue method
Pioneers o f the equity offering area, Myers and M ajluf (1984) argue that a firm will 
issue new equity to fund potential growth opportunities (projects with positive NPV).
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According to Myers and M ajluf (1984), if  the firm has no financial slack (and cannot 
cover the investment with it), it will fund the project with debt. Debt has lower costs 
in comparison with equity (e.g. it provides tax deductibility, monitor effects, no 
dilution and value mitigation) and it is preferable. However, if  the firm is unable to 
raise debt (e.g. it is already to leveraged), it will issue equity only if  the net proceeds 
collected by selling new shares are more than the benefits from the project. That is, 
the value allocated to new investors with the new shares is less than the value o f the 
project. Thus, the equity issue conveys managements’ belief that issuing to finance 
an investment opportunity will mitigate overvaluation to new shareholders. If the 
value transferred to new investors is higher than the project benefits, the firm will 
choose to forego the investment opportunity. On that basis, the market reactions at 
the announcement o f equity issue are negative.
The evidence complies with the Myers and M ajluf (1984) adverse selection problem, 
as negative reactions are reported for SEO issue (see section 2.3.4). Attempting to 
explain the choices among the equity issue types, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) identify 
a pecking order for US firms which is based on the cost o f each equity offer method. 
They argue that if  the expected take-up by existing shareholders is high, no wealth 
transfer is expected. On that basis, the firm will choose the cheapest option, i.e. non­
underwritten RI (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Li and Masulis, 2006). If the take-up 
percentage falls, the firm will go for an underwritten RI (the underwriter will certify 
the firm value). Lower taken-up percentages will lead the firm to choose a firm- 
commitment offer. Although the market reactions are negative, the worse reaction is 
documented when bought deals are announced. The least negative reactions are 
reported with non-underwritten offers. This suggests less overvaluation.
Norwegian SEO follow similar pecking order in terms o f adverse selection problems 
(Boehren et ah, 1997). Mardsen (2000) also reports more favourable reactions for 
non-underwritten offers in New Zealand. Contrary, in Sweden reactions are not 
statistically significant regardless of the offer being underwritten or not (Cronqvist 
and Nilson, 2005) and, as a result, the preference on the SEO choice is less clear. In 
France, SEO document greater adverse selection effects for RI than public offers 
(Gajewski and Ginglinger, 2002). This suggests stronger underwriter certification in
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public offers and contradicts the pecking order model. In Australia, underwritten 
issues are also associated with more favourable market reactions than non­
underwritten (Balachandran et ah, 2008). Thus, the Eckbo and Masulis order is not 
internationally applicable.
This pecking order does not apply in the UK either (Korteweg or Renneboog, 2002). 
It appears that when the issue is not underwritten, it is when the corporate is in 
financial distress and not when the expected take-up level is high (Armitage, 2002). 
Thus, the underwriter is less willing to secure the issue due to the high risk o f unsold 
stock which is a bad signal to the UK market (Armitage, 2002; 2007; Korteweg and 
Renneboog, 2002; Slovin et ah, 2000).
While these adverse selection costs refer to RI and public offers (or OO), Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) expand the Myers and M ajluf (1984) model to include private placing 
as an equity option, using US data. They report that the underinvestment problem of 
undervalued firms is mitigated by choosing PP over public offer or not issue. Rather 
than forego the investment opportunities when the take-up is low, firms issue to few 
private investors. The rationale is that private investors certify the stock value by 
investigating privately the firm prior the placing. In this way, existing shareholders 
costly convey their private information to the market but retain larger fractions o f the 
firm without equity dilution (or with only small dilution). As a result, PP signals 
higher firm quality or undervaluation causing positive market reactions.
At the same time, it is argued that PP firms are o f higher asymmetric information 
(Wu, 2004; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; and Folta and Janney, 2003). Likewise, 
Cronqvist and Nilson (2005) use Swedish SEO and argue that firms with higher 
asymmetric information will choose PP over RI. Higher information asymmetry for 
placings over RI is also documented in the UK (Barnes and Walker, 2006).
Overall, the issue choices are mainly based on the level o f asymmetric information of 
the firm, the costs of raising capital under each method, whether the firm is under- or 
overvalued and the corresponding signals sent to the market. All studies control for 
institutional settings, issuer and issue characteristics (e.g. distress, value, ownership 
control and information asymmetry levels). Additionally, the financial situation of
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the company and its need to raise funds could explain the SEO choice. A quick fund 
rising would be ideal for a firm with liquidity problems. It is most likely that the firm 
will choose OO over RI, due to the less time required. It could also go via pure 
placing as the time needed is less (assuming relatively small offer up to 10% o f the 
issued capital and in advance disapplication of the pre-emptive rights). Hence, the 
choice on the issue type is subject to several factors, rather than a simple, 
straightforward decision.
2.3.2. Demise of rights
The pecking order o f Eckbo and Masulis (1992) on the choice o f the flotation 
methods according to the cheapest option, suggests that non-underwritten RI should 
be the first choice o f a firm and, underwritten RI to be the second. However, RI are 
generally not preferred in the US (Hansen, 1988; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Over 
the periods 1963-1981, RI were less than 5% of the US issues (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992, p.294). Even in the UK that pre-emptive rights are still automatically imposed, 
RI are now very few (Armitage, 2007) and have been replaced by OO. Thus, the 
Eckbo and Masulis order cannot explain the disappearance (or reduction) o f RI. This 
"right offer paradox’ is considered vague by the academic world and attracts a great 
deal o f interest.
Evidence suggests that the demise o f rights is attributed to high asymmetric 
information, as the flotation method is a signalling mechanism. Non-underwritten RI 
are chosen by firms with lower quality not willing to pay the underwriting cost 
(Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986 for US; Armitage, 2002; Korteweg and Renneboog, 
2002 for UK; Balachandran et al., 2008 for Australia). Firms in financial distress are 
more likely to go for non-underwritten issue, due to the high underwritten risks/costs. 
On that basis, very few US industrial firms still issue non-underwritten rights. They 
are firms in financial distress and for them the cost o f adverse selection of 
underwriter certification lack is small (Ursel, 2006). Thus, although underwritten 
offers entail higher direct costs, the extra expenses could actually be seen as 
opportunity cost to ensure the success o f the issue. This interpretation is consistent
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with the more favourable market reactions for underwritten offers (Armitage, 2002; 
Balachandran et ah, 2008).
The replacement o f RI from OO in the UK is probably attributed to similar signalling 
mechanisms. The market reacts negatively to RI announcement but positive to OO 
(Slovin et ah, 2000; Armitage, 2002; Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002). Firms with 
higher growth also choose OO (Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002). Additionally, the 
abnormal performance o f RI firms becomes significantly negative few years later 
(Ngatuni et ah, 2007). However, results are less clear for OO. Ngatuni et ah (2007) 
document positive performance for OO while Iqbal et ah (2009) negative. 
Regardless, better performing firms choose OO rather than RI (Ngatuni et ah, 2007). 
This might be in line with the view that RI signal lower firm quality and thus, it is 
less preferable.4
Additionally, the avoidance o f RI is likely to be associated with higher indirect costs 
beyond the signalling effects o f the firm being in bad financial situation (Smith, 
1997; Hansen, 1988; Armitage, 2007). Hensen (1988) argue that negative reactions 
to non-underwritten RI are due to high transaction costs incurred when attempting to 
find investors for the new shares. Contrary, in a firm commitment offer the 
underwriter is able to find new investors without such large deviations from the 
market price (in smaller discount).
Along similar lines, studies such as Loderer et ah (1991) and Corwin (2003) attribute 
the negative market reactions to the SEO being illiquid and with downward sloping 
demand curve. While the fact that SEO stocks are generally illiquid cannot explain 
the replacement of rights from other SEO types, Kothare (1997) documents higher 
stock liquidity following BD in comparison to RI. This implies that although both are 
illiquid, BD stocks become less illiquid (smaller bid-ask spread) after the offer. This 
could explain the preference to BD. Consistently, UK RI might appear less costly in 
comparison with OO and placings (becausd o f the largest discount offered; 
Armitage, 2002). However, they are in fact o f lower cost due to uncertainty about the 
issuer value and the stock inelastic demand (Armitage, 2007). Costs o f selling the
4 Burton and Power (2003) aim to identify system atic characteristics o f  UK RI and OO by exam ining 
the firm size, growth, liquidity and perform ance. N onetheless the predictability  o f  issue m ethod is 
limited.
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rights and shares to the market are larger than initially seem, while placings are 
cheaper and more effective.
Finally, RI may cause capital tax gains to the seller (Smith, 1977) while OO do not. 
Concerns regarding the choice between RI and OO are also expressed by the UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, 1999).5 RI might be subject to capital 
tax gains, while they might be more time consuming due to the extension o f the offer 
period by two-three weeks if  an EGM is needed to authorise the PALs (the rights) 
before being tradable. For the above reasons, the RI are not particularly famous.
2.3.3. Discounting
SEO are usually offered at discount to the prevailing market prive prior the offer. 
Evidence on SEO discount is reported regardless the issue being underwritten or not, 
and regardless the SEO type being RI, OO, BD or PP. Discount is documented in 
various markets such as in the US (Hansen, 1988; Loderer et al, 1991; Wruck, 1989; 
Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; 2007; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic 
and Hansen, 2003; 2007; Gao and Ritter, 2008), UK (Armitage, 2000; 2002; 2007; 
Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002, Slovin et ah, 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; 
Balachandran et ah, 2009), Greece (Tsangarakis, 1996), Netherlands (Kabir and 
Roosenboom, 2003; De Jong and Veld, 2001) and Japan (Kang and Stulz, 1996). 
Contrary, Tan et ah (2002) report premiums for Singapore PP. Discounting could in 
fact be seen as the most important indirect flotation cost (Eckbo et ah, 2007).
Details on the discount determinants can be found in Chapter 4.6 However, the most 
dominant explanations are in line with the view that it is necessary to compensate 
investors for costs or risks they undertake. The discount is needed to ‘bribe’ investors 
in order to invest into a relatively overvalued stock consistent with the Myers and 
Majluf model (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Given the asymmetric information 
between the firm and the market, the offering is also associated with a certain level 
o f risk that investors are exposed to. Investors will incur investigation expenses and
M onopolies and M ergers Com m ission is a form er UK body w hich was responsible for investigating 
non-com petitivepractices. In 1999, it was replaced by the Com petition Com m ission.
(’ Eckbo et al. (2007, Table 8) describes the variables used to explain the discount by various papers 
exam ining US SEO.
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undertake uncertainty for which the require discount, (see Korteweg and Renneboog, 
2002; Armitage 2002). Alternatively, the discount is necessary to compensate 
investors for the illiquidity costs and risks they undertake, as SEO are mainly illiquid 
stocks (Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Armitage, 2007; Loderer et al., 
1991; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988).
Specifically for the PP, the stock involves greater levels o f information asymmetries 
(e.g. Wu, 2004). US findings suggest the discount reflects costs incurred by the 
private investors to acquire the necessary information and certify the stock (Hertzel 
and Smith, 1993). Contrary, agency theories attribute the discount to costs incurred 
to monitor the management (Wruck, 1989) or even to entrench the incumbents 
(Barclay et ah, 2007; Wu, 2004). Such arguments for PP have not been tested for the 
UK market.
Finally, recall that the offered price in the US is set by the underwriter after the book- 
building, while in the UK it is set the evening prior the announcement and remains 
fixed until the issue day. This flexibility in the US motivates studies to examine 
incentives that might take place during the offer period that affect the underwriter 
decision to set the discount, such as short-selling activities (Kim and Shin, 2004; 
Sarrieddine and Wilhem, 1996; Gerard and Nanda, 1993). However, such tests are 
not applicable in the UK market as the offered price is set ex-ante the announcement 
and cannot alter.
2.3.4. Announcement market reactions
As mentioned, SEO are associated with negative market reactions to the 
announcement. Distinguishing by offer type, such findings are consistent with US RI 
(Hansen, 1988; Ekcbo and Masulis, 1992; Singh, 1997) and US BD (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986; Smith, 1977; Masulis and Korwar, 1986). These reactions are 
attributed to adverse selection problems. The SEO signals that the issue proceeds 
exceed the intrinsic value of the funded ‘project’ in the spirit o f Myers and M ajluf 
(1984). Alternatively, the reactions are attributed to inelastic demand which causes 
downward pressure on market prices (1972; Loderer et al., 1991; Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003). In fact, Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) argue that the
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negative change in market price between the announcement and issue day should 
reflect the placing discount.
Likewise, evidence referring to other markets documents mainly negative market 
reactions on SEO, while some positive response is also documented. Specifically, 
Bohren et al. (1997) report negative announcement reactions for underwritten RI in 
Norway. Kabir and Roosenboom (2003) and De Jong and Veld (2001) report 
negative reactions for Dutch RI, Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) for France, Loderer 
and Zimmerman (1988) for Switzerland, Eckbo and Verma (1992) for Canada, 
MacCulloch and Emanuel (1994) and Mearsden (2000) for New Zealand. Contrary, 
evidence for Japan (Kang et al., 1999; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Kang and Stulz, 
1996), Greece (Tsangarakis, 1996), Finland (Hietala and Loyttyniemi, 1991) and 
Singapore (Tan et al., 2002) suggests positive reactions. Swedish RI cause positive 
reactions for 1986-1997 (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005) but negative for 1980-1994 
(Molin, 1996).7
The different market reactions amongst the countries are due to the different settings, 
different market size and liquidity, different tax and regulatory systems (Korteweg 
and Renneboog, 2002). With regards to the UK market, Marsh (1979), Burton et al. 
(1999), Korteweg and Renneboog (2002) and Armitage (2002) report negative 
market reactions to RI, with the non-underwritten rights to experience the most 
severe price effect (Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002). Interestingly, less adverse 
information signals associated with RI are reported prior to 1986 that firms 
mandatory issued RI (distinction between high and low quality UK firms was not 
possible). After the deregulation period, the firms were able to differentiate 
themselves. By choosing placings they signal quality and potential increase of 
external monitoring as reactions are positive (Slovin et al., 2000).
Barnes and Walker (2006) extend the Slovin et al. (2000) study and use a sample 
starting from mid-1990s. They hence capture the deregulation o f 1996 Companies 
Act (which allows firms not to publish prospectus for placings below the 5% of the
Korteweg and Renneboog (2002, Table 1) also docum ent m arket reactions o f  international SEO 
types: negative for the UK. US, N ew  Zeeland, Netherlands, Sweden, and positive for Korea, Greece, 
Finland Norway, Switzerland and Japan.
-40-
Chapter 2: Understanding the UK market, background on equity offerings and motivations
share capital). Still, negative market reactions for RI and positive for placings are 
reported, suggesting RI adverse selection and placing quality information.
The UK market reacts more favourable to placings. Korteweg and Renneboog (2002) 
report positive but statistically insignificant reactions, while Slovin et al. (2000) 
document significantly positive to placings. Balachardan et al. (2009) also report 
positive reactions for placings with OO and for accelerated book-builded placings. 
Similarly, OO document significantly positive reactions (Korteweg and Renneboog, 
2002; Armitage, 2002) which is consistent again with the view that the market 
interprets OO firms as having higher quality (in comparison with RI).
Furthermore, when a US PP is announced, the market reacts positively, as value 
improvements are expected (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Barclay et al., 
2007; Folta and Janney, 2003). Silber (1991) and Maynes and Pandes (2008) report
o
similar findings for US and Canadian restricted PP. Likewise, positive reactions are 
also found for Japanese PP (Kang and Stulz, 1996; Kato and Schallheim, 1993), for 
Hong-Kong (Wu et al., 2005). Thereby, the implications o f the placings in the UK 
are closer to the US PP rather than BD (contrary to Slovin et al. (2000) definition of 
UK placings being similar to BD). Slovin et al. (2000) argue that the positive 
reactions of UK placings are due to the higher underwriting risks in the UK, which 
certify offer. This contradicts the US BD which report negative reactions. However, 
the difference in the reactions is not about underwriting certification but about firm 
quality similar to the US PP. Lower quality firms are not willing to pay the 
underwriter fee (Armitage, 2002). The fee is mainly to guarantee the offer and reduce 
the risk of unsold stock.
Finally, Wu and Wang (2005) argue that the market reactions could vary according 
to agency problems, which affect the signals sent to the market. They refer to over- 
and under-investment problems associated with the SEO, due to private benefits.
8 R
estricted placem ents cannot be sold in the m arket w ithin two years from  the event (see W u, 2004, 
p.96). The m ethods and num ber o f  sales are also restricted (Securities Act Rule 144). R egulations D 
and S frame the restricted private placem ents sold in the US and outside the US, respectively. 
Additionally, restricted placings under regulation D are exem pt from SEC -m andated disclosure 
requirem ents (i.e. prospectuses issue and m andatory inform ation disclosure).
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These allow for both, positive and negative market reactions (based on how the 
market interprets the offer).
2.3.5. Long-horizon abnormal performance
In the long-run, US SEO underperform their benchmarks (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 
1997; Lee, 1997; Teoh et ah, 1998; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; McLeughlin et 
ah, 1996; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Similar findings are reported for Japanese 
SEO (Cai and Loughran, 1998; Cai et ah, 1999), Japanese RI (Cai, 1998), Dutch RI 
(Kabir and Roosenboom, 2003) and Korean SEO (Yoon and Miller, 2002). In the 
UK, evidence is similar in the sense that the abnormal performance following RI 
becomes significantly negative (Ngatuni et ah, 2007; Levis, 1995; Andrikopoulos, 
2009). Little evidence o f long-run underperformance of OO is also reported (Iqbal et 
ah, 2009; Ngatuni et ah, 2007).
The common explanation for the negative market reactions at the announcement (of 
RI and US BD) but deeper underperformance few years later is that investors 
underreact when the SEO is announced (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). The market 
realises the true firm value with a delay. However, with regards to the Japanese 
market, AR do not follow the underreaction hypothesis. The reactions are positive at 
the announcement (Kang et ah, 1999; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Kang and Stulz, 
1996). Similar findings are also implied for UK OO. They, thus, suggest overreaction 
consistent with the evidence for US private placements (Hertzel et ah, 2002). In fact, 
US and Japanese PP experience negative abnormal performance few years after the 
event (see Hertzel et ah, 2002; Sheehan and Swisher, 1998; Barclay et ah, 2007 for 
US and Kang et ah, 1999 for Japan).
Hereby, (private) placings are associated with different implications in comparison 
with public offers. Krishnamuthy et ah (2005) suggests that the underperformance o f 
US PP is related to firm bad financial situation and investor activity. Controlling for 
these, the long-horizon underperformance is eliminated. Wruck and Wu (2009) argue 
that when investors are related to the PP finn and have strong ties, the highest value 
is added. The relationships are 'multi-dimensional’ and could constitute hierarchy for 
business choices to add value. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2004) also document that
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30.5% of the Swedish PP establish a product relationship. Such findings are sparse 
for UK (private) placings.
2.3.6. Secondary placements
Finally, the US literature investigates the post-performance surrounding secondary 
placements (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Bethel et ah, 1998, Allen and Philips, 
2000). They report over-performance when active, affiliated and/or corporate 
investor participates in the placing. In particular, Bethel et al. (1998) classify 
investors based on their intentions to activists, financial and strategic investors. 
Activist group appears to prefer more diversified stocks which underperform, in 
order to increase performance by cutting down operations (effective restructuring).
Placings of existing shares by active investors could also constitute corporate control 
transactions (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Philips, 2000). Inconsistent 
with the monitoring theory (Wruck, 1989), ownership concentration maintains 
constant as the share blocks go from the block seller to the block buyer, keeping 
ownership levels constant (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991). Corporate investors do 
not target underinvestment or illiquid companies that need money to survive or 
expand (Allen and Phillips, 2000). Rather, corporate ownership creates synergies. 
The identity and (managerial) skills o f the investors could enhance firm value 
(Barclay and Holdemess, 1991) and/or create product market relationships such as 
alliances and joint ventures (Allen and Phillips, 2000). This provides benefits of 
monitoring management and mitigating investment opportunities information.
Overall, investor identity is positively related to abnormal top management turnovers 
and long-term performance (see Bethel et al., 1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; 
Allen and Philips, 2000; Wruck and Wu, 2009 for the US market). However, there is 
no similar evidence with regards to the UK market. As a conclusion, the lack o f such 
UK evidence inter alia pinpoints the motivation to investigate UK secondary 
offerings. The fact that evidence on non pre-emptive equity offerings in the UK 
sparse (primary and secondary placings), whilst different settings and implications 
characterize the UK market, provide a motivation to investigate these two types of 
equity offerings in the UK.
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2.4. Sum m ary and conclusions
The objective of this chapter is to describe the UK equity offerings area. It provides a 
description o f the market, in terms of institutional settings and procedures. It also 
reviews the existing evidence and identifies gaps in the literature. Although it 
compares two developed, 'common law countries’, i.e. UK and US (La Porta et al.,
1998), international findings are also reported. Table 2.1 gathers the most prominent 
information and emphasises on how this study contributes to the extant literature, 
given the different settings o f the UK market and the lack o f (adequate) evidence on 
UK non pre-emptive offerings.
More specifically, equity offerings in the UK usually have a ‘first refusal right’. New 
equity is automatically offered first to existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis and 
then to outside investors. Disapplication o f the pre-emptive rights is allowed under 
certain circumstances. Nowadays, the common issuing method is an open offer 
accompanied by a placing (Barnes and Walker, 2006). Contrary, in the US, the so 
called firm commitment offers, or bought deals dominate while pre-emptive rights 
are rarely used. When a (private) placing takes place, the two countries are subject to 
different disclosure requirements, with the UK being less informative.
A few further important issues worth attention. First, the UK offered price is set at 
the announcement and remains fixed until the issue day. This contradicts the US 
offers, as the price is set at the end o f the offered period, after the underwriter 
observes the market reactions and stock valuations. Thus, the price setup in US 
provides flexibility and lower risks. Second, the US models regarding the issue 
method preferences, adverse selection problems and market reactions are not 
applicable into the UK (Slovin et al., 2000; Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002). Third, 
private placements investors participating into UK placements are mainly existing 
shareholders (Armitage, 2010), contrary to the US findings that refer to new 
investors (Bethel et al., 1998; Wruck and Wu, 2009). Hence, different investor 
incentives are plausible. Finally, little evidence exists regarding UK placings, while 
evidence on transactions with already listed shares do not seem to exist at all.
For these reasons, the UK provides a suitable and interesting setting to investigate 
the implications o f these two non pre-emptive samples, such as their discount,
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market reactions and long-run performance. These issues facilitate in contributing to 
the extant literature.
Table 2.1: Differences between UK and US settings & motivations










A utom atic im pose unless:
- w aived in advance
- EGM  resolutions for 
disapplication
No
2. Issue types -RI, OO, placings 
(RI, OO are pre-em ptive 
offers)
BD, PP - US models for SEO 
choice & market 
reactions are not 
applicable in UK
3. Offer price - Price setup before the 
announcem ent
- Price rem ains fixed 
during the offer period
- No flexibility
- Road shows during the 
offer period
- Price setup im m ediately 
after the offer period
- F lexibility to revalue the 
stock
- M anipulation during the 
offer period can affect 
the discount
- Higher underwriter 
risks in the UK
- Manipulative short- 
selling during the 
offer period cannot 
affect the discount 
in the UK
- Different incentives 
in US & UK
4. Investor 
identity
- M ainly existing 
shareholders
- N ew  investors
- Corporate, affiliated, 
active
- Different incentives 
in US & UK
5. Non pre­
em ptive equity 
offers
- L ittle evidence on 
placings
- Placings offered at 
discount
- Positive m arket 
reactions for placings
- No evidence on 
secondary offers
- PP offered at discount
- Positive m arket 
reactions for PP
- N egative long-run AR
- Positive post-event 
perform ance for 
secondary placings
- Gaps in the 
literature regarding 
non pre-emptive 





- Publish prospectus if  
placing >10%  o f  sh.cap
- Com m on practice to 
publish prospectus if  the 
offer is >  5% o f  sh.cap
- No requirem ent for 
registration o f  secondary 
offers
- N ew s reports
- File exhibits for the SEC 
registered PP (com m on 
evidence refers to 
registered PP)
- No disclosure 
requirem ents for 
unregistered PP
- Relative opacity in 
the UK 
Different implications 
in US & UK
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Chapter 3 : Long-horizon Abnormal Performance. Review o f  
the Research Design Debate
3.1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the first part the third research objective (Obj.3). It reviews 
the debate on long-run abnormal performance approach and, explains the underlying 
problems associated with each method. It also attempts to provide suggestions on 
how to choose among the alternative methods and, how the extant literature can be 
expanded.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the motivation o f the 
chapter and its contributions. Section 3.3 describes the theoretical framework behind 
the stock long-run event-study methodology and the several applicable models o f 
expected performance. It illustrates the rationale o f the so called ‘bad model 
problem’ and how this might affect the reliability o f the estimated abnormal returns 
(AR). Section 3.4 analyses the existing debate regarding the choice o f an appropriate 
method. Section 3.5 explains the econometric problems o f AR  and how the literature 
attempts to overcome the faults. Section 3.6 provides a brief guidance on the 
selection o f an appropriate approach for valid inferences. Section 3.7 relates stock 
and operating abnormal performance methods and, the last section 3 .8  concludes.
3.2. M otivation and m ain contributions o f  the chapter
Event studies are the main tool used to evaluate major managerial decisions such as 
earnings announcements, dividend payments, SEO, initial public offerings (IPO), 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), corporate governance information and/or other 
corporate event. The basic intuition of event studies is the comparison o f the event 
firm return Revent with the return o f a corresponding benchmark Rhenck over the same 
period of time. The rationale is that benchmark returns reflect the expected returns of
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the even firm Rbench = E{Revent) ■ Assuming market efficiency, the null hypothesis is 
zero abnormal returns, AR (AR = Revent -  Rbench = 0). That is due to the assumption that 
any delay in the response o f new information is alive only for few days (expected 
returns are close to zero; Fama, 1998).
Various studies focus on event-studies since their origin (Fisher et ah, 1969). As an 
example, few review studies focus on the ‘traditional’ few-day AR around a specific 
event (e.g. Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; Armitage, 1995; Strong, 1992; 
Smith, 1986). However, contrary to few-day AR  that are reliable in the sense that 
they are well specified and not to particularly sensitive to the event-study method 
applied (Fama, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Armitage, 1995; Kothari and Warner, 
2007), long-run AR are not (details are provided later). For this reason the current 
study emphasises on long-run abnormal performance. Kothari and Warner (2007) 
focus on the econometrics of event studies and stress the increasing use o f event- 
studies over time among the top five journals in finance (from 1974-2000). They 
refer to MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997) as the ‘the origins and breadth’ 
o f event studies (Kothari and Warner, 2007, p.7), implying how important event- 
studies have become. Both of these latter studies survey articles that use event- 
studies and refer to problems that researchers need to consider.
Given the increasing use o f event studies up to date as well as the several problems 
they face (Fama, 1998), clear understanding of the pertinent issues is essential. This 
becomes apparent mainly during the post-Fama (1998) period, who was the first to 
summarize the bad-model problems and to suggest a calendar-time approach as an 
event-study tool. Fama (1998, p.299) argues that no model could tell a ‘perfect 
story'. The models misspecify the expected performance mainly o f small stocks with 
low book-to-market ratio whilst they are subject to several econometric problems and 
assumptions. After that, two competing long-run AR approaches dominate, namely 
the calendar-time AR and buy-and-hold AR.9
l) C alendar-tim e AR requires the application o f  an accepted capital asset-pricing model and a Jensen-
alpha approach (as applied by Jaffe, 1974 and M andelker, 1974). Buy-and-hold AR  could also use an
asset-pricing model, but it is com m on to use m im icking factor portfolios and/or single non-event
control firms based on com m on risk factors. They are thus very m uch correlated with the success o f
the asset-pricing literature.
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Binder (1998) focuses in the extensions o f the original event-study methodology. 
However, it does not include any discussions about the buy-and-hold or calendar­
time AR approaches, the bad-model problem or the recent developments in the extant 
literature. Methodological long-horizon event-study articles such as Kothari and 
Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al., (1999), Brav (2000), Jegadeesh 
and Karceski (2009) attempt to improve the extant literature using simulated or real- 
event datasets. Indeed, they suggest solutions such as calendar-time portfolios (Fama, 
1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), careful portfolio construction and non-parametric 
bootstrap approaches for statistical inference (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Lyon et all.,
1999). Nonetheless, concerns about their power exists (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 
2007). Doubts on whether the reported abnormal performance is attributed to the 
event or to model misspecifications have also been raised (e.g. Brav and Gompers, 
1997; Fama, 1998; Eckbo et al., 2000). Hence, extreme caution is needed.
This chapter contributes to the area in several ways. It builds upon the existing 
evidence and contributes mainly by providing guidance on the choices/alternatives o f 
how to measure long-horizon AR. To do so, it considers the testable hypothesis and 
dataset nature that a research project might have. It gathers the most significant 
issues discussed by the relevant literature and presents the rationale o f the long-run 
event-study research design debate. After synthesizing the implications derived from 
contributions of prior studies, it provides suggestions for further research that could 
expand the extant literature.
In sequence, the chapter considers the frequent application o f both, stock and 
operating abnormal performance by corporate finance articles (e.g. Hertzel et al., 
2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Teoh et al., 1998b) as well as by market based 
accounting literature (see the review o f Kothari (2001) that refers to applications of 
event-studies in accounting literature). On that basis, the current study explains the 
pertinent issues on operating performance. While it is based on fundamental ratio 
analysis, it is also subject to the bad-model problem (Brown and Warner, 1986; 
Barber and Lyon, 1996). Perhaps, its biggest flaw is the dependence o f accounting 
items to historic cost and managerial discretion. In short, this chapter has potential
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interest for research areas closed to corporate and behaviour finance, market based 
accounting, as well as anomalies, asset pricing and market efficiency.
3.3. T heoretical fram ew ork on the m odel o f  norm al or expected  
perform ance
3.3.1. Asset pricing models and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
A common way to assess stock abnormal performance is to apply a capital asset- 
pricing model, as derives by the financial theory. This concept implies the use o f the 
market factor as benchmark and, examines whether significant errors exist between 
the expected (estimated) firm returns and realized ones, over specific periods o f time. 
It is based upon the assumption that the model can actually estimate the expected 
firm returns. In fact, all asset-pricing models are subject to a joint-hypothesis test 
(Fama, 1973; 1998), that the market is efficient (Fama, 1970; 1991) and that the 
model is able to measure the variation o f expected returns.
A substantial amount o f papers investigates the market efficiency and identifies AR 
using as benchmark several variations of the known traditional market model:
Rjj = Uj +bjRu , Eq. 3:1
R j , is the return on a security j  on time t, RM t is the return on the market factor, a - 
and bj are the regression coefficients. Returns could be discrete 
{ ^  = Price, + D,vidend-?nce, , j Qr logarithmic { ^  = lo/ ?rice- +D™dend\ }_ Strong ( j 992)
Pr ice.7-1 Pr ice,7-1
advocates that logarithmic returns should be preferable for theoretical and empirical 
reasons. "Theoretically, logarithmic returns are analytically more tractable when 
linking together sub-period returns to form returns over longer intervals. Empirically, 
they are more likely to be normally distributed and so confonn to the assumptions of 
standard statistical techniques' (ibid, p. 535).
To estimate any AR from the above relationship (Eq.3:l) one should first regress the 
returns of the security j  (in a time-series manner) over the market return for a certain 
period of time (e.g. -250 days to -30 prior the event). After replacing the estimated
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values o f a r b / in Eq.3:l, the outcome is the expected (estimated) return E{RjJ ) .
The difference between the estimated and the actual returns is the abnormal: 
ARJ r = R J I - E ( R j , )  = R j , - ( d j +bJRml). Cumulating the daily or monthly AR
provides the abnormal performance of the total period tested:
CAR.t = £ ARU = ± [R U ~{d] +bJRmf ]  Eq. 3:2
/=1 /=1
Logarithmic returns are also common, so that continues compounding is taken into
account. Few versions o f the market model are applicable, depending on the
hypothesis tested. The simplified so called Index model (Lakonishok and Vermaelen,
1990), implicitly assumes that ay= 0 and f  =1. Therefore, the expected return on a
stock j  equals the return on the market RMl over a specific period o f time
(E(RJl) = RMl). In addition, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM  (Sharpe, 1964;
Merton, 1973) which derives from a whole set o f theoretical assumptions (that can be 
found even in any corporate finance text-book) is a widely used market model:
R j ^ R f j + b ^ - R f f )  Eq. 3:3
R f stands for the risk free rate. The EiR,) is therefore subject to changes depending
on the chosen benchmark. The above models are widely applied and, provide valid 
estimations in short-horizon event studies. Applying the models for few-day event 
windows results are qualitatively the same as applying a more complicated model 
(Armitage, 1995; Ikenberry et al., 1995). Nevertheless, it seems that none is fully 
acceptable when it is empirically applied for long periods. The asset-pricing 
literature suggests that they are not completely able to describe the cross-section 
variation of the expected returns for long periods (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; 1995; 
Lakonishok et al., 1994). The above models ignore risk factors such as size and 
book-to-market (BTM), which are indicated to be arbitrary variables related to risk 
factors beyond the market. Both variables control for contrarian strategies. 10
’ Contrarian strategies involve the investm ent intovalue stocks (stocks w ith low  m arket value relative 
to other fundamental values) that outperform  grow th ones in the long-run (grow th (or glam our stocks) 
are those that have high m arket value relative to fundam ental ones). See m ore in section 3.3.2).
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The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (hereafter FF-3factor) confirms that 
portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to size and BTM add substantially 
to the variation in stock returns explained by a simple market portfolio. It represents 
a more precise model to look for anomalies in expected returns:
R j , - Rf ,t = cij + bj (RM, -  Rf t ) + sjSMBl +hj.HM f+e,, Eq. 3:4
SMB is the premium on the size portfolio (market capitalization) which distinguishes 
the securities o f the market into small and big capitalization securities. HML is the 
premium on the growth portfolio which distinguishes the securities in the market into 
high and low growth (BTM) securities. Based on the original FF-3factor model, 
firms are sorted according to their market value at the end o f each June and allocated 
into small and big stocks based on their median value. The stocks are subsequently 
sorted into stocks with small, medium and high BTM value based on the bottom 
30%, middle 40% and top 30%, forming six portfolios. Once their returns are 
assessed, SML is calculated as the difference between the average return o f three 
small portfolios minus the average o f the three big ones. Similarly, HML is the 
difference between the average return o f the two high minus the two low BTM 
portfolio returns. Practical applications o f the FF-3factor model deviate by allowing 
the construction o f the SMB and HML to vary.
Specifically, several portfolio combinations are used by the literature. Among the 
most popular ways is to follow the Fama and French (1993; 1995; 1996) and 
estimate the 6 portfolios. However, it is also common to form 16 size and BTM 
portfolios (4 size quartiles x 4 BTM quartiles), 25 portfolios (5 size quintiles x 5 
BTM quintiles), 50 portfolios (10 x 5), 100 portfolios (10 x 10). Scholars also use 
several breakpoints, beyond the original FF-3factor, e.g. the size breakpoints could 
be based on the 10th or 70th percentile, whereas the BTM breakpoints could be one 
third o f the size portfolio, 40th and 60th portfolios, and so on. Sorting deviations are 
also valid (see for example the empirical review o f Michou et ah, 2007). Finally, the 
average return of the portfolios could be either equal or market value weighted. 
Apparently, the choices depend on the market of investigation and the requirement of 
a proper allocation o f the market firms. The model estimations might change 
according to the choices made.
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Beyond the SMB and HML, evidence suggests firms with higher performance 
perform worse during the long-run, while firms with low performance tend over­
perform during the long-run (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Therfore, not only 
contrarian strategies, but also momentum strategies should be taken into account 
when estimating expected and abnormal returns. The intercept a y. might be biased
due to momentum strategies (Fama and French, 1996). On that basis, Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model (hereafter Carhart-4factor) augments the FF-3factor model by 
adding a momentum factor PRXYR, which accounts for investor momentum
strategies. PR\YRt is defined as the average return o f firms with the highest 30% 11- 
month returns (lagged 1-month), minus the average return of firms with the lowest 
30% 11-month return (lagged 1-month). It is advocated to improve the average 
pricing errors of the CAPM and FF-3factor models:
Ru - R fJ = aj +bj(RM, - R f  t ) + sJSMBl +hJHML, + p JPRXYRl + e ., Eq. 3:5
Carhart-4factor documents low cross-correlation which implies that multicollinearity 
does not substantially affect the estimated four-factor model. Table 3.1 summarises 
the studies that use the mentioned models as event-study tools.
3.3.2. Portfolio and/or single-firm matching
In an attempt to measure long-term abnormal performance, scholars use a model that 
is able to tell an adequate economic story and estimate accurate expected returns (as 
possible it can be). More recent studies also apply control portfolio  or single firm - 
matching approaches. They create size and BTM portfolios which are used as 
benchmarks and compute long-term abnormal performance. The event-retums are 
simply compared with the returns o f the control portfolio which is designed to have 
similar risk (size, BTM, beta estimations, performance and other), without the 
application of the asset-pricing model itself.
It is worthwhile that the use o f constructed portfolios or single-control approaches 
(rather than pricing-model application) overcome the join-hypothesis test. It does not 
directly examine the efficiency hypothesis, but whether known patterns are captured
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by both samples: since the two samples have similar size, growth, industry and/or 
return dimensions, their expected long-run returns should be common. Portfolios or 
single-matching approaches overcome the linearity assumption between the model 
estimates, and the independence assumption between the asset-pricing factors (see 
more in section 3.4). For this, asset-pricing models are more sensitive to the bad- 
model problem.
3.3.1. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
Equally popular approach of long-term abnormal performance is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) method. Alike cumulative returns, buy-and-hold approach 
has its basic intuition to the use of an appropriate benchmark for the event sample. 
The main difference o f BHAR, is that periodical compounding is taken into account 
for the whole period tested. The abnormal buy-and-hold return o f each event firm 
j ,  B H A R j, r , is the difference between its realized and expected buy-and-hold return:
BHA R j lT = Eq. 3:6
Where R jt is the return on the event security j  over the month t, and E ( R .,) is the
expected return which equals the return o f the corresponding benchmark, r  
represents the start o f the event window and T  the total period tested. It is supported 
that BHAR approach has the advantage of being more realistic than CAR as it takes 
periodical compounding into account (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). BHAR lay on the 
assumption that an investor buys the stock at the beginning o f the event window and 
holds the stock for the whole period tested. If he/she exits the investment earlier, 
his/hers realized returns will depend on the holding period.
The benchmark in estimating BHAR could again vary. A very common attitude is to 
construct mimicking factor portfolios based on similar pre-event characteristics and 
subsequently estimate their holding period returns (e.g. Ikenberry et al, 1995; Lyon et 
ah, 1999). Choosing a single non-event matching firm for each event return is also 
common (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1997). The application o f an asset-pricing model 
could result to BHAR, although it is less commonly used. Table 3.1 indicates 
examples of articles that use the BHAR approach along the benchmark they use.
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3.3.2. Ability of the model to explain E(R)
This section provides more information on the rationale about the debate in choosing 
appropriate model and/or risk factors. More specifically, all common asset pricing 
models have systematic problems in explaining the average (expected) returns, 
mainly for small securities with low BTM. The models predict strong growth for low 
BTM stocks (glamour or growth stocks) and poor growth for high BTM (value) 
stocks. However, the high growth o f glamour stocks deteriorates after the portfolio 
fonnation, while the low growth o f value stocks increases. As a result, returns 
reverse over the years (Fama and French, 1992; 1993; 1995). This bad-model 
problem is observable in all AR  methods that use size and BTM as risk factors.
Several early and more recent studies document reverse direction o f returns (and 
earnings) before and after the portfolio constructions, especially for the small and 
low BTM firms. This convergence is attributed by the literature mainly into two 
alternatives. Fama and French (1992) suggest that the ultimately higher performance 
of high BTM firms is due to the fact that value firms are riskier (the book-to-market 
anomaly). A firm with high BTM signals sustained low performance prior the 
portfolio constructions and vice versa (Fama and French, 1995). For that reason the 
BTM indicates positive relationship with the delivered average returns (value 
premium). Thus, investors over-estimate the low BTM stocks and under-estimate the 
high BTM.
A second alternative interpretation is that, investors are naive and do not understand 
the difference between small-big and high-low BTM stocks (market inefficiency). 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the market does not understand the similarity in 
retums/eamings between glamour and value stocks. They systematically ignore the 
fact that future growth rates are mean reverting and, assume glamour firms will 
continue grow faster than value firms. The reversal corrects systematic expectation 
errors and irrational pricing.
Similar arguments are implied by older studies as well. For instant, De Bondt and 
Thaler (1987) attribute the reversal to investor overreaction. At the event period, the 
market expects more than it should and overvalues the stock. Therefore, during the
-55-
Chapter 3: Long-horizon abnormal performance. Review o f the research design debate
long-run the true firm value is revealed and reverses. Ikenberry et al. (1995) do not 
report reversal but highly significant AR increase along the time for value companies. 
These reactions are attributed to the traditional signalling theory and information 
asymmetry factors. They argue that if  the market was efficient (Fama, 1970; 1991; 
Ross, 2005) it wouldn’t need so much time to react to the announcement and adjust 
for the new information. The behaviour finance interpretations allows for miss- 
pricings and miss-understandings. Other studies even challenge the ‘status’ o f BTM 
as a risk factor (Haugen, 1995; Brav et al., 2005).
O f course, an extensive number o f studies focus in asset pricing model improvements 
examining various investor strategies. A brief but comprehensive review in Fama 
(1998, p.285-291) discusses the results o f prior studies that seem to reject market 
efficiency due to over/under-reactions and reversals in AR. Likewise, an interesting 
paper by Malkiel (2003) provides a good description on the critics o f the efficient 
market hypothesis (which is jointly tested with a pricing model o f equilibrium). 
Flowever, the purpose o f this study is to explain the rationale o f the debate in event- 
studies, rather than the asset pricing literature itself. Thus, the description in the 
development of the asset pricing literature is limited to few key papers. 11
The concerns regarding the ability of the pricing models to predict correctly the 
expected returns on securities create concerns about the validity o f the long-run event 
studies. Brav and Gompers (1997) suggest that ‘event anomalies’ are actually 
manifestations of known pricing deficiencies o f the pricing model. The literature 
concerns that if  the market does not understand that the return growth tends to mean 
revert, stock prices at the event time would be too high by default. If the market
11 Overall, several studies report reversals by exam ining the over/under-reaction hypotheses, 
seasonality, m arket efficiency, anom alies. See for exam ple Daniel and Titm an (1997) that focus on the 
characteristics o f  the portfolio firms observing seasonalities in their returns. A iming to im prove prior 
model predictions they argue that firm characteristics (size and BTM ) are what actually explain the 
cross-section variation in expected returns rather than the returns o f  the corresponding factors. 
Contrary, Davis et al. (2000) suggest the value prem ium  and BTM  anom aly are not sam ple specific 
and thus, the FF-3 factor model seem s able to explain the anom aly better than that o f  Daniel and 
Titm an (1997). See also other pertinent studies exam ining reversals, anom alies and seasonalities such 
as Ball and Brown (1968); Black (1986); De Bond and Thaler (1985); Bernard and Thom as (1990); 
R itter (1988; 1991); Agrawal et al., (1992); Chopra et al. (1992); Jegadeesh and Titm an (1993); 
Cusatis et al. (1993); Ikenbery and Lakonishok (1993); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Dharan and 
Ikenberv (1995); Shleifer and V ishny (1997); A ntw eiler and Frank (2006) and others.
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realizes its mistake gradually, prices and returns will be corrected in a future time, 
justifying the reversal.
Further concern o f the reversal is when events such as IPO and SEO are under 
examination. IPO and SEO firms tend to belong to the small/high growth firm groups 
which are mainly the groups that indicate the most misspecifications. Note that IPO
and SEO display strong stock returns in the years prior to the issue which reverse
12afterwards. This suggests underperformance following the specific corporate event. 
If the model cannot capture the cross-section variation o f E(R) properly, a long- 
horizon event study would be misspecified. The estimated AR  would be miss-leading 
on drawing conclusions related to the event. Would the reported AR  attributed to the 
event or to model misspecifications?
3.3.3. Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR)
Therefore, all long-run event-study approaches are subject to the mentioned bad- 
model problem and are incomplete in terms o f capturing the expected returns. In 
addition, long-run AR  are subject to further problems such as new listing bias, 
rebalancing, survivorship, dependence, violation o f the normality assumption (see 
details in section 3.4). Hence, it is likely that ‘no method can minimize the bad- 
model problems for all classes o f events’ (Fama, 1998, p.299). For that reason, Fama
(1998) strongly advocates for a calendar-time portfolio approach with which the 
long-run AR  can be statistically more reliable. He suggests the use o f an asset-pricing 
model with a Jensen-alpha approach, similar to Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974). 
As size and BTM appear significant risk factors, he suggests a variation of the FF- 
3factor model in a calendar-time approach, as follows:
Rp., ~ Rf,t = aP +bP(RMj - Rf j )  + spSMB< +hpH M f +epJ Eq. 3:7
Based on the calendar time abnormal return (CTAR) approach, the unit of 
investigation is each calendar month, not each event as the event-time returns 
discussed earlier. An event portfolio p  is formed which is rebalanced every calendar
12 See studies such as R itter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Spiess and A ffleck-G raves (1995); 
M itchell and Stafford (2000); G om pers and L em er (2003).
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month to include the stocks that have been involved to the event in the previous years 
(e.g. in the previous 5years/60 months or other period based on the tested event 
window). R includes the monthly returns on the event-portfolio p  (equally or value
weighted). The monthly average return of the companies included in p  the specific 
month, represents the portfolio monthly return. Having estimated the average returns 
o f p  for the months included in the tested period, a time-series regression against the 
FF-3factor model is run.
The intercept a p o f the time-series regression represents the average AR  for the
period tested. After controlling for the size and BTM factors, a significant positive 
intercept indicates over-performance and vice versa. This suggests that the event- 
portfolio has performed better or worse than expected (the null hypothesis is zero 
intercept a p for all assets) . 13 This approach is widely used by the recent literature
(see Table 3.1). Similar to a Fama-MacBeth approach (Fama and MacBeth, 1973),14 
the Jensen-alpha could be applied with any model. It is argued that it overcomes 
econometric problems such as cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity 
(details are provided in the following sections).
It is important to make clear that monthly benchmark rebalancing is likely to occur 
under each o f the previous methods apart from the single match-firms approach. The 
firms constitute the market factor, index or constructed portfolio change periodically 
due to the fact that new firms are listed or existing firms disappear. This causes 
unavoidable benchmark rebalancing over the period tested.
Regardless the evidence related to the bad-model problem, researchers such as 
Kothari and Warner (1997) and Jegadeesh (2000) document that long-term AR are 
not sensitive to the benchmark used. Specifically, Jegadeesh (2000) argues that
Note that when the original FF-3factor model is applied as in Eq.3:4, the m onthly returns o f  each 
event-firm  are regressed over the model (rather than o f  p ). The original FF application results to a 
distribution o f  cross-sectional AR  while in CTAR the intercept represents the AR.
14 The Fam a-M cBeth approach regresses the m onthly security returns Ru  over the actual betas o f  the 
security j ,  as estim ated after applying an asset-pricing model, e.g. the CAPM . The beta (bp) o f  the 
stock is used as the independent variable in a second regression as follows: r - n +« h c u , and
j.t \,t u T.ju j,t  ' 1,1
a: , are the cross-sectional regression coefficients. Theoretically, a /i( is the coefficient o f  a zero-beta 
portfolio and should equal the risk-free rate, cc, is the expected perform ance o f  the m arket and, bJt the 
actual beta o f  the security j  on the month t. The logic o f  this two-stage regression approach to m easure 
the expected return o f  the security j  based on its risk over the market portfolio.
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studies suggesting miss-valuations because o f the benchmark are misleading. After 
using several benchmarks and controlling for several biases, he reports no sensitivity 
to the model selection. He examines the long-run performance o f firms issuing SEO 
but, he removes from the potential controls the stocks subject to the event and also 
all stocks that issue equity during the following period tested. The rationale is that 
when the benchmark includes the new issues, it partly uses the new issue anomaly to 
explain itself (Eckbo et al., 2000; see also section 3.4.1 for new listing bias).
3.4. The debate: further bad-m odel problem s and choice o f  appropriate  
m ethod
Tests o f long-horizon performance have become increasingly common within the 
academic literature. Two important issues should be taken into account: 1) the power 
of the model to measure any AR (as explained above) and 2) the power o f the 
statistical test that measures AR  significance or the AR. This section describes known 
problems o f long-horizon AR that affect the reliability o f the estimated performance 
and increase the probabilities for Type I error (false rejection o f the null which is 
mainly associated with the statistical tests) and Type II error (false acceptance o f the 
null which is mainly associated with the model selection).
3.4.1. New listing bias
Several firms that combine the constructed portfolios or market indexes are newly 
listed firms (IPO). However, the event firms are usually not (if not IPO firms). 
Evidence suggests that new listed firms underperform their benchmarks few years 
after their listing (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
Worries exist due the suspicion that the IPO underperformance is primarily related to 
the small firm size and high BTM of newly listed firms, rather than to the IPO event. 
This suggests that underperformance is related to the failure o f the asset-pricing 
model to capture the variations o f small growing firms, which allows for the 
signalling and behavioural theories to be valid (miss-valuations).
Regardless of the reason that IPO underperform, since they indicate the worse 
performance for decades (Brav and Gompers, 1997) their returns are not good
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indicators for event-firm expected performance. Using IPO returns as benchmark 
returns might cause upward drift to the estimated AR (positive bias).
3.4.2. Rebalancing bias
As mentioned above, the firms constitute the market index or the constructed 
portfolios change along the time due to the fact that new firms are listed or existing 
firms disappear/delist. This causes benchmark rebalancing. Rebalancing helps in 
maintaining the weights o f the samples equal (during the months tested). However, a 
negative bias arises by the fact that when the benchmark portfolios are periodically 
rebalanced it is implicitly assumed that event-retums are periodically rebalanced as 
well. Nonetheless, the returns on the event-portfolio are not subject to any 
rebalancing. The negative bias arises because more successful firms will mainly 
consist o f the portfolio over time. The small and unsuccessful stocks will delist and 
the event returns will mainly be compared with the more successful ones.
Rebalancing bias is common to all approaches except the CTAR and single-control 
matching firms. CTAR approach appears superior to the portfolio and event-time 
factor analysis approaches, as both samples (event and benchmark) are subject to 
periodical rebalancing. CTAR has two more main advantages. First, it is also free of 
data availability problems, i.e. when reference portfolios are to be formed or single 
non-event firms are to be chosen, data for all potential matching firms are required. If 
for any reason the potential matching company does not have available data for that 
particular month, it is completely excluded from the matching process and the 
analysis. However, with periodical rebalancing, the procedure is repeated in each 
calendar period. This means that all potential matching firms can be taken into 
account. This is common to all methods using asset pricing models and control 
portfolios, but not for single matching-firms. Second advantage o f the CTAR 
approach is that, with the event portfolio fonnation the returns of large firms or firms 
with high BTM are compared with small or low BTM firms, regardless the 
individual firm size and BTM (not explicit measurement of size and/or BTM). This 
makes the bad-model problem less apparent. This again holds for the pricing models.
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However, event rebalancing also causes problems to CTAR. By forming event- 
portfolios power is likely to be sacrificed (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997). That is because the returns within the event-portfolio are averaged 
over the months without taking into account the possibility that some months may be 
heavily event active compared to less active ones (hot versus cold activity periods). 
In certain periods, events could be significantly different than others. Hence, in 
events such as SEO that managers are likely to time the offer at particular periods 
when the stock overperforms (e.g. Hertzel et ah, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; 
Lee, 1997), CTAR with equal weights might not be able to appropriately capture 
post-abnormal performance. By ignoring the frequency o f the event activities, the 
sum of OLS is minimized, reporting lower AR. Thus, its power to detect AR  is 
limited (Type II error).
In addition, since the firms in the event-portfolio change through time, factors such 
as industry clusters are likely to change too (the firms in the portfolio are likely to 
participate in different industry sectors through time). Hence, the true slopes on the 
risk factors are time-varying. However, CTAR assumes the firm characteristics are 
stable over time, which is not true (Fama and French, 1997). Since the intercepts can 
embody factors other than what is explicitly being controlled for (when samples are 
clustered by calendar time or industry), they may yield misspecified test statistics. 
This implies poor asset pricing model (Lyon et al, 1999).
Finally, as the firm number is likely to change through time, the portfolio variance is 
affected. This would probably cause residual heteroskedasticity and misspecify the 
intercept ap . To avoid heavy effect of heteroskedastic residuals, it is common by the
literature to require at least 10 event firms in each calendar time portfolio (see 
Hertzel et al., 2002; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).
3.4.3. Survivorship bias
An issue related to rebalancing is the fact that unavailability data problem arise when 
an event/match company delists during the tested period. By removing the delisted 
returns assumes that investors sell the stock at its last trading price. This would 
provide the actual return o f a portfolio. Nevertheless, it is not always feasible to
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know ex-ante the last trading price. For example, if  a firm delists suddenly without a 
pre-announcement o f its intention to delist, investors might not have the opportunity 
to sell the stock. Shumway (1997) states that NYSE/AMEX stocks whose delisting is 
a surprise for the market, usually become useless afterwards. Hence, the delisted 
return is -100% for the day. If this fact is ignored when estimating the portfolio 
return which includes the particular stock, the portfolio returns will be biased 
upwards (see also Shumway and Warther, 1999 for NASDAQ firms). BHAR should 
not be as sensitive to delisted return bias (Shumway, 1997), as they can avoid 
rebalancing.
To overcome the survivorship bias, two alternative treatments o f delisted returns are 
widely used. First, to drop the firm data after the delisting period or replace the 
delisted returns with the returns of the corresponding benchmark until the next 
rebalancing and then to remove it completely (similar to Ritter, 1991; Kothari and 
Warner, 1997; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Hertzel et al., 2002). 
Second treatment, is to replace the delisted returns with the return o f the 
corresponding benchmark for the remaining period tested (e.g. Lyon et al., 1999). 
Replacing with the corresponding benchmark returns ensure data availability for the 
whole period tested and it is based on the assumption that investors will re-invest at a 
similar rate o f return as the delisted one. However, replacing the delisted returns 
would bias the level of reported AR towards zero. The AR o f the delisted firms will 
equal zero (from the delisting month to the end o f the tested period) contrary to the 
alternative treatment of removing the returns completely. Therefore, the possibility 
o f false acceptance of the null hypothesis (of zero AR) would be higher (type I error).
3.4.4. Equal or value weighted AR
Although the model selection is difficult, someone should also consider its 
configuration. It seems that when the benchmark portfolio or index is equally- 
weighted, problems are more severe especially for small stocks (Fama, 1998; Brav 
and Gompers, 1997; Brav et al., 2000). Specifically, when small firms are equally 
weighted with larger ones, small stocks have greater weight than they ought to, 
which makes the portfolio more sensitive to new listing and rebalancing biases
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(Barber and Lyon, 1997). They are also more sensitive to the delisting bias 
(Shumway and Warther, 1999). Therefore, the models yield misspecificed test 
statistics as the empirical rejection rates exceed the theoretical ones (type I errors; see 
also Barber and Lyon, 1997, p.342).
Contrary, the number o f firms included in the portfolio does not affect its return 
when the portfolio is value-weighted (it is thus less sensitive to rebalancing and 
survivorship biases). However, value-weighted benchmarks could have higher return 
variances in periods with large weights o f a single firm (because its systematic risk is 
not weighted). This would result in higher errors (AR) but low t-statistics. For this 
reason Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggest that equal-weighting might be more 
appropriate. Nonetheless, probably the biggest advantage with value-weighting is 
that, the bad-model problem is less susceptible. That is because small stocks that are 
the most susceptible to the bad model problem have smaller weight when the 
portfolio is value-weighted. Thus, if  the event sample mainly consists o f small firms, 
value weighting mitigates the bad-model problem (Boehme and Sorescu, 2002).
3.4.5. Cross-sectional and time-series dependence
As event firms follow a specific corporate event, their returns are likely to be cross- 
sectional correlated, especially when they share the same event period. In addition, 
when firms are subject to the same event more than once within the tested period, 
their AR  are overlapping. In fact, this might be the most severe form o f cross- 
sectional dependence in AR  (Lyon et ah, 1999). The lack o f independence generates 
misspecified test statistics, as the traditional test-statistics assumes independence and 
normality in the AR  distributions. For that reason, studies such as Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afflek-Graves (1995) require sample firms to 
participate only once at the SEO event for the 5-year period tested. Noticeable, not 
only corporate events, but randomly selected samples are also subject to return 
overlapping (Brav, 1997). Random firms are usually selected with replacement, 
which implies that the same firm might be used multiple times and/or participate into 
the same industry. This is important as several methodological papers use randomly
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selected samples aiming to improve the statistical properties o f long-horizon AR 
(Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999).
However, CTAR approach avoids the overlapping problem since the returns are 
calculated in calendar-time rather than event-time (Brav, 2000; Ritter and Welch, 
2002). The literature acknowledges that CTAR approach eliminates the cross- 
sectional dependence problem among sample firms because returns are averaged into 
a single portfolio each month. Thus, the CTAR method yields more robust test 
statistics in non-random samples (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). It however remains 
more sensitive to the bad model problem. Lyon et al. (1999, p. 197) give two possible 
reasons of why CTAR approach is more sensitive to the bad-model problem even 
when both approaches (BHAR and CTAR) are based on the size, BTM and maybe 
momentum factors. First, the FF-3 factor model (or any other asset pricing model) 
assumes linearity between the factors (i.e. market premium, SMB, HML) which 
seems unlikely to hold for the SMB and HML factors. Second, the model assumes 
the factors are independent which seems to be violated especially for small firms.
In addition, due to the estimation o f cumulative or buy-and-hold returns, any errors 
and/or miss-estimations in the event-period will shift over time. Even when no 
returns are reported, AR are carried through the following months. This might inflate 
the reported AR. Cumulative (or buy-and-hold) returns will have spurious upward 
drift bias: because cumulating (or multiplying) short-term returns to long periods bias 
is mitigated (Comad and Kaul, 1993). This creates the drift which could be 
economically large for long-horizon AR. The problem is less severe with CAR 
approach, as the periodical AR are aggregate and not multiplied with themselves.
Supporters o f the BHAR such as Ikenberry et al (1995) and Lyon et al. (1999) 
suggest that careful portfolio formation (controls for new listing and rebalancing 
bias) and data availability can mitigate the cross-sectional dependence problem when 
estimating the test-statistics. They suggest bootstrap approaches (details on bootstrap 
approaches and the relevant argumentation are provided in section 3 .5 .2 ).
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3.4.6. Normality assumption
The traditional statistical techniques that measure the significance o f AR  are based 
upon the normality assumption o f the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). That is, the 
return distributions are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid).
Nonetheless, the normality assumption for long-term AR has proved not to hold. AR 
distributions are significantly skewed to the right (e.g. Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; 
Korthari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997). As AR  are right skewed, they 
follow the Student t-distribution, which is asymmetric with a mean smaller than the 
zero. Additionally, skewness is also related to the model used. As reference 
portfolios/market indexes are subject to rebalancing and new listing biases, 
combinations o f the biases lead to increased misspecifications. Barber and Lyon 
(1997) argue that in CAR, rebalancing and skewness lead to negative bias in t- 
statistic (especially when returns are equally weighted).
Contrary, the new listing bias causes positive mean bias (or less negative) in AR  due 
to the IPO underperformance. In BHAR, the negative bias o f rebalancing offsets the 
new listing, causing negative bias in the t-statistic (Barber and Lyon, 1997). It seems 
that BHAR indicate more obvious problems o f skewness and cross-sectional 
dependence (due to the compounding which is likely to inflate the reported returns), 
however less susceptible to the bad-model problem (as reference portfolios or single 
matching firms are used).
These violate the normality assumption of the residuals, suggesting misspecifications 
on their statistical inference. Thus, the use o f traditional parametric t-tests may 
indicate abnormal performance when none is present. This reduces the t-test 
reliability (Type I error).
3.5. Tests for statistical inference in relation to the know n biases and  
norm ality assum ption
3.5.1. Parametric tests
Assuming normality, the traditional parametric test-statistic has a null hypothesis o f 
zero average AR and is measured as:
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AR
t -  test =
a(ARjt)/ 4n
Eq. 3:8
where AR , is the average AR o f the event firms j ,  over the months t. cfARj,) is the
cross-sectional standard deviation (n represents the observations). Depending on the 
approach used, ARJ: could be CAR, BHAR or CTAR. The traditional t-test (Eq. 3:8)
assumes that AR are time-series and cross-sectional independent (it also assumes that 
securities have the same o{AR.,)). However, the (auto and/or cross-sectional)
dependence of AR often violates the assumption of being identically and 
independently distributed (iid).
To address this issue, time-series statistics are frequently used by employing 
variations of Fama-MacBeth approach (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). Such approaches 
adjust for autocorrelation in standard error coefficient and, also control for factors 
such as size and BTM (see Table 3.1 for references and application frequency).
More specifically, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) estimate the long-run abnormal 
performance following bond ratings. They use both, simple statistical tests and 
variations o f Fama-MacBeth approach for fonnal investigation o f potential inflation 
in test-statistics due to dependence, as follows. Cross-section regressions are run for 
each calendar month tested in their sample, controlling for size, BTM and a dummy 
variable that captures upwards or downwards bond rating changes (which is their 
event). Loughran and Ritter (1995) also run monthly cross-sectional regressions over 
the FF-3factor. The rationale o f using a pricing model is that, by forming portfolios 
the cross-section dependence is eliminated (but power might be sacrificed and be 
correlated with omitted factors; see also section 3.4.5 for CTAR dependence).
In sequence, the monthly cross-section coefficient of interest is used to estimate a 
corrected test-statistic. The t-statistics equals the average periodical coefficient 
divided by the standard error of the time-series of periodical coefficients.
_ mean(coefficien t) Pri ^ .Q
Fama -  Mac Belli ,  ,  4 'a(cejficient)
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Hence, the t-statistics o f this approach is immune o f cross-section dependence on AR 
(dependence does not affect the un-biasness o f the coefficients, as they rely on time- 
series independence for statistical testing).
Finally, it is supported that CTAR eliminate the cross-sectional dependence because 
the returns over the periods are aggregated into a single portfolio, yielding more 
robust test statistics in non-random samples. As all cross-correlations o f the event- 
firm AR are automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance, the distribution o f 
the AR is closer to the normal distribution. Therefore, the distribution allows for 
classical statistical inference (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).
3.5.2. Non-parametric tests
Recall that BHAR indicate more obvious problems of skewness and cross-sectional 
dependence in comparison with CTAR. However, they are less susceptible to the bad- 
model problem (see section 3.4.6). Ikenberry et al. (1995) examine share repurchases 
and support that the biases in BHAR can be avoided with careful benchmark portfolio 
formation (that control for cross-sectional dependence, new listing and rebalancing 
biases) and bootstrapping procedures (that address the skewness problem) similar to 
Brock et al. (1992).
Bootstrapping is a straight-forward procedure. It is argued that it can solve the 
problems of t-statistics that assume normality and time-dependence. It derives from 
the simulation o f an empirical null distribution o f AR  that corrects the normality 
assumption. Initially, a pseudo-portfolio is created by replacing randomly with 
replacement each event-firm with a non-event firm within the same reference 
portfolio (e.g. size and BTM portfolios). This procedure is repeated several times to 
get a large number o f matching returns for each event-firm. Then, the BHAR o f the 
pseudo-samples is estimated in the same manner as the actual one. This creates a 
pseudo-distribution of AR. If the difference between the average pseudo and real AR
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is significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis of no AR is rejected. 15 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) do not document serious dependence problems.
In the same spirit, Lyon et al. (1999) estimate an empirical p-value which derives 
from a bootstrap approach. They propose a bootstrapped version of a skewness- 
adjusted t-statistic to eliminate the sample misspecification:
tsa= M s  + \ ? S 2 + ^ -Y )  Eq. 3:10
3 on
where 5  = ARJ'‘ and A R . t is the mean AR  for at the time t. <r(ARj t ) is the
<r(ARj,) J'
variance o f AR. y  is an estimation of the coefficient o f skewness that equals
t ( A R j . , - M j . ' ) 3
Y = id ______________ . The null hypothesis o f the skweness adjusted t-test is zero
na(ARj t ) 3
AR (zero difference in the event and empirical average AR). The skewness adjusted t- 
test can be applied to the event sample, as well as the bootstrapped AR. Lyon et al.
(1999) suggest that only the bootstrapped version of the skewness adjusted t-test 
yields well-specified test statistics. 16
Both, Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Lyon et al. (1999) advocate that BHAR approach 
can avoid the skewness bias with careful benchmark portfolio formation. They also 
advocate that the normality assumption can be corrected with the use o f non- 
parametric bootstrapping procedure. Hence, as nonparametric tests are assumed to 
release long-term AR from the CLT assumptions and control for the new listing and 
rebalancing biases, bootstrap procedures seem promising to long-term event study 
methods. They can also be used for both, BHAR and CAR. On that basis, BHAR and 
single non-event firm approach would probably be the most appropriate method to 
compute corporate abnormal performance (less econometric problems and the bad-
1:1 Ikenbery et al. (1995) sort all NYSE and AM EX firms into deciles based on their size (m arket value 
at the end o f  each April), the annual return o f  each event com pany is com pared with the average 
return o f  the size portfolio it belongs. Each o f  the 10 size portfolios is then ranked on quintiles on the 
same date, resulting to 50 size and BTM portfolios. Each event-firm  is replaced by a non-event firm 
within its corresponding portfolio. The procedure is repeated 1000 times, to create 1000 pseudo­
portfolios. Each pseudo firm is com pared with the reference portfolio return, calculating pseudo-XT?. 
The distribution o f  1000 pseudo-X/? is treated as the "expected” abnorm al perform ance. The null 
hypothesis is zero difference between the pseudo and the real AR.
16 For further details on bootstrap procedures see bootstrap m ethodological papers such as Hall and 
Horowitz (1996): Horowitz (1996; 1998); Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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model problem is less obvious). Thus, various scholars follow BHAR and the Lyon et 
al. (1999) bootstrap approach (see Table 3.1).
Nevertheless, arguments against the assumption of BHAR being iid following 
bootstrapping exist. Although normality can be approached with bootstrapping, the 
independence assumption is severely overstated. That is because most corporate 
events are not random (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). This constitutes one o f the main 
drawbacks of the methodological papers that use random samples (e.g. Lyon et ah, 
1999; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997). The traditional t-test o f 
significance for simulated random event-firms AR is frequently misspecified . 17
If the two samples (event and empirical) have systematically different residual 
variations, the new empirical distribution will be biased (Brav, 2000). In other words, 
if  the event-sample is cross-correlated but the empirical distribution is not, the 
resulting inferences might be mistaken. This is because the bootstrap approach 
assumes that observations are cross-sectionally uncorrelated, which is likely to be 
violated for non-random samples (Jegadeesh and Karcski, 2004). This problem 
makes the above methods applicable to random events that are uncorrelated across 
firms, rather than non-random.
Brav (2000) attempts to provide more accurate predictions, by employing a Bayesian 
predictive approach. He uses IPO samples and argues that it ‘relaxes’ the assumption 
of independence in certain circumstances. Contrary to previous models that simulate 
based on the size and BTM characteristics, he chooses the pseudo-distribution based 
on their BHAR. The AR are estimated following a characteristics-based model such 
as Daniel and Titman (1997) (any model can be used). Thus, the randomly chosen 
pseudo-portfolios should have similar dimensions with the event-firms. The AR  o f 
each firm are measured in time-series manner but the model parameters are estimated 
for the sample firms as indicated by the CTAR approach to avoid dependence. It is 
suggested that this approach overcomes the normality assumption and problems o f 
cross-sectional correlation o f long-term AR. He advocates for CTAR approach.
17 Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and W arner (1997) attem pt to address the biases in long- 
horizon AR  studies (CAR and BHAR). They docum ent different statistical techniques for each 
benchm ark used, different biases and different perform ance evaluation. B arber and Lyon (1997) 
advocate for BHAR  approach, whereas K othari and W arner (1997) for CAR.
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In addition, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) oppose the frequent claim that bootstrap 
procedure solves all dependence problems: the normality assumption is valid with 
bootstrap (becomes more plausible with big samples) but the independence is not (it 
increases with sample size). The problem of bootstrap procedures is the benchmark 
formation which overstates the tests statistics and not the independence assumption 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). After controlling for 
dependence and heteroskedasticity, 18 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate that the 
calendar-time portfolio has more power to identify reliable evidence o f AR.
More specifically, they estimate CTAR as advocated by Fama (1998) and decompose 
the intercept to the expected abnormal performance (given the FF-3factor model and 
the sample composition) and second to the unexpected abnonnal performance 
(attributable to factors such as the event, industry clusters, specific investor strategies 
or any other factor that the model cannot capture). The expected AR  is estimated by 
composing an empirical distribution via bootstrapping: they run 10 0 0  calendar-time 
portfolio regressions of random samples chosen to participate into the same 
portfolios as the event (size and BTM). The average intercept o f the pseudo-Hi? 
constitute the expected AR (a0). An "adjusted intercept" or unexpected intercept is
the difference between the event (n) and pseudo-mean intercept (a0) . Hence, they 
estimate a new t-statistic by dividing the adjusted intercept with the event 
distribution standard error s .
Interestingly, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate that the CTAR automatically 
accounts for the portfolio variance as the calendar portfolios eliminate the cross- 
sectional dependence o f event AR. Therefore, the distribution is closer to the normal 
distribution which allows for classical statistical inference. Several subsequent 
articles follow this approach (see Table 3.1).
Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) also focus on the main problems of non-random 
samples. They attempt to correct any potential biases o f AR dependence ignored by
ls A com m on correction o f  heteroskedasticity for equally-weighted portfolios is to standardize the 
CTAR by the calendar-tim e portfolio variance (see Franks et al., 1991). M itchell and Stafford (2000) 
use general nonparam etric bootstrapping procedure (following Horowitz, 1996).
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the Lyon et al. (1999) approach. As Lyon et al. (1999) do not account for the fact that 
non-random samples might be concentrated in specific industries and/or to specific 
periods (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), cross-sectional dependence and 
autocorrelation is not eliminated. Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) propose an auto- 
and serial-correlation t-test that generate White (1980) corrected estimations and 
allows for non-zero serial covariance (generalized version o f Hansen and Hodrick, 
1980) which is applicable for non-random samples, samples with industry clustering 
and overlapping returns. Nevertheless, they acknowledge a drawback o f their 
approach. Their suggested t-test is less powerful in comparison with the conventional 
t-statistic in non-random samples. That is, its rejection rate is lower than that o f the 
conventional t-test, e.g. while the conventional t-test would reject the null o f no AR  
when a three-year AR is 44.8%, their serial correlation consistent t-statistics will 
reject the null at 38.5%. Hence, it increases the possibilities for a Type I error. 19
3.6. Selection o f the appropriate approach for valid inferences
3.6.1. Robustness tests
Having explained the problems o f long-run event studies, an attempt to provide some 
practical indications for valid inferences would be helpful. When the objective o f a 
research project is not to expand the extant literature but to test the long-run AR 
following a corporate event, the application o f the two main competing 
methodologies (BHAR and CTAR) is assumed to provide reasonable valid inferences. 
In line with this, Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p.302) argue that ‘the best way to 
check the robustness o f the results is to repeat the analysis with a different model o f 
expected returns and a different methodology’. Indeed, having a careful look at Table
3.1, the majority o f the papers apply more than one long-run event study for robust 
findings. In addition, most recent studies report not only conventional t-tests, but also 
(skewness) adjusted t-tests, based on bootstrapped standard errors.
19 Further discussion on the econom etrics o f  event-studies can be found in Kothari and W arner (2007).
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3.6.2. Nature of the dataset, market of interest, testable hypothesis
3.6.2.1. Nature o f dataset and market o f interest
An appropriate approach of long-run AR computation should focus on the nature of 
the data and the market of interest. Let us assume that a research project addresses a 
question related to a small market. An example could be the Greek market which is 
considered to be a developed (FTSE, 2009) but only with about 330 listed 
companies. On this market, it is impossible to construct a big number o f size and 
BTM portfolios as the researcher will face data availability problems. The firm 
numbers consisting of each constructed portfolio will be very few, with a result to 
draw invalid estimations. Therefore, simple control matching approach would 
probably be the most obvious applicable method.
CTAR would also be applicable (if at least 10 firms can be included in each calendar 
portfolio, to avoid heavy heteroskedasticity problems). Nevertheless, more caution is 
needed. The model would be more reliable when specific market conditions are taken 
into account when constructing the risk factors. If for instance the 70% of the market 
capitalization fall within the three lowest size deciles, constructing the factors similar 
to the original FF-3factor model would not capture the size effect of the specific 
market. The same holds for the BTM or momentum factors. As an example, 
Boechme and Sorescu (2002) state that the nine smallest deciles comprise only the 
12% of the total US market value. However, these firms are the ones that document 
the dividend anomaly. Hence, adjustments to the portfolio breakpoints might be 
necessary for valid estimations.
In contrast, if  the study refers to a more ‘global’ portfolio (e.g. the European 
portfolio) rather than being country specific, there is scope for examining sub­
samples based on each local market. More specifically, under the assumption o f one 
efficient and integrated international market, Fama and French (1998) suggest a 
world three-factor model (that explains international stock returns better than an 
international CAPM). The factors are constructed similar to the original FF-3factor, 
however they consist of international stocks weighted by country-specific market 
value components. They are also weighted with domestic-factors. Thus, the model 
accounts for the different impact of the foreign and domestic factors. Liew and
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Vassalou (2000) examine this world-factor model, documenting high ability to 
estimate expected returns in various international markets.
However, Griffin (2002) examines the predictive ability o f the model having 
estimated world and domestic factors. After comparing the coefficients he advocates 
that working on international index provides less reliable results than country 
specific. He argues that the choice between of a domestic or global model may 
substantially affect the expected return estimation. ‘Using the wrong model can lead 
to errors in capital budgeting, portfolio evaluation and risk analysis decisions’ (ibid, 
p.783). Domestic (market specific) model should be preferable. A domestic model 
choice would also avoid problems o f country specific components, controls for 
institutional settings, investor protection levels, etc. O f course, such controls might 
be unavoidable if  the AR  is used as an (in)dependent variable for a broader research 
question e.g. about the European portfolio (see below).
3.6.2.2. Testable hypothesis
P The event
In addition to prior decision, the testable hypothesis determines the model o f 
expected performance. Let us assume now that a research project measures the 
abnormal performance surrounding an event that affects the total market population, 
e.g. the adoption o f International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe at 
the 1st of January, 2005. This event affects the universe o f European listed firms. 
Thus, any benchmark would be subject to the event. Loughran (2000), Jegadeesh
(2000) suggest excluding the event firms from control portfolios. In such case, single 
matching firm approach would not be applicable. The intuition behind single-control 
benchmarks is to match each event firm with a firm that is not subject to the event.
With the use o f an asset-pricing model and/or portfolio approach, the constructed 
portfolios are also affected by the event. However, with the inclusion o f a binary 
variable that captures the time that the particular event takes place (before and after), 
the model can distinguish whether the AR  experience a change after the event in firm 
and/or portfolio level. At the same time, the coefficients o f the relevant interaction
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terms might document changes in the risk loadings after the particular event. With 
the use of simple reference portfolios the pre- and post-event periods can also be 
distinguishable in calendar-time. Hence, these approaches can capture the effect of 
the event for a specific firm.
>  AR time-horizon
The time interval o f AR is also an important issue. Let us assume that all firms in the 
sample have the same event time (e.g. the IFRS adoption) and the time horizon is one 
year. In such case, CTAR in its traditional form (Fama, 1998) would not make sense 
because all event firms will participate to the same monthly calendar portfolios and 
only 12 monthly observations will be available for the time-series regression.
Nevertheless, running 12 cross-section monthly regression models and use the mean 
intercept coefficient should provide valid inferences in terms o f the magnitude o f the 
AR. In addition, time-series regressions over an asset-pricing model for each 
individual event firm should also provide reliable results. A mean cross-sectional 
intercept will reflect the AR (Boechme and Sorescu, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 
1995). Reference portfolios would also provide valid inferences (as well as matched- 
firms if the event does not involve the total market population).
>  Relation to accounting measures
Finally, if the research objective of the study is associated with accounting items, it is 
scope for the AR to correspond to the fiscal year of the corporation. Note that 
accounting items are published on a quarterly basis. Thus, AR outside this fiscal 
period would not be affected by the accounting information. For this reason, AR need 
to be adjusted accordingly. If possible, estimation of the AR with a lag o f four 
months (or more) after the fiscal year end date o f each firm would provide adequate 
time to the market to incorporate the new information o f the financial statements into 
the market prices (Barth et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2004). Thus, AR would be 
comparable (in terms o f timing) with the corresponding accounting amounts o f the 
event firm and, be able to capture the impact of the accounting information.
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Likewise, Teoh et al. (1998a, b) and Iqbal et al. (2009) that examine the long-run 
performance around SEO and IPO in relation to earnings management estimate FF- 
3factor adjusted BHAR and CAR to examine the long-run firm performance around 
the events. However, they use market-adjusted AR  as at four months after the fiscal 
year end or the event month (whichever is later) when the long-run AR  are compared 
with accounting items. They run the market-adjusted AR over the accounting items, 
whilst they control for the size and BTM  effects in a firm level at the right-hand side 
o f the equation (also adjusted for the firm fiscal year end). Other ‘accounting’ studies 
use simple market-adjusted AR and adjust only for size (e.g. Chaney and Lewis, 
1998), whereas others do not control for other risk factors beyond the market 
premium at all (e.g. Yoon and Miller, 2002).
The separate control has its intuition to return overlapping. Estimating annual AR that 
corresponds to the fiscal year o f each firm in the benchmark portfolio would lead to 
return overlapping (each benchmark firm is likely to have its fiscal year end at 
different periods). Also, the portfolio construction represents calendar returns, 
rebalanced always at the same month even if  the fiscal year end dates o f the firms 
vary. Thus, the return for a calendar month cannot be adjusted for FYE in aggregate 
level. For that reason, it is common to use market-adjusted returns. However, 
controlling for the size and BTM effects at the right hand side o f the equation, 
assumes linearity with the AR.
3.6.3. Improving the ability of the model to capture the cross-section variation of 
expected returns
Most recent studies follow the Fama and French (1992, 1993) model, assuming that 
size and BTM can describe the cross-section variation o f expected returns regardless 
of the implications o f the known bad-model problem. Note that three out o f the 
twenty-five portfolios in Fama and French (1992) provide significant AR. This 
suggests that the model fails to predict the expected returns accurately (for the 
particular portfolios) by default. The problem could become more severe when the 
firms participate into a specific event that is driven by factors unrelated to size and 
BTM and the model cannot capture. Hence, the documented AR  include not only
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post-event performance effects but also a certain level of models’ inability to capture 
the expected returns (combined effects).
Lyon et al. (1999) concludes that scholars could identify other characteristics with 
which they can match event returns such as recent return performance, recent 
quarterly earnings surprises, price/eamings ratios and perhaps others. ‘Descriptive 
analysis should provide insights regarding the important dimensions on which 
researchers should develop a performance benchmark’ (ibid, p. 198). Indeed, Ahem 
(2008) draw non-random simulated data and test event-study methods when the 
samples share similar characteristics such as size, prior returns, BTM, eamings-to- 
price ratios. Beyond the market, FF-3factor and Carhar-4factor models, he also uses 
a characteristics-based model. He reports the lowest biased returns and least standard 
errors when the benchmark has similar characteristics as the event one. Although his 
findings refer to short-event windows, they again underline that AR  estimations could 
be improved with more careful benchmark techniques.
On that basis, scholars appear more willing to experiment with the sample 
constructions, matching procedures and statistical tests beyond the traditional 
portfolio formations, bootstrapping and/or momentum factors. Deviations from the 
‘traditional’ models are applied. For example, Brav et al. (2005) use actual return 
expectations, extracted from Value Line (rather than measure the expected returns by
9Q
assessing the realized ones following the event).“ The authors state smaller standard 
error compared to the studies that use realized returns, whilst overlapping problems 
and autocorrelation are less susceptible.
Boechme and Sorescu (2002) follow the suggestion of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
and estimate expected and adjusted CTAR. However, instead of simulating an 
empirical distribution they match each event-firm with a single non-event firm with 
similar size and pre-event momentum. With this, they capture any firm-level 
momentum (contrary to the aggregate momentum of the Carhart-4factor model).
J Value Line is an independent research with no affiliation to investm ent banking activity. Hence, 
Brav et al. (2005, p .34) argue that analysts optim ism  bias (Rajan and Servaers, 1997) or conflict o f  
interest bias (M ichael and W om ack. 1999) are less likely to affect its expected return estim ates. Value 
Line expectations cover the 90%  o f the US market and are highly correlated with the m arket 
expectations. It also has long time series o f  historical expected returns.
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They thus distinguish between expected and unexpected AR  based on the assumption 
(or suspicion) that the asset-pricing model cannot capture firm specific pre-event 
momentum that is likely to occur prior the event. Such controls would be helpful 
when evidence suggests timing strategies for a particular event, e.g. IPO and SEO 
(see Loughran and Ritter, 1995 and Lee, 1997 respectively).
Likewise, Eckbo et al. (2000) advocate that liquidity risk is reduced after the SEO 
event, due to the de-leverage effect o f SEO. This is not observed by the 
corresponding benchmark firms, which creates misspecifications to the estimated 
intercepts. They apply a six-factor multifactor model which expands the FF-3factor 
model to include macroeconomic factors. They report sensitivity o f AR  to the method 
used and, scope for improvements. Similar findings are reported by Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) for IPO firms.
Of great importance is also a parallel set o f literature that grows and provides 
evidence on asset pricing models based on the market model and stock (il)liquidity, 
rather than the size and BTM factors. It is generally well documented by the 
literature that liquidity risk affects the stock returns, in time-series manner. For 
instance, Liu (2006) compares a liquidity-adjusted two-factor pricing model with the 
CAPM and the FF-3factor model, reporting higher ability to predict returns. He 
advocates that his illiquidity factor captures the cross-section variation o f expected 
returns that the BTM fails to. Various other studies also create (il)liquidity factors in 
relation to expected returns. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest a liquidity factor 
that account for momentum liquidity strategy profits which can predict AR. Amihud 
(2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) suggest that illiquidity premium partly 
drives the expected AR  and/or affect the asset prices. Datar et al. (1998) argue that 
liquidity is a significant factor in explaining the cross-section variation in expected 
returns. Campbell et al. (1993) also report negative correlation between trading 
volume and returns. These are few published papers o f the pertinent literature, 
published to leading finance journals.21
21 See also Holm strom  and T irole (2001); H asbrouck and Seppi (2001); Chordia et al. (2001); Lo et al. 
(2004); G allm eyer et al. (2004); Chordia et al. (2008); Bekaert et al. (2007) am ong others.
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This study refers to them as liquidity-adjusted models. As it is advocated that 
liquidity-adjusted models have high ability to forecast stock returns, a question o f 
why not to estimate AR  based on these models and/or other liquidity factors is raised. 
These models are generally accepted and can (at least partly) explain the AR. Given 
the bad-model problems and the sensitivity of long-horizon AR  to the model o f 
specification, liquidity-adjusted approaches could be complementary and provide 
robust results. As a conclusion, the road for further research is open.
3.7. O perational / A ccounting perform ance
As various studies with different research objectives estimate not only stock but also 
accounting performance (e.g. Hertzel et ah, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Teoh 
et ah, 1998b; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; 1998; Piotroski, 2000; Ou and Penman, 
1989; Stober, 1992; Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; Piotroski, 2000; see more in 
Kothari, 2 0 0 1 ), the impact of the corporate event on the accounting data is valuable. 
This section describes the methods and power of operating abnonnal performance.
Fama and French (1995) document that earnings and stock returns are driven by the 
same factors, i.e. market premium, size and BTM. Returns and/or earnings of 
glamour firms (low BTM) are mean reverted and, small firms tent to mean-revert 
more quickly than large firms with similar risk factors. Thus, operating performance 
is subject to the bad problem in the same manner as stock performance. Not only 
methodological papers but also empirical studies confirm the earnings reversal. For 
instance, Loughran and Ritter (1997) attempt to link the stock and operating 
abnonnal perfonnance of SEO firms and report positive stock and operating 
performance prior the event which reverses afterwards. When the transitory nature of 
the operating perfonnance becomes apparent, the stocks underperform.
Similar to stock approaches, the identification of accounting abnormal performance 
requires the use o f an appropriate benchmark, i.e. an expected performance model to 
ensure that the estimated abnonnal earnings are not manifestation o f the mean 
reversion documented by the literature. Flowever, in the case o f operating 
performance, no asset-pricing model (or variation) is applicable, as the market
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models examine stock returns and not accounting earnings. In addition, accounting 
items cannot be available on daily basis as the market returns.
3.7.1. Models of expected performance -  the appropriate benchmark
The models o f expected operating performance are simpler in comparison with stock 
AR. They are restricted to comparisons between event and non-event earnings 
measures (controls based on specific risk factors). A simplistic approach mentioned 
by Brown and Warner (1985) estimates the expected operating performance o f the 
event-firm j  at year t, E(Pj t ) being equal its past performance PjtA :
Significant differences between them imply abnormal performance. However, this 
model ignores the performance o f any benchmark. It is less reliable and the tests 
statistics are not be well specified. Alternatively, the expected performance o f the 
event-firm j, E(Pj t ) equals the performance o f an appropriate benchmark i, Pn . The
changes in operating performance between the event and benchmark company over 
the same period of time are also comparable:
Brown and Warner (1985) use another model, which defines the expected 
performance o f the event-firm E(Pj,) as the lag of its own performance Pj M plus 
the change in the benchmark performance E(Pn ) '■
Appropriate benchmarks used by previous studies are either single control non-event 
companies or constructed portfolios that consist o f companies with similar risk 
characteristics (size, growth and/or industry). The use of industry averages is in fact a 
very common approach (e.g. Teoh et ah, 1998; Iqbal et ah, 2009; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Hertzel et ah, 2002; Bethel et ah, 1998; McLaughlin et ah, 1996). 
Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluate the power o f operational event-studies and suggest
Eq. 3:12
E{PJ, )  = Pi,  or A(E(Pj l )) = A(PiJ) Eq. 3:13
Eq. 3:14
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that single-control firm matching approach is the most powerful approach to detect 
abnormal operating performance, especially in relation with the firms’ own past 
performance (Eq. 3:14). Risk factors used are based on accounting measures such as 
the book value o f assets and earnings growth for size and performance (contrary to 
market value and return performance that stock event-studies use).
3.7.2. Measures of operating performance
The use o f several accounting items that measure operating performance such as 
return on assets (the most common), return on sales and return on market value o f 
assets are common in the literature. The use of other measures includes among others 
the retum-on-equity, Tobin’s Q, profit margins, market-to-book and earnings per 
share.22 It is important to point that beyond operating measures, the use o f cash-based 
performance is also acceptable (e.g. cash-tlow return on assets and return on cash- 
adjusted assets). Cash-based performance is less powerful than eamings-based, as 
cash-flows are driven by activities such as increase in capital, financial loans, sale of 
fixed assets or other. These activities do not reflect firm performance. Hence, the 
definition of ‘cash-flows’ might change the results (e.g. operating cash flows vs. total 
cash flows at the end of a fiscal year).
However, cash-based measures might sometimes be more appropriate, because o f the 
sample characteristics. For example, in an IPO or SEO, the management might have 
incentives to manipulate operating items to report higher performance in their 
attempt to achieve better offer price and placing characteristics (e.g. Teoh et ah, 
1998a; 1998b; Aharony et al., 2000; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000). In such case, the reported operating income would be inflated, 
concealing the firm real financial situation. Typically, the management might benefit 
by manipulating earnings (and other common accounting risk factors) and thus, the 
reported earnings might be misspecified.
See Healy and Palepu (1990). Barber and Lyon (1996), Loughran and R itter (1997), Hertzel et al. 
(2002), Bethel et al. (1998). M egginson et al. (1994), Jain and Kini (1994), Hanson and Song (2000), 
and others.
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Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that matching only with the industry or size solves 
the problem of earnings manipulation but unfortunately, it ignores the performance 
history of the firm relative to the benchmark lag-performance. Matching with past- 
performance and size probably captures the cross-variation better. However, book 
value o f assets reflects the cost o f all assets, not only the operating ones. This could 
understate the true productivity o f operating assets. Although the problems are 
recognizable, they do not seem to deter the use of measuring operating performance 
by the accounting literature.
3.7.3. Tests of statistical inference
To evaluate the statistical inference o f the operating performance, traditional t- 
statistics are argued to be well specified only if event-firms are matched by control 
firms with similar pre-event performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Nonparametric 
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests are uniformly more powerful than parametric ones, due to 
extreme accounting observations that might misspecify the tests. It is typical by 
studies investing abnormal operating performance to report median results along 
nonparametric tests o f statistical significance (e.g. Wilcoxon test). However, test 
statistics are likely to be misspecified if the benchmark is subject to rebalancing over 
time. Benchmark rebalancing would erode the power o f the statistic reference. More 
powerful estimations can be achieved with constant benchmark. Hence, single­
control matching is probably more appropriate. In summary, operating assets are 
good indicators for operating performance. Operational performance is not subject to 
the debate o f the long-run event studies and it is well specified, regardless the biases.
3.8. Sum m ary and conclusions
This chapter describes the debate about the research design o f long-run event studies. 
Although the event-study methodology is not new (e.g. MacKinlay (1997) refers to 
Dolley (1933) as possibly to be the first article that applies an event-study), long-run 
abnormal performance methods are relatively recent and require extra caution as they
23 See Loughran and R itter (1997); H ealy and Palepu (1990); M cLaughlin et al. (1996); Jain and Kini 
(1996); Patrch and Shah (1997), DeAngelo (1988); Kaplan (1989) and others. They all report 
medians.
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face several problems. This raises the need for proper understanding of the extant 
literature, which is the main objective o f this chapter. It attempts to describe the most 
significant issues discussed by the relevant literature and focuses mainly on the 
recent methodological and practical concerns.
BHAR and CTAR long-horizon AR approaches compete each other, while the 
traditional asset-pricing model used to identify mispricing (Fama and French, 1993) 
over-estimates the average returns during the sampling period mainly for small, low 
BTM securities (the bad-model problem). In fact, no AR estimation method is free of 
the bad-model problem (Fama, 1998). Consistently, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
suggest that one third of their sample long-run AR is manifestation of the model 
deficiencies rather than due to the event. Brav and Gompers (1997) imply that event 
anomalies are due to misspecifications of the pricing model. Various other papers 
including Lyon et al. (1999), Ritter and Welch (2000), Gompers and Lemer (2003) 
also seem to be consistent with this view. This issue raises the question o f whether 
the estimated AR derive from the corporate event, misspecifications of the pricing 
model, or combine effects of the event and model misspecifications.
Several methodological papers advocate for one or another approach and attempt to 
reduce as much as possible the known biases (e.g. Ikenberry et al., 1995; Barber and 
Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2000). In short, CTAR are more sensitive to the bad- 
model problem contrary to BHAR that have more severe econometric problems. 
Thus, extreme caution is needed in conducting long-horizon event studies (Kothari 
and Warner, 1997).
This study suggests ways of how a scholar can choose among the alternative methods 
based on the nature o f the dataset that a research project might have, on the market o f 
interest, on the hypothesis tested. As a conclusion, each approach should be 
considered as complementary rather than competing to other methods. In addition, as 
the literature has failed to provide a single model against which robust AR can be 
measured, it creates a setting for new methodological approaches or diversions form 
the existing ones.
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Such methods could be benchmark choices based on pre-event characteristics (Lyon 
et ah, 1999), adjustments of the event returns for pre-event momentum strategies 
(Beochme and Sorescu, 2002), inclusion o f macro-economic factors to a pricing 
model (Eckbo et ah, 2000) and/or other. The road for further research is open. On 
that basis, this study builds upon prior studies and suggests that adjusting for 
liquidity (e.g. Liu, 2006; Pastor and Stambaugh; 2003; Amihud, 2002; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Datar et al., 1998) might facilitate the extant literature in providing 
more valid inferences in long-horizon AR.
Finally, the chapter describes the power o f the operating abnormal performance 
approaches. Although abnormal earnings are subject to the bad-model problem 
(Barber and Lyon, 1996), they are not subject to the big debate o f stock performance. 
Contrary, are easy to implement. The models of expected performance are relatively 
straightforward and traditional statistical tests can be applied. Their major flaw is 
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Chapter 4 : The Determinants o f  the Discount or Premium in 
Non pre-emptive Equity Placements
4.1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the factors affecting the discount or premium of the two UK 
non pre-emptive equity placements used in this study (primary and secondary 
placements). It investigates the first research objective o f the study (O bj.l) and 
provides answer to the first research question Q l. Hence, it examines whether the 
offered discount o f the two samples reflects certification, monitoring and/or liquidity 
costs. It treats premiums as a special case, investigating whether they arise because 
the buyer receive private benefits.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains its motivation and 
contributions. Section 4.3 describes the existing evidence on theories about equity 
offering discounts and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the 
methodology and research design. It defines the control variables and predictions on 
the testable hypotheses. Section 4.5 explains the sample collection process and 
sample characteristics. Section 4.6 analyzes the empirical findings and the last 
section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. M otivation and m ain contributions o f  the chapter
Typically, SEO are offered at a discount to the prevailing market price o f the day 
prior to the announcement. This holds for different issue types and various 
countries.24 Conflicting explanations for the discount provided by the US literature, 
argue that the discount is necessary as investors need to be compensated for investing
24 Inter alia see for US findings H ansen (1988), Loderer et al. (1991), W ruck (1989), Eckbo and 
M asulis (1992; 2007), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Corw in (2003), A ltinkilic and H ansen (2003; 2007), 
Gao and R itter (2008). For the UK see A rm itage (2000; 2002; 2007; 2010), K orteweg and Renneboog 
(2002), Slovin et al. (2000), Barnes and W alker (2006), Balachandran et al. (2009). For G reece see 
Tsangarakis (1996), for the N etherlands (K abir and Roosenboom , 2003; De Jong and V eld, 2001), for 
Japan (Kang and Stulz, 1996). See section 2.3.3 for details about the SEO type involved in each study.
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into a relatively overvalued stock (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992), for covering expenses 
due to high trading costs o f new shares with inelastic demand (Hess and Frost, 1982; 
Loderer et ah, 1991; Corwin, 2003) and for undertaking uncertainty risks related to 
the issuer value (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003). Other evidence suggests that the 
discount derives from manipulating activities of investors that wish to profitably 
cover their short-positions, by manipulating the market price downwards (Kim and 
Shin, 2004; Sarrieddine and Wilhem, 1996; Gerard and Nanda, 1993).
While the above explanations refer to SEO in general, studies referring specifically 
to firms conducting private placements suggest that they are subject to higher 
asymmetric infonnation in comparison with those conducting public offers (Wu, 
2004; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). For that reason, the discounts in private 
placings reflect investigation expenses. They are attributed to certification costs 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993). Alternatively, they reflect agency costs such as 
monitoring (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009) or entrenchment (Barclay et ah, 
2007). Moreover, US evidence advocates that transactions with existing shares are 
likely to be priced at a premium, as investors aim to extract private benefits (Barclay 
and Holderness, 1989), or to become active placeees (Barclay et ah, 2007).
Nevertheless, the theories applicable for US SEO have not always been applicable 
into the UK (Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002; Slovin et al., 2000). Different settings 
result into different implications and market reactions. More specifically, an 
argument easy to criticize about its validity in the UK market is the manipulative 
short-selling. The relevant studies advocate that short-selling activities during the 
offer period can influence the underwriter decision to set deeper discount for US 
SEO. Such tests are not applicable in the UK market, simply because o f the different 
discount setup procedures. Recall that in the US the offered price is defined 
immediately after the offer period, following a road-show and price negotiations. 
Thus, incentives to drive the market price down are plausible. The underwriter will 
consider the downward price path after the announcement as negative market 
reactions and, setting a larger discount will reduce the risk of the offer being 
unsuccessful.
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However, in the UK, the offer price is set before the placing announcement and 
remains fixed during the whole offer period. Thus, as changes in market prices after 
the announcement day do not affect the discount, manipulating activities will not 
affect the discount either. The underwriter fee might be affected upwards as the 
manipulation is likely to jeopardise the success o f the issue. However, the discount is 
a distinguishable cost from the underwriter fee in the UK (Armitage, 2000; 2002) 
(contrary to the US that the fee and discount are joined; see section 2.2.2.2).
Another issue that it is likely not to hold in the UK (although not tested by prior UK 
studies) is the monitoring argument (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009). The 
reason again is the different settings in the UK. Mainly existing shareholders invest 
(Armitage, 2010) rather than new as the relevant US studies argue. Thus, costs o f 
new investors to act as external monitor factors in the UK would be limited.
These differences provide a motivation to investigate deeper the offered price 
discount (or premium) of UK placements. In addition, the UK lacks evidence on the 
discount for transactions with existing shares, while evidence referred to private 
placement discounts is limited. Most UK studies that include private placements 
mainly use placings accompanied by a pre-emptive offer (Burton and Power, 2003; 
Armitage and Snell, 2004; Balachandran et ah, 2009) and placements defined similar 
to the US firm commitment offers (Slovin et ah, 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006).25 
Armitage (2010) and Balachandran et al. (2009) report discount for private 
placements that are smaller than the discount o f other UK SEO types. Nevertheless, 
they focus on the investor identity and flotation choices, respectively.
This study contributes by examining the certification and monitoring arguments 
related with the two non pre-emptive UK offering types tested. Furthermore, it 
deviates from prior studies by investigating the stock liquidity as an important 
driving factor o f the offered discount in non pre-emptive offers. The motivation o f 
this latter argument is twofold. While prior literature does recognize the importance 
o f liquidity for US public and right offers (Kothare, 1997; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic 
and Hansen, 2003), UK rights and open offers (Armitage, 2007; 2002), Canadian and 
US private placements with sale restrictions (Maynes and Pandes, 2008; Silber,
“5 See section 2.2.1.3 for further details.
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1991), the liquidity impact on non-sale restricted placings is disregarded. Second, the 
discounts of private placings are reported to be larger than the corresponding 
certification and monitoring costs (Barclay et ah, 2007), which implies that other 
economic factors are omitted. On that basis, the present study contributes by 
examining the liquidity impact on non-sale restricted stock in the UK market that has 
different settings, using private and secondary placements. It also investigates the 
premiums separately, which have had less attention by prior studies.
4.3. H ypotheses developm ent and em pirical predictions
4.3.1. Certification and value uncertainty as explanations for the discount
There is no doubt about the existence o f a discount in SEO, however the literature 
provides conflicting interpretations for its need. A dominant explanation is that 
discounts reflect adverse selection problems. Consistent with the Myers and M ajluf 
(1984) model, a firm will issue stock when the anticipated benefits of the proceeds 
are more than the anticipated increase in firm value from investing into a positive 
NPV project. Thus, investors interpret the new issue as a choice with adverse 
selection costs, suggesting that the new stock is relatively overvalued. Hence, equity 
issuing will mitigate overvaluation to the new shareholders, otherwise the 
management will choose not to issue. To overcome the ‘winners curse problem’ that 
informed investors will participate only in good issues, studies such as Rock (1985) 
and Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that under-pricing is necessary to compensate 
uninformed investors.
With regards to private placements, greater levels o f information asymmetries 
between the firm and market are involved (Wu, 2004). US findings suggest the 
discount reflects costs incurred by the investors to acquire the necessary information 
and certify the stock (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). Hertzel and Smith (1993) report that 
undervalued firms choose private placement over public offerings or over foregoing 
the issue (expanding the Myers-Majluf model). Outside placees are to demand 
discount as compensation for their investigation costs to certify / assess firm value 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993).
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In line with the asymmetric information rationale, UK evidence suggests the SEO 
offering is associated with a certain level o f risk that investors are exposed to which 
imposes the discount (see Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002; Armitage 2002). Hence, 
discounting is necessary and should be expected due to the market mechanism 
(investors need to be compensated for their costs). Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) 
decompose underpricing into expected and unexpected, arguing that expected 
discount reflects uncertainty and investors’ expenses to assess firm value. Expected 
discount should be included into the stock prices. Unexpected components reflect 
placement (transaction) costs and information asymmetries, attributable to 
uncertainty about the issuer value.
On the one hand, considering the different settings o f the UK market that suggest 
higher asymmetric information as well as higher risk (due to the lack o f underwriter 
flexibility in setting the discount after a road show) the first hypothesis o f this 
chapter tests the certification argument and the possibility that the discount is subject 
to investor uncertainty about the issuer value. On the other hand, as investors in the 
UK are mainly existing shareholders (Armitage, 2010), less asymmetric information 
costs should be needed. This hypothesis involves not only the private placements, but 
also the secondary offerings, as the information provided to the market is limited to a 
news report. However, since the stock is already listed, different implications are 
involved. To distinguish between the two samples, the hypothesis is set into 4.1a and 
4.1b, referring to the primary and secondary placements, respectively.
H4.1: The discount o f  (a) primary and (b) secondary placements reflects certification 
and/or uncertainty about the issuer value.
To examine the first hypothesis, variables that reflect firm and offer characteristics 
are used (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003). These include the 
firm age, value, past abnormal performance, return volatility and ownership 
concentration. Such characteristics reflect the level o f asymmetric information 
between the firm and the market, in relation to the firm value.
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4.3.2. Monitoring (or entrenchment) as explanation for the discount
A different view attributes discounts to agency and corporate governance problems 
(Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007; Wruck and Wu, 2009). Potential investors need 
to be assured that their funds are not to expropriated or wasted on unattractive 
projects. On that basis, it is argued that discounts are necessary to compensate 
investors for costs incurred to monitor the incumbents, in terms of participating into 
the decision making process and governance (Wruck and Wu, 2009).
Contrary, Barclay et al. (2007) document that only a small portion of the investors in 
their US private placements becomes publicly active, or conflict with the incumbents 
after the event. In fact, the discounts paid are significantly larger than the 
corresponding certification or monitoring expenses. This suggests that the discounts 
cannot reflect mainly certification or monitoring costs, arguing that discounts o f 
private placings actually reflect entrenchment costs. Wu (2004) also reports evidence 
that mainly supports the entrenchment rather than monitoring.
With regards to the secondary offerings, investors appear to get involved with firm 
affairs (at least attempt to) after the placing (Barclay et al., 2001). Activity signs are 
also reported by other studies examining US secondary placements (Barclay and 
Holdemess, 1991; Bethel et al., 1998; Allen and Philips, 2000). Moreover, the 
investors in secondary placements seem willing to pay more for the stock (Barclay et 
al., 2001). It is thus argued that active investors mainly participate into secondary 
placings and pay premium, whereas discounts o f primary placings reflect managerial 
entrenchment.
Considering that investors participating into UK private placements are mainly 
existing rather than new (Annitage, 2010), as well as those participate into the 
secondary sample (see Appendix I), arguments referring to new investors acting as 
external monitor factors on placements (Wruck and Wu, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 
2005; Slovin et al., 2000; Allen and Philips, 2000) are expected to have less impact 
into the UK. As prior UK studies have not directly examined the above possibilities, 
the second hypothesis examines the monitoring argument. As above, the hypothesis 
is set into 4.2a and 4.2b to distinguish between the two offering types.
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H4.2: The discount o f  (a) primary and (b) secondary placements paid by active 
investors reflects monitoring.
The monitoring hypothesis predicts significant activity signs after the event or at 
least signs that indicate efforts o f the new investors to get involved with the 
management and affect firm policies. Significant changes in ownership 
concentration, changes in top management around the event, as well as potential 
investor incentives to be ‘strategic’ are measures that provide indication on whether 
they intend to be active or not. The identity o f investor (e.g. activist, corporation, 
institution) might also have impact on monitoring the incumbents. If the monitoring 
hypothesis is valid, significant positive relationship between post-purchase activity 
and the offered discount is expected.
Although this study does not directly examine for entrenchment, it allows for it since 
entrenchment and monitoring are mutually exclusive. While lack o f monitoring does 
not necessarily mean entrenchment (entrenchment suggests that passive investors 
require discount to support the incumbent management), the study offers ‘food for 
thought’ on whether entrenchment might valid in the UK.
4.3.3. Inelastic demand and liquidity costs as explanation for the discount
An issue that has attracted less attention in the private placement literature is the 
(il)liquidity o f SEO stocks. Liquidity is defined as the ability o f the stock to be traded 
cheaply and with little deviation in market prices (caused by new information). If the 
stock is seen as illiquid, the cost o f trade and the relevant risk for investors are 
higher. Thus, they will be willing to take large positions on illiquid stocks only if 
they are compensated with discount (Loderer et ah, 1991; Barclay and Litzenberger,
1988). Evidence on equity issues suggests that the stock is illiquid with a downward 
sloping demand curve (Allen and Postlewaite 1984; Korajczyk et ah, 1990; Loberer 
et ah, 1991). This means inelastic stock demand and high cost o f trade (Corwin, 
2003; Kalay et ah, 2004; Armitage, 2007).
US evidence on public offers supports this explanation (Barclay and Litzenberger, 
1988; Loderer et ah, 1991). Corwin (2003) reports that underpricing is more
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pronounced for stocks with inelastic demand and high stock uncertainty. Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2003) argue the discount is expected due to information asymmetries, 
while unexpected discount reflects liquidity costs. Kothare (1997) report illiquidity 
for rights and bought deals. However the later are more liquid. Similar interpretation 
is provided by studies examining sale-restricted shares (e.g. Silber, 1991; Maynes 
and Pandes, 2008).26 UK findings also comply with the illiquidity argument. 
Armitage (2007) suggests discounts of UK pre-renounced rights reflect liquidity 
costs and uncertainty about the issuer value, while Armitage (2002) documents 
higher liquidity costs for rights rather than open offers.
Nevertheless, the liquidity is disregarded with regards to the non-sale restricted 
private placements and secondary placements. This has profound implications since 
liquidity might also characterizes pure private placements, especially if  we consider 
that discounts are larger than the corresponding certification and monitoring costs 
(Barclay et ah, 2007, p. 479). Additionally, selling pressure can be observed not only 
when new shares are issued, but also when investors attempt to sell existing blocks of 
shares (Scholes, 1972). On that basis, the third hypothesis examines the relation 
between liquidity costs and discount, distinguished into 4.3a and 4.3b for each equity 
type.
H4.3: The discount o f  (a) primary and (b) secondary placements reflects liquidity 
costs and/or compensation fo r  price pressure due to inelastic demand.
The liquidity hypothesis predicts that the distribution of the new shares cannot be 
absorbed by the market unless investors are compensated with discounts. Therefore, 
positive relationship between the relative offered size and the discount is expected. In 
addition, following the arguments of Loderer et al. (1991), if  the demand curve is 
downward sloping, the relative offered size will be positively correlated to the 
discount: deeper discount implies deeper price pressure. The study additionally uses 
a number of other proxies for liquidity costs effects over the discount, such as the 
bid-ask spread, trading volume, volume turnover and the relative offered size, as well
Articles exam ining the price techniques o f  IPO such as Rock (1985), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) also suggest that liquidity is significant for SEO.
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as the riskiness o f the stock. The general prediction is, positive relationship between 
the discount and the level o f illiquidity.
4.3.4. Buying at a prem ium
Considering that SEO discounting is necessary and expected by the market 
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003), paying premium sounds obscure. However, prior 
studies report that small percentages o f their samples are priced at premium, e.g. 
14% o f the private placements in Barclay et al. (2007, p. 475). Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) document that about 36% of their sample pays a premium, which reflects 
control incentives as the investors are already insiders (ibid, 470). Similarly, 
Armitage (2010) reports large variations in the offered price including large 
discounts and premiums for the UK market.
This raises the question of what the investor incentives are in order to pay more than 
the market price, when the common practice is to require discount. The plausible 
explanation is extraction of private benefits o f control (Barclay and Holdemess,
1989). In fact, Wu and Wang (2005) expand the Myers and M ajluf (1984) model by 
allowing for investments into projects with negative NPV, contrary to the original 
Myers-Majluf assumptions. Investing into negative NPV projects allows for self- 
dealing investor interests. It derives from agency costs that lead to overinvestment 
(not only to underinvestment as with the adverse selection problem of Myers-Majluf 
model). Thus, they introduce agency costs and private benefits. This assumes 
asymmetric information not only between the firm and the market, but also within 
the corporation. This is plausible, considering that investors are mainly existing 
shareholders.
Building upon this rationale, the fourth hypothesis examines the incentives of 
investors to have personal targets. This study argues that pursuing private benefits is 
not related to the placing type, primary or secondary. An investor who has self- 
dealing interests is not affected by how he/she will buy the shares, via the secondary 
market or directly from the firm. Such view is consistent with Wu (2004) who argues 
that the key to the placing discount/premium is related to factors other than the 
placing type. This study treats placements at a premium separately from discounts, as
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only few placements are offered at premium (see section 4.6.1). Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses are tested.
114.4a: The premium reflects private benefits and it is irrelevant from  the placing 
type (primary or secondary).
A second case that is likely to involve personal goals exists when investors become 
votive with the management and improve firm value. Expectations for future value 
improvements due to their participation might make them willing to buy at premium. 
In such cases, the personal incentives o f the investors are also beneficial for the 
shareholder wealth. In addition, when fewer discounts are required by active 
investors or for an illiquid stock with high uncertainty would also suggest self- 
dealing interests. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H4.4b: Active investors aiming to improve future firm  value will be willing to pay 
premium or accept lower discount, while benefits o f  any value enhancement 
are mitigated to all shareholders.
In such case, monitor signs are to be positively related to premium. The premium 
will also be positively related to announcement market reactions.
4.4. Research design and m ethodological details
This section explains the variables used to examine the testable hypothesis. It starts 
with the discount/premium, which is the main interest o f the chapter.
4.4.1. Discount/premium measures
The market price is the 'accessible' price for an individual investor that does not buy
directly from the company. Thus, the relative premium is presented as percentage o f
the market price (negative premium represents discount):
(pi.price -  mkt.price,) „  . .premium = - ------------- ------Eq. 4:1
mkt.price,
The pi.price is the offer price collected from the news reports or prospectuses; 
mkt.price, is the unadjusted market price at day t (DS item UP), t=0 is the
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announcement day. The premium/discount is estimated over the market prices at 
days t= -l, t=+l and t=+10. The market prices after the announcement should 
incorporate the placing information and thus, any significant premium/discount will 
reflect additional premium/discount driving factors. The different day discounts also 
take into account the placing post-offer effects as well as control for the possibility 
that the market delays to incorporate the placing information.
Additionally, when new shares are issued at a price different than the market one, the 
market price is expected to adjust accordingly. Precisely, assuming the firm value 
remains constant and there is no information effect, offering additional stock at a 
price different than the market one, the subsequent market price is expected to equal 
the weighted average value between the two prices (or the theoretical ex-right price 
as commonly known; e.g. Armitage, 2007). As an example, consider a stock with 
100 shares outstanding and market price at the day prior the announcement equal to 
ti=10. If the firm issue additional 100 shares with offer price tot-fer=5, then the market
price following the announcement should be 7.5 i  100*10+100*5 _ j0 + 5\  Thus, the
I (100 + 100) 2 /
market price will experience a mechanical dilution, which does not reduces the firm 
value. Based on the example, the real discount the investor gets is 2.5 (10-7.5) and 
not 5. Ignoring this market mechanism, a consideration of a discount o f 5, biases the 
discount upwards. The study adjusts for this mechanical effect on market prices. The 
correct or adjusted market price the day after the announcement p  , should be:
Old exjst shares * mkt.price + New , shares * pi.price
P
Mjj +1 Old exisl shares + New p, shares
Oldexis,shares is the number o f the existing shares outstanding, m k t.p r ic e the market
price the day prior the announcement, New ¡shares the number o f the placing shares
and pl.price the placing (offer) price. PMJl=+l should represent the price that a new
investor could buy from the market after the placing, assuming no change in the 
equity value. If the market price the day following the announcement differs from the 
adjusted one, it can be interpreted as information effect. Similar arguments are 
discussed by Corwin (2003) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2003). As this mechanism 
might have significant impact on the price premium or discount, investors would 
require compensation for the price dilution. For the primary sample that new shares
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are issued, the analysis is applied following both, the raw discount (Eq.4:1) and the 
price adjusted (Eq.4:2).
Further controls are taken. Few firms state at the prospectus that they plan to 
reorganize, to proceed with price adjustments and/or warrants are attached to the new 
share issue. Four cases involve share consolidations. To control for this, the market 
price at the day prior the announcement is adjusted to express the value reduction by 
multiplying it with the number o f old shares consolidated into one new 
mkt.price, , * nconsolshares.
Finally, most prospectuses state that the new shares ‘rank pari passu in all aspects 
with the existing ordinary shares and will rank in full for dividends or other 
distributions hereafter. If the dividend entitlement is not waived or not mentioned at 
all, it is assumed that the placing shares are entitled to the same rights as the existing 
issued capital. (If investors were not entitled to dividends, this could affect the 
discount as their expected cash-flows will be lower).
4.4.2. Variable definitions and empirical predictions on the testable hypotheses
To explore the testable hypotheses, variables that capture the existing and changes in 
asymmetric information (HI),  agency (H2 & H4) and liquidity (H3) are used. The 
analysis involves each of the samples (primary and secondary).
4.4.2.1. Certification and uncertainty (HI)
The certification hypothesis is examined with the use of variables that measure the 
uncertainty about the issuer value and certification costs for which investors might 
require compensation. Five variables test the first hypothesis, as follows.
I. A g e: The firm age is used as proxy for asymmetric information, measured as the
years since the company listing. An older company has more information available to 
the public over the years, which suggests fewer information costs for an investor to 
certify its value (see Wu, 2004). Thus, negative relation to price discount is expected.
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2. F.Value: The firm value. Firm value (or size) is a proxy for asymmetric
information. It results from multiplying the market price with the shares outstanding. 
Similar to the firm age, the bigger the placing company the more disclosed and thus, 
easier for potential investors to get information and certify its value. Thus, negative 
relation to the discount is expected. Following common practice, it is measured as 
the natural logarithm o f the firm market value (providing normality), 
F.Value = In(M V ) . The average MV over the three month around the placing 
announcement for the secondary sample is used. For the primary sample the enlarge 
MV is used which includes the placing proceeds (MV over the 3-months after the 
offer).
3. ARpre_offer: The past abnormal performance of the firm. It measures the firm ability
to perform well and thus, to be priced accordingly. Over-performing firms are 
expected to be priced at lower discount, as it implies better firm quality. Thus, 
negative relationship to the price discount. At the same time, the proxy captures the 
possibility that the firm times the offer when it is overvalued or when the stock over­
performs (Hertzel et al., 2002). In such case, the relation between ARpre_offer and
discount will be positive. This assumes that the market realizes the over-valuation 
and requires higher discount.
Stock abnormal return (ARpre.0ffer)  is defined as the buy-and-hold AR  for the months 
(-12,-1) prior the announcement day. Each o f the placing firm is matched with a non­
placing company based on its size and industry. From the population of UK listed 
firms (excluding firms within the financial services sectors) the firm with the closest 
MV, restricted to firms within the same industry sector (NIMD2) is chosen as 
benchmark.27 For the primary sample, the enlarged MV is used (similar to Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995).
4. Volatility : The volatility o f abnormal stock performance prior the event is a proxy 
for stock value uncertainty (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003). It indicates
11 A second non-event firm is chosen, based on the closest book-to-m arket ratio and size restriction o f
M V ±30%  betw een the two firms. Book-to-m arket is the book value o f  equity  (equity  capital and
reserves m inus total intangibles) divided by the m arket value as at the fiscal year end prior the event
(Liu et al., 1999). The past-perform ance on this benchm ark does not alter the conclusions.
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the magnitude o f pre-offer returns. A risk-averse investor would require higher 
compensation for a stock with higher volatility. Hence, it predicts positive 
relationship between the volatility and discount. Volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of the monthly abnormal return, for the months (-36, -1) prior the event.
5. Concentration : The ownership concentration is a proxy for information asymmetry. 
A highly concentrated firm is less transparent for an outsider and thus, it is more 
difficult to assess its value, if the investor aims to be active. This raises the cost to 
invest and thereby, a new investor would need to be compensated with deeper 
discounts (corresponding to the additional expenses). It is thus expected to have 
positive relationship to the placing discount.
As ownership characteristics are not always accessible, researchers use the most 
appropriate available data. As an example, Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), 
Kothare (1997) use the sum of the beneficial shareholder portions that own equal to 
or more than 5% of the share capital. Wruck (1989) states that the results on 
ownership concentration are qualitatively similar when the five largest shareholder 
portions are sum up regardless of the stake of the individual larger shareholders. This 
study aggregates the portions (as a percentage o f the total capital) of the six largest 
beneficial holders before the placing.
4.4.2.2. Monitoring the incumbents (H2)
Monitoring is addressed with the examination o f significant changes in ownership 
after the offers, post-purchase activities and investor identity. Due to the findings that 
in the UK investors are mainly existing shareholders (Armitage, 2010), the 
corresponding hypothesis is likely to have minimum weight on the discount. 
Relevant descriptive statistics on whether activity signs are observed are presented in 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. For multivariate analysis purposes, three proxies are used.
/. Aconcentr : The changes in ownership concentration before and after the offer 
(similar to Wruck, 1989). The intuition of this proxy is as follows. It is more difficult 
for an outside investor to affect firm policies and governance, when the firm is highly 
concentrated. Hereby, the change in ownership concentration captures changes in the
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'bargaining’ power o f the shareholders after the placing. This might help an investor 
to be active, regardless o f being new or existing. It therefore captures the possibility 
that a new or existing investor might have bought a large stake to gain control or gain 
more power among the shareholders. The discount should reflect the present value o f 
the monitoring expenses. Hence, the more the monitoring expenses, the more the 
discount they require. Contrary, significant negative coefficient will suggests private 
benefits; it implies the willingness o f an investor to accept less discount to get the 
power to affect the firm policies.
2. Aconcentr* Dmgl mrn'. This is an interaction term between the Aconcentr and a
binary variable Dmgt lurn that takes one for changes in management due to the
placing. It takes zero otherwise. This proxy complies with more recent literature 
(Barclay et al., 2007; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005) that the post-placing activity 
beyond the changes in ownership concentration, plays important role in monitoring 
or entrenching the incumbents. Shareholder activity indicates the intention o f 
investors to become active, in terms o f gain a place among the directors. Hereby, 
abnormal managerial turnovers for the ±4 months around the event are assessed. 
Significant findings would imply pre-placement agreements between the firm and the 
placing investors. In a similar vein, Hertzel and Smith (1993) use interactions
between their monitoring proxies and “ Aconcentr dummy” and “Single investor
dummy’’.
The relation with the discount is expected to be positive, as active investors will 
incur costs to monitor the incumbents (Wruck, 1989), especially if  the firm is highly 
concentrated. Changes in the ownership structure but no changes in the management 
composition would imply entrenchment; passive investors would require discount to 
support the incumbent management (Barclay et al., 2007). Hence insignificant 
coefficient will be reported. If the proxy documents negative coefficient, it will 
suggest intention to extract private benefits; investors will seem willing to accept less 
discount for their involvement to the management, as predicted by H4.b.
In addition, to describe whether significant changes in management take place 
around the events, the managerial turnover (change in the number o f directors over
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the total number o f directors)28 is measured over a long period of ±3 years around the 
announcement, for each placement. Annual changes over this six year period are 
used as a benchmark, as being the expected (or normal) changes. Then, the 
managerial turnovers over the eight month period (±4) around the announcement are 
estimated and compared with the benchmark turnover. Significant differences 
between them are reported as abnormal (see descriptive statistics in Table 4.3).
3. Str.Inv: Strategic investor. This is a binary variable that takes 1 when the
investor is classified as strategic. It takes zero otherwise. Strategic investor is the one 
who buys the whole or substantial portion o f the placing (20%) but it is not an 
institutional investor. It could be large existing shareholder, insider, director or other 
affiliated investor. It could also be a subscriber for such percentage of the placing 
necessary to maintain his/her stake undiluted or, such percentage with result to be 
characterized by the LSE authorities as ‘related party’. The placing might also be 
relatively small but significant for the investor wealth to provide him/her with 
bargaining power, to affect firm policies. A positive coefficient would imply 
monitoring costs [while negative would imply private benefits]. Table 4.4 describes 
the identity o f the investors and portions o f the discount paid.
4.4.2.3. Liquidity and inelastic demand (H3)
The impact of liquidity costs and risks on the offered discount is examined in 
multivariate analysis with the use of five variables as follows.
/. TrVolm : The trading volume reflects the quantity dimension of liquidity. Large
historical trading volume indicates stock liquidity. A largely traded stock is easier to 
sell without big fluctuations in the market price. The turnover is thus expected to be 
negatively associated with the price discount. Similar to Corwin (2003), it is defined 
as the natural logarithm of the mean daily volume within a window of (-250, -1) 
trading days prior the announcement (DS item VO). Opposite sign should imply 
inelastic demand (see also Gao and Ritter, 2010).
Directors are considered to be both, executive and non-executive directors (including chairm an, 
CEO. CFO. COO. production m anagers or other managers reported as executives).
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2. %Volm: The volume turnover reflects the speed dimension of liquidity. It
captures the sensitivity o f trading to changes in firm size. It is thus more related to
the level o f asymmetric information. Alike the trading volume, negative sign is
expected. Following Wu (2004), %Volm is the trading volume as a percentage o f the
shares outstanding prior the event, within an average day window (-250, -1):
Volm ,
%Volm =  —  •
Sh.Outst j,i
3. Spread : The bid-ask spread reflects the cost dimension of liquidity. If the stock
is illiquid, the spread between bid and ask prices will be far from zero and, the
opportunity to trade large amounts cheap will be limited. Less liquid stocks are more
costly to trade. Thus, if  the stock is seen as illiquid investors need to be compensated
with larger discount (positive relation to the price discount is expected). Following
Kothare (1997), the spread is defined as the difference between the ask and bid
prices, divided by the did-ask midpoint price, over a window of 30 days prior the
AskPr ice, -  Bid Pr ice,
event: Spread =----------- J-   ■
(Ask, + Bid,)12
4. OffSize : The relative offer size. It is the shares placed as a percentage o f the
shares outstanding (enlarged number for the primary sample), OffSize = —: . It
Sh.Outst
represents the increase in shares relative to the shares outstanding, i.e. the increase in 
the stock supply (which is one component o f the demand elasticity). A positive 
relation to the offered discount suggests the stock demand curve is downward 
sloping (Loderer et al., 1991). Flereby, it could be argued that the discount represents 
compensation for the subsequent pressure in the market price following the 
announcement due to inelastic stock demand (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; 
Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003).
Positive relationship is also documented by Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Barclay et 
al. (2007) for US private placements. Hertzel and Smith (1993) interpret the positive 
coefficient as information costs o f assessing the value o f a larger block. Contrary, 
Barclay et al. (2007) consider the negative relationship between premium and offered 
size as insight for passive investors. Specifically, buying a larger block o f shares
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might lead investors to require larger discount, as the risk of mistakes in evaluating 
the stock due to asymmetric information will have greater impact on the shareholder 
wealth. Along similar lines, larger discount might be necessary to compensate a 
passive investor for buying a large portion to entrench the management. The 
possibility that the stock is illiquid and selling large amounts o f the stock raises the 
actual cost and risk of trade (e.g. Corwin, 2003) is disregarded.
5. OffSize*DWghS read: In a manner similar to Corwin (2003) an interaction term
between the OffSize and a binary variable D m hs d is used. DmghSpread takes 1 when
the Finn is in the highest quartile o f bid-ask spread. As the placing size incorporates 
the effect o f the offered quantity, when DHighSpread equals one implies the stock is
among the riskiest in terms of liquidity risks/costs. The term should capture the price 
pressure effect due to inelastic demand and is expected to be positively related to 
price discount.
Note that the bid-ask spread and stock volume could also be considered as proxies
for asymmetric information (e.g. Wu, 2004). The argument is that, the more the
information about the stock, the less the risk and costs o f trade. Thus, the more the
stock liquidity. This fact makes information asymmetries significant for both
hypotheses (certification and liquidity). However, they refer to different nature of
costs. This study distinguishes between the two hypotheses by adding proxies for the
quality of the stock and whether theses significantly affect the discount. The riskiness
of stock in terms of value uncertainty is directly captured by the return volatility,
while the firm quality is directly measured by the past abnormal performance. In
addition, it is known that the relative offered size is a component of demand
, . . , AP IP
elasticity (Elasticity^ ). By interacting it with the most illiquid stocks
distinguishes between information and elasticity effects. In other words, examining a 
variety o f measures and combining the arguments should facilitate in distinguishing 
between uncertainty about the issuer value and liquidity.
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4.4.2.4. Buying at premium and private benefits (H4.4)
Barclay and Holdemess (1989) argue that investors do not have any reason to pay 
more than the market price for a stock, unless they pursue private benefits o f control. 
Hence, premium defined as the difference in the placing price and the prevailing 
market price after the event reflects private benefits (the market price should 
incorporate the information associated with the placing, after the event and thus, 
differences to the offer price should reflect private benefits). In such case, the above 
models are replicated using a premium sub-sample. The two equity offering types are 
distinguished with a binary variable that takes 1 for secondary placings and zero for 
the primary sample (sample .dummy ). According to the hypothesis H4.4a, private 
benefits o f control should not be affected by the issue type (primary or secondary). 
Thus, the sample .dummy is expected to be statistically insignificant. Additionally, 
H4.4b predicts that the relationships o f the explanatory variables will be opposite 
than the predictions o f hypotheses H4.1, H4.2, H4.3.
Overall, as the premium sub-sample is small, the study mainly focuses in 
understanding the implications around the placements priced at premium by 
providing relevant descriptive statistics such as classifying investors into categories 
based on their identity (which might imply incentives to pay more), the percentage 
bought, managerial turnovers and liquidity information.
4.5. Sam ple collection and characteristics
4.5.1. Sample collection
The study examines the implications around the two non pre-emptive UK equity 
placings that cover the period between 01/1998 -  06/2006. The choice for this period 
is twofold. First, prior evidence about primary placings refer to years 1996-1998 (see 
Barnes and Walker, 2006). Second, given the regulation changes in 1996, the study
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investigates the post-deregulation period (allowing 2 years for adjustments), while it
29also covers the Companies Act 2000 issuing requirements.
The first sample involves primary placings within the paradigm of SEO. New shares 
are issued but the existing shareholders do not maintain pre-emption rights to 
subscribe for the new shares on a pro-rata basis. Offers combined with pre-emptive 
offer are excluded (e.g. Right and Open Offers), as the study focuses on the 
implications o f pure non pre-emptive offers that the evidence is sparse. To identify 
the private placings, a search through the news report o f LexisNexis database was 
conducted, using the term ‘placing’ and reading line by line all the publicly 
announced placings over the period tested. US studies such as Wu (2004) and Wruck 
and Wu (2009) identify their samples using keywords such as ‘private placement’, 
■private stock offering’, ‘private negotiated transactions’, ‘common stock sale 
privately’, ‘direct placement’, ‘private offering or sale’ and ‘Regulation D and/or S’ 
which are regulations dealing the sale-restricted private placements in the US (there 
is no relevant regulation in the UK, although few placings sold to the US are sold 
under the regulation S or D). The search is replicated using the above keywords 
without successful sample increase.
If the placing is less than 5% of the company share and the report does not refer to 
pre-emptive rights, it is assumed that pre-emptive rights were waived in advance 
according to the Companies Act. 1996 (if not, a prospectus should be published). 
Such smaller placings might seem insignificant to the firm market value, however, 
they might have a great impact on the agency costs of the firm. A simple example is 
the placing o f 2% of the share capital with an existing large blockholder. The 2% 
stake might raise his/her stake to a controlling part. Additionally, these small 
placings usually take place to very big companies, contrary to the traditional form of 
private placements over the 5% arbitrary cut-off point. Therefore, a 2% stake might 
create a selling pressure to the market.
' (| Recall that the 1996 Com panies Act allowed UK listed firms to waive the pre-em ptive rights for 
offerings more than 5% o f  their share capital and approve the placing 12 months in advance. Firm s 
could exem pt from the prospectus requirem ent for placings below the 5%. In sequence, the 2000 
Com panies Act 're laxed ' the size restriction o f  non pre-em ptive offers, while the prospectus 
requirem ent relaxed further from 5% to 10% o f the share capital (see section 2.2.1).
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For the placings over the 5% of the shares outstanding, it is common practice for 
companies to publish a prospectus explaining the reasoning behind the private 
placing (prospectuses were extracted from Perfect Information). After reading the 
prospectus and the resolutions o f the EGM, the placing is included into the sample if 
the pre-emptive rights o f the existing shareholder are waived. To control for any 
differences o f the two sub-samples (below and above the 5% cut-off point) the 
placings over 5% of the share capital are examined separately. Beyond the 
differences in the firm characteristics, the results in terms o f the discount driving 
factors are similar. This makes the results robust.
The second offering type involves secondary placings. A block o f existing shares is 
sold to the market or to specific investors. These placings are initiated not by the 
company but by one or more shareholders. The secondary placings are collected after 
reading the news reports o f International Financial Review and confirmed by 
LexisNexis. Typically, a book building takes place and they are underwritten. 
Regardless the fact that the shares sold are already listed, the new investors pay the 
agreed placing price, not the market one.
The collection process resulted into 418 (primary and secondary) placements, by 
U.K. industrial firms. Investment companies, banks or companies that belong into 
financial industries are not included, as they are stocks with higher risk and betas. 
Share placings as a result o f tender offers, mergers and acquisitions are not included 
into the samples (the transfer o f an acquired firm shares to the acquirer is not 
considered as secondary placing). All placings are required to involve ordinary 
shares and, the relative offered size and placing price to be available or assessable 
from other sources. 55 placings are additionally excluded due to double counting o f 
the placements. The double counting was due to the different data collection sources, 
as follows.
LexisNexis news reports are published the following day o f the original 
announcement. Thus, for these placings, all announcement days had to be adjusted. 
In addition, the placings with prospectuses needed to verify the announcement day. 
Initially, the prospectus publication day was used. However, in rare cases the firm 
announced the forthcoming private placing few days earlier with a news report. The
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first (informal) announcement day is used (by the time of the prospectus publication, 
the market might already adjust the firm price). To ensure this, the news report 
sequence for each placing with prospectus is followed, using as announcement day 
the day at which the placing is first reported. This procedure leads to the closest 
previous market price before the announcement.
A few US studies investigating public issues use the issue day as the event day. 
Others follow volume-based methodology to define/correct the issue day (e.g. Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1992; Safieddine and Wilhelm, 1996; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003). 
The present study chooses the first news report day as the event day, as all 
information is released at the announcement, including the offer price. Thus, the 
market prices will incorporate the new information after the announcement day, 
contrary to the US, that the offer price is set immediately before the issue (not at the 
announcement). Besides, in many cases the issue or completion date is not reported, 
or the placements are already completed at the time of the announcement.
Second reason for possible double counting is that, in some cases companies 
announce placings that are to be allocated in more than one days (periodical offers). 
These cases usually involve few secondary offerings with book-building. A specific 
number of shares are to be sold and the initial characteristics are announced to the 
market. However, the whole procedure takes several days or the number/price o f 
shares sold might change by the end of the placing procedure, due to the high or low 
demand. The news reports mention each placing in different day and cautious is 
needed to identify their relation in order to use the initial news report as the 
announcement day. Further, if the price or number of shares initially reported is 
different from the realized ones, the data are adjusted accordingly.
Finally, 10 additional placings are excluded due to lack of availability o f market data 
in Datastream database (DS). The whole screening procedure leaves 230 primary and 
123 secondary placements. Overall, as the UK market is smaller and more opaque in 
comparison to the US, the sample is relatively small compared US studies examining 
private placings such as Hertzel and Smith (1993), Wruck (1989), Hertzel et al. 
(2002), Barclay et al. (2007).
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4.5.2. Sample characteristics
The final samples are described in Table 4.1. They involve 353 placings by 283 
companies. Approximately 21% of the placings are followed by a previous placing 
from the same company. 11 cases involve simultaneous primary and secondary 
placings (same day announcement for 11 primary and 11 secondary placings). 
Typically, the news reports related to such simultaneous placings state that the seller 
(usually member o f the management team or large block holder) takes advantage o f 
positive market reactions or identify a window of opportunity to sell shares at a 
higher price, due to the arrangements of the primary placing. Thus, each sample 
includes 11 placings from the same company, referred to the same day.
The secondary placement firms are much bigger in size, suggesting lower 
asymmetric information. The primary and secondary offering firms document mean 
(median) market value of 1.3 (0.048) billions and 5.1 (0.9), respectively. 
Additionally, the primary placings appear to consist o f very large firms in 
comparison to the SEO size reported by previous UK studies (e.g. Annitage, 2010; 
2007; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Slovin et al., 2000). Although not tabulated in Table
4.1, the difference in the firm size is attributed to the inclusion of placings smaller 
than the 5% cut-off point of the shares outstanding (Table 5.1 presents descriptive 
statistics for the two sub-samples). Such deviations in the firm size are also 
documented by Balachandran et al. (2009) who include smaller placements (in 
relative offered size) and accelerated book-buildings.
The primary placing firms offer approximately 22% (15%) o f their share capital, 
while secondary offerings about 12% (8%). Similarly, the proceeds collected as 
percentage of the firm value is 60% (12%) of the primary and 20% (7%) for the 
secondary placings. Hence, the relative offered size and the value offered is much 
bigger for the primary rather than the secondary offerings. These differences imply 
different incentives to place equity and larger discount for primary placings are 
expected (as there is higher asymmetric infonnation but less amounts collected). 
Indeed, the gross proceeds collected are 73millions (7m) for primary placings but
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186m (59m) for secondary.30 Finally, the secondary placing firms are ‘older’, in 
terms of being listed for longer. Thus, more information about them is available to 
the market. Precisely, they are listed for approximately 12 (7) years compared to 8 
(4) of primary placements. Overall, it seems that the two samples have substantial 
differences. The larger firm size and age o f the firms participating into block of 
already listed shares suggests lower asymmetric information. Hence, lower 
discounts/ premiums are also expected.
4.6. Findings and discussion
4.6.1. Descriptive statistics
4.6.1.1. Discount/premium
y  Private placements
Consistent with the existing evidence, the UK placing samples are mainly offered at 
discount (see Table 4.2). The mean (median) discount o f primary placings ranges 
from -10% (-7%) to -11% (-8%) depending on the day, all highly significant at the 
1% level. Notably, the third column that presents the adjusted premium/discount 
indicates statistically insignificant mean 1.5% but significant median -5.9%. The fact 
that the discount level is lower indicates the significant impact o f the mechanical 
dilution on the offered discount/premium. Recall that all else being equal, the 
adjusted price should equal the market one at day +1 after the announcement. 
Significant differences between the two prices imply information effects, agency, 
inelastic demand and/or other factors that affect the real premium /discount.
Although the discount levels reported are consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) report -9% to -14% depending on the sub samples used; 
Wruck (1989) reports discount levels around -11% to -13% at the day prior the 
announcement depending on whether the stock is registered or not), the discrepancies
30 It is w orthwhile to note that a few prim ary placing firm s announce reorganisation and reconstruction 
along the placing, causing enorm ous am ounts at the time. This m ight drive the discrepancies betw een 
the offer size and m arket value. To control for it, the discount is w inzorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.
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between minimum and maximum are extremely large. This implies heterogeneity in 
investor valuations (Armitage, 2010).
Attempting to explain why there is such big variation in investor valuations, the 
samples are reallocated based on whether they are priced at premium or discount to 
the prevailing market price (see Panels B and C). 84% of the primary placings are 
priced at discount to the market price at t=-l and only 16% (36 cases) are priced at 
premium. Mean (median) premium is +13% (+7%). At the day following the 
announcement t=+ l, 17% (38 cases) of the primary placings are priced at lower 
premium of +11 % (+5%), suggesting rise in market price after the announcement.
Nonetheless, the more days after the announcement, the more stocks are priced at 
premium, suggesting downward direction in market prices. At day t=+10, 25% 
placings o f the primary sample (58 cases) are priced at premium of +14% (8%). 
Hence, the market price temporary rise immediately after the announcement o f 
placing shares at premium, but soon recovers. This might suggest that the market 
needs few days to adjust or understand the premium implications. Consistently, 
based on the adjusted offer price PAdj,t=+i, 23% of the sample (56 placings) are priced 
at premium. The mean is extremely high to +56%, driven by very few stocks, 
whereas the median is 8% which is similar to the premium based on t=+10. Again, 
this implies the market does not immediately understand the premium reasoning.31
Regarding the discounts, they become smaller the days following announcement, 
suggesting rise in market prices. The discount is -14.6% (-9%) at t= -l, increases to - 
15.4% (-10%) at t=+l and subsequently increases further to -18% (-13%) at t=+10. 
Therefore, the market prices follow an upward trend after the announcement. 
Discount o f -15% (-9%) is also reported based on the adjusted market price PAdj,t=+i-
Discounts and prem ium s are by default unequal to zero. Statistically insignificant prem ium  would 
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Consistent with Barclay et al (2001), the difference between the discounts and 
premiums is approximately 25%-30%. However, they refer to sample differences, 
primary vs. secondary, not discount vs. premium within the same placing type. Only 
14% of their primary placings are priced at premium, but the majority o f secondary 
placings are priced at premium, having a 30% difference between the primary and 
secondary samples. The findings of this study reveal different situation in the UK.
r- Secondary placings
The majority o f the secondary placings are also priced at discount. The mean 
(median) discount is approximately -3% (-4%) to -4% (-3%) of the market price, 
significant at the 1% lever. Thus, secondary placings are not priced at premium as 
Barclay et al. (2001) suggest. They are offered at a discount which is less than half in 
comparison with that of the primary placing. They are offered at a discount which is 
approximately 6% (4%) to 8% (5%) lower, with this difference being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The economic interpretation is that, investors are willing 
to pay approximately +7% more for existing shares than new issues. The fact that 
secondary placings are valued at price closer to market one is consistent with the 
expectations and the predictions according to the descriptive statistics o f Table 4.1. 
The lower pricing reflects lower asymmetric information for this sample.
Similar to the primary placings, large investor heterogeneity on the offered price is 
reported. Distinguishing between the placements priced at discount and premium, the 
average difference between discount and premium is approximately 13%-15%. Not 
25%-30% as the primary sample. This again is consistent with the lower asymmetric 
information associated with the secondary placings.
The mean (median) discount level is -7%  (-4%), -7% (-5%) and -10% (-7%) for the 
days -1, +1 and +10 around the announcement, respectively. These discount levels 
arc again about half o f corresponding discounts o f the primary placings. This 
difference o f about 8% (5% - 6%) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
lower asymmetric information o f the secondary offers seems to affect the stock 
valuation (section 4.6.2.2 examines this issue further).
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Regarding the premium sub-sample, only 19% secondary placements (23 cases) are 
offered at premium based on the market price the day before the announcement -1. 
The number o f placements at premium increases to 29% (36 placements) at the 
subsequent days. The premium equals to +9% (+1.5%) based on the market price at 
t=-l and, reduces to +5% (+1.4%) at the day +1 following the announcement. It thus 
indicates a relative increase in the market price. However, by the day t=+10, the 
premium rises to +13% (+3.1%). This suggests the market requires few days to 
interpret the premium (whether adverse information signals are associated or not).
While the premium of the secondary shares seems lower than that o f the primary 
placements, the differences between them are not statistically significant. Only for 
the day +1 the difference is statistically significant. These insignificant differences 
are in line with hypothesis H4.4a, that private benefits and the premium are not 
driven by the placing type (primary vs. secondary). The paths fo the market prices 
for the premium sub-samples are also similar.
4.6.1.2. Ownership and managerial changes
> Ownership
In sequence, Table 4.3 presents details on the changes in ownership concentration
in
and changes in management around the placements. Consistent with the original 
monitoring argument (Wruck, 1989) ownership concentration decreases significantly 
after the placing for both samples, primary and secondary (Panel A). The ownership 
dispersion is consistent with Slovin et al. (2000), who report significant ownership 
dispersion for UK placings and argue that institutions and other investors join the 
company to act as external monitor factors.
When distinguishing between placings priced at discount and premium, only the 
discount sub-samples document significant ownership dispersion. This holds for 
both, primary and secondary offerings. However, the difference in ownership
32 Investigating hypotheses H2 and H4b requires the exam ination o f  m onitoring signs (e.g. ow nership 
concentration and m anagerial turnovers). Such data could be available by  databases for recent years 
only (e.g. N om inus database reports ownership data m ainly from  2000 onwards, while only for few  
cases data are available from  1998. D atastream  also provides ownership data from  2002 and onwards). 
It was thus im possible to include data for the placings before 2002. This has a result to reduce the 
num ber o f  observations.
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changes between discount and premium is not statistically significant. It is 
inconsistent with the view that when investors are willing to pay more for the stock 
will indicate higher monitoring in terms of reducing ownership concentration.
Table 4.3: Changes in ownership and management turnovers around the offers
Panel A presents the ownership concentration and its changes after the equity placing. Concentr. 
Before and Concentr. After are the sums o f  the portions o f  the six largest beneficial holders before and 
after the placing, respectively. The difference in ow nership concentration is the change in 
concentration variable (Aconcentr.). The null hypotheses are zero changes in means and m edians after 
the placing. Panel B presents the means and medians o f  m anagerial turnovers around the placings. It 
presents the changes am ong directors, within ±4 months and ±1 year surrounding the placings. The 
turnovers are m easured as the director changes within the corporation. D irectors are considered to be 
both, executive and non-executive (including chairm an, CEO, CFO, COO, production m anagers or 
other m anagers reported as executives). The m anagerial changes are percentages to the total num ber o f  
the directors. ___________
PR IM A RY SECO N D A R Y
Panel A : O w nership  concentration and changes
Concentr. Concentr. A Concentr. 





Mean 53.69 51.43 _2 55***
Full samples 
49.23 45.17 -4.24***
Median 52.62 49.42 -1 .86 *** 46.88 42.12 -3.97***
Mean 52.890 50.321 -2.804***
Priced at discount 
49.420 44.912 -4.544***
Median 50.890 49.350 _ 2  25 * * * 47.140 42.120 -4.105***
Mean 57.121 56.134 -1.483
Priced at premium 
48.100 46.657 -2.382
Median 58.050 51.550 -1.45** 46.620 43.635 -3.500
Mean -4.230 -5.813
Discount vs.. Premium 
-1.321 1.320 -1.745 -2.162




( -12, -4) ( -4, 0) ( 0, +4) (+4, +12) (-12, -4) ( -4, 0 ) ( 0, +4) (+4, +12)
Mean 0.193 0.066 0.097
Full samples 
0.189 0.126 0.057 0.107 0.151
Median 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.059
Mean 0.208 0.064 0.100
Priced at discount 
0.196 0.129 0.058 0.094 0.122
Median 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05
Mean 0.122 0.075 0.085
Priced at premium 
0.159 0.118 0.050 0.158 0.273
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.063 0.000 0.024 0.200
Mean 0.086** -0.011 0.015
Discount vs. Premium 
0.037 0.011 0.009 -0.063 -0.151**
Median 0.143** 0.000 0.000 0.105 -0.010 0.000 -0.024* -0.155**
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
r  Managerial turnovers 
Nevertheless, ownership concentration cannot tell an adequate economic story 
related to the monitoring hypothesis, as investor post-purchase activity (not only the
- 118 -
Chapter 4: The determinants o f the discount or premium o f non pre-emptive equity offerings
ownership dispersion) is a significant factor in monitoring the incumbents 
(Knshnamurthy et ah, 2005). Active investors should be associated with abnormal 
changes in the management o f the placing firm (Bethel et ah, 1998; Barclay and 
Holdemess, 1991). Otherwise entrenchment is possible (Barclay et ah, 2007).
Panel B documents managerial turnovers for the months surrounding the event. The 
management o f primary placings changes on average by 7% within the 4 months 
period before the announcement (-4, 0) and by 10% the later months (0, +4). 
Similarly, the average management turnover o f the secondary offers for the months (- 
4, 0) is 6% and 9% for (0, +4). However, the medians are zero for both placing types 
and they are statistically not far from zero in time-series manner.33 Hence, although 
ownership concentration disperses, there are no direct signs for shareholder activity. 
The fact that managerial turnovers are mainly normal does not comply with the 
monitoring argument (H4.2a and H4.2b). It rather suggests entrenchment, especially 
in the case that investors are existing shareholders that increase their stakes and 
bargaining power.
When distinguishing the primary placings based on the discount and premium paid, 
the premium sub-sample indicates lower managerial turnovers for the months (-12, - 
4). The difference from the discount sub-sample being statistically significant at the 
5% level. This is in line with the view that active investors are willing to pay more to 
increase firm value (H4.4b). During the remaining months, the managerial activity 
between the two sub-samples is similar. Additionally, with regards to the secondary 
placings priced at premium, they document significantly higher managerial turnovers 
the months after the event. This is again consistent with hypothesis H4.4b
4.6.1.3. Investor identity, ownership and discount/premium paid
As the identity o f investors might indicate activity incentives or incentives to buy at 
discount or premium, Table 4.4 describes the ‘players’ o f the primary and secondary
33 The changes in m anagem ent within ±3 years around the placing are also exam ined for both placing 
types. The m ean m anagerial turnovers for the prim ary and secondary sam ple range from  16.4% to 
30.3%  and 16.6% to 29% , respectively. In both offering types, the m anagerial turnovers peak at the 
event year (0-12 m onths). However, the m anagerial turns are not significant in tim e series m anner 
(com paring the differences during the years, the null hypothesis o f  zero abnorm al turnovers cannot be 
rejected).
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offers, after being categorized into institutional, corporate and individual (see 
Appendix I for details on the classification). Similar investor identification for the 
UK is documented by Franks et al. (2001). The table presents the net change in their 
ownership, i.e. whether they end up increasing or reducing their stake. It also shows 
descriptive statistics on the discount or premium paid by each investor category. 
While the levels o f discount/premium are not significantly different among the 
investor categories, the table facilitates in understanding the implications around the 
placings in terms of the decisions to buy or sell the event stock.34
r  Private placements
The primary shares are placed with several investors rather than a single or few 
investors, while the majority o f them go to existing institutions. Specifically, 190 
institutional investors participate to the 230 private placings, 75 corporations and 190 
individuals. It is hence obvious that several investor types might participate into the 
same placing, contrary to the US arguments about single investors (Wruck and Wu, 
2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005). This is consistent with Armitage (2010) that 
several investors participate into UK SEO. The placing causes increase in the 
institutional holdings by 35%. Corporate and individual investors also increase their 
stakes by 9% and 8% respectively.
Distinguishing the holdings based on whether the placing is at discount or premium, 
institutions increase their stake by 38% when it is at discount (about -14% discount) 
and by 25% when premiums are involved (about +9.5% premium). Note that 
premium cases are only 29, contrary to 153 discount cases.
Corporations increase their stake by only 6% when the offer is at discount (about - 
16% discount) but by 21.17% when premium is involved (about 9% premium). The 
premium cases are only 11, while discount involve 56 cases. These different 
valuations and participations suggest different incentives to participate to the placing 
e.g. institutions might aim monitoring (Allen, 2000; Chemmanur et al., 2009).
34
Although not tabulated, changes in ownership categories as provided by D atastream  are also 
examined. The num ber o f  shares held by em ployees and investors with substantial position in the 
com pany with significant voting rights (NOSHEM ), by investm ent com panies (NO SHIC), pension 
funds (NOSHPF), strategic investors who hold shares that public investors do not have access 
(NOSHST), foreign investors (NOSF1FR) and governm ent holdings (NOSHGV). The placing does not 
affect these group ownerships.
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Corporations might foresee synergy creation (Allen and Phillips, 2000) or improve 
the value o f less well performing firms (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005) when premiums 
are involved. Individual investors also increase their stake by 6% when they buy at 
discount (about -14% discount) but by 12.5% when the shares are at premium (about 
10% premium). This is consistent with the view that individuals participate when 
they have benefits to do so and they are willing to pay more (H4.4b).
Table 4.4: Type of the placing investors and offered discount/premium
The table presents the percentages o f  the holdings o f  the placing investors categorized to institutional, 
corporations and individuals. Institutional holders include all the investm ent trusts, fund m anagers, 
pension funds, insurance com panies and generally, all firm s included in the general financial industry. 
Corporations are industrial com panies. Individuals include m anagers, directors, fam ily m em bers or 
other ow ner that the beneficial is a single person. Individuals are further sub-divided into: 1) 
m anagem ent m em bers, directors and fam ily m em bers, 2) em ployees, 3) other individuals and 4) 
undisclosed accounts. The m anagem ent m em bers’ inform ation was extracted from  the p lacing 
prospectuses ( if  any) when it was clearly  stated that a m em ber o f  m anagem ent was to subscribe for the 
placing shares. The fam ily m em ber inform ation is m ainly collected from  N om inus database, under the 
heading o f  fam ily trusts o r sim ilar. The other individuals and undisclosed holdings are m ainly collected 
from N om inus.The discount/prem ium  is m easured as in Table 4.2.
PRIMARY S E C O N D A R Y
N M e a n  M edian N M e a n  M e d ia n
Panel A : Buyes o f th e  offer in perce n ta ge  of th e ir  p a rtic ip a tio n
Institutional 190 35 .8 3 % 3 6 .1 6 % 97 2 0 .4 3 % 1 2 .9 9 %
C orporation 75 8 .9 4 % 2 .1 7 % 42 -2 5 .5 7 % -2 2 .8 2 %
Individual 190 8 .1 2 % 5 .5 7 % 97 -1 6 .6 0 % -2 .8 0 %
455 236
A t  discount
Institutional 155 3 8 .1 6 % 4 1 .4 9 % 81 1 9 .9 9 % 1 2 .4 0 %
Corporation  57 6 .0 2 % 1 .6 9 % 35 -3 4 .1 1 % -3 1 .0 8 %
Individual 154 6 .3 2 % 5 .5 7 % 82 -1 4 .9 5 % -0 .8 6 %
A t  p re m iu m
Institutional 30 2 5 .4 3 % 2 3 .2 2 % 16 2 2 .6 4 % 1 7 .9 3 %
Corporation  16 2 1 .1 7 % 1 3 .3 7 % 7 1 7 .1 5 % 0 .0 8 %
Individual 31 1 2 .5 4 % 1.3 9 % 15 -2 5 .6 4 % -1 7 .9 6 %
Panel B: T h e  d isco u n t payed
Institutional 153 -0 .144 -0 .088 83 -0 .063 -0 .0 3 6
Corporation  56 -0 .161 -0 .084 39 -0 .057 -0 .040
Individual 152 -0 .144 -0 .088 83 -0 .069 -0 .040
361 205
Individual details
Director / M G T  / Family  12 -0 .167 -0 .097 4 -0 .095 -0 .052
Em ployee 11 -0 .099 -0 .0 8 0 8 -0 .078 -0 .020
O th e r  individual 133 -0 .146 -0 .091 68 -0 .070 -0 .042
Undisclosed A/C 145 -0 .1 4 4 -0 .088 76 -0 .065 -0 .0 3 8
Panel C: T h e  p re m iu m  payed
Institutional 29 0.095 0.060 17 0.067 0.012
Corporation  11 0.089 0.084 8 0.031 0.012
Individual 30 0.104 0.068 17 0.067 0.012
70 42
Individual details
Director / M G T  / Family  2 0.153 0.153 3 0.005 0.001
Em ployee 1 0.143 0.143
O th e r  individual 26 0.115 0.089 13 0.049 0.007
Undisclosed A/C 29 0.095 0.060 17 0.067 0.012
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r- Secondary placements 
With regards to the 123 secondary placements, 97 institutional investors participate, 
42 corporations and 97 individuals. This again contradicts the US arguments about 
involvement o f few active investors into transactions with existing shares (Barclay 
and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Phillips, 2000; Bethel et al., 1998). Approximately 
20% of the secondary shares go to institutions, as a net increase of their stake. 
Contrary, corporation and individual investors reduce their stakes by -25.6% and - 
16.6%, respectively.33
These percentages change when we take into account whether the shares are bought 
at discount or premium. While the participation o f institutional investors remains 
relatively stable at 20% when discount is involved (about -6% discount), they 
increase their participation to 23% when the offer is at premium. This suggests
36monitoring activities and certification o f institutional investors (Allen, 2000). 
Contrary, corporations reduce their stake by -34% when the offer is at discount 
(about -7% discount) but increase their ownership by 17% when premiums are 
involved (about +3% premium). Possibly corporate investors sell overvalued stock 
(Lee, 1997), but buy when they foresee synergy creation (Allen and Phillips, 2000). 
Individuals also reduce their participation regardless of the offer being at discount or 
premium: by -15% when discount of -6% is paid and by -26% when premium of 7% 
is paid. This could be a signalling tool, suggesting adverse information and 
implication that insiders sell overvalued stock (Lee, 1997).
4.6.2. Explaining the offered discount
As descriptive statistics are only suggestive, Table 4.5 applies OLS multivariate 
cross-sectional regression analysis. Dependent variable is the offered discount, 
estimated based on the market price at the day prior the announcement as in section
In fact, corporate investors buy approxim ately 28.33%  but sell 50.12% , whereas individuals buy 
11.83% and sell 29.20%. Among individuals, the group with the largest sales is the other individuals 
(34.26% ). followed by the directors/fam ily m em bers (18.10% ), undisclosed accounts (6.54% ) and 
em ployees (3%).
Corporate governance studies docum ent significant role o f  institutional investors in term s indirect 
means o f  activism  and m onitoring (Carleton et al., 1998; M ikkelson and Ruback, 1985; O pler and 
Sokobin, 1998; Smith. 1996). It is argued that institutional investors reduce transaction costs and the 
level o f  inform ation asymmetries.
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4.6.1.1. Explanatory variables are proxies for each of the testable hypotheses as 
developed in section 4.4.2. Since the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, 
having all variables in a single model facilitates in identifying which hypothesis has a 
greater weight on the offered discount. The analysis also follows a backwards 
stepwise regression approach. All variables are initially included into a single model. 
In every step the model runs, the least suitable variable is removed. The final model 
consists o f the significant variables only (at the 10% level). Individual regressions for 
each testable hypothesis are also run, for both equity placing types (primary and 
secondary). However the conclusions drawn are qualitatively the same with the full 
models and thus, not tabulated.
4.6.2.1. Primary placings priced at discount
With regards to the primary placings, the first model documents the 
A concentr* D nirn as the only significant variable. It has a small, closed to zero
positive coefficient o f 0.0004, significant at the 5% level. While this has small 
economic value, the model 2 that follows a backwards stepwise regression approach 
suggests that liquidity and inelastic demand are the main driving factors o f the 
offered discount, in UK placings.
Precisely, the volume turnover %Volm has the highest coefficient o f -2.769. This 
suggests liquidity and information asymmetry costs. The impact o f pure information 
effects is also noticeable, as the coefficient of the firm size is negative (-0.14) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the OffSize *DHighSpread has a
significantly positive coefficient o f 0.194. As this proxy captures the relative offer 
size o f the firms with the highest liquidity risk (belonging to the highest spread 
quartile), it implies inelastic demand and relevant risks (Corwin, 2003).
Recall that certification and liquidity hypotheses are both subject to information 
asymmetries. However, they refer to different nature of costs and different placing 
implications. Observing the coefficients o f past-performance and return volatility, 
that capture the certification impact on the discount, they are both statistically 
insignificant. Hereby, although the liquidity variables such as volume and bid-ask
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spread also capture asymmetric information (e.g. Wu, 2004), the fact that the past- 
performance and volatility are not significant, suggests the discount is to compensate 
investors for liquidity costs and risks (H4.3a) rather than certification (H4.1a).
Table 4.5: Cross-sectional regression analysis for the discount
The table presents W hite (1980) corrected coefficients o f  OLS analysis, w ith explanatory the discount as 
defined in Table 4.2. Age is the years since the corporation listing. F. Value reflects the firm size, 
Volatility is the volatility o f  abnorm al return for the m onths (-36, -1) p rior the event. ARpre.0ffer is the 
abnorm al holding return o f  the previous year. Concentration is the existing ownership concentration and 
Aconcentr is the change in concentration before and after the events, as described in Table 4.3. OffSize is 
the relative offered size, Spread is the bid-ask spread, TrVoIm is the trading volum e and %Volm is the 
volume turnover as percentage o f  the shares outstanding prior the event. Aconcentr*DmglJurn is an 
interaction term between the Aconcentr and a binary variable (DmgtJum)  that takes 1 when m anagerial 
changes are reported within the ±4 months around the announcem ent. Str.inv is a binary variable that 
takes 1 when strategic investor participates, and zero otherwise. OffSize*DHigi, Sprer2Cj, is an interaction term 
defined as the product between the OffSize and a binary variable DHigh Spread that takes 1 when the standard 
deviation o f  the trading volum e is in the 4 lh quartile o f  the distribution and, zero otherwise. O bservations 
beyond ±2 error standard deviations are om itted to avoid outlier impact. A VIF 10 cu t-off point is used 
for m ulticolinearity. SW denotes a backwards stepwise regression approach: all variables are initially 
included into the model. In every step the model runs, the least suitable variable is rem oved. It ends with 
a model including only the significant driving factors (at the 10% level).
Variables Prediction
PRIMARY PtACINGS SECONDARY PLACINGS
1 2 (sw) 3 4 (sw)
Intercept 0.046 0.163*** -0.071 -0 .078**
Age - (info costs) 0.0002 0.000
F. Value - (info costs) -0.008 -0.014*** 0.015** 0.009*
preoffer - (high quality), + (overvaluation) -0.005 0.006
Volatility + (uncertainty) 0.088 0.165*** 0.126*
Concentration +(info costs) 0.001 0.001* 0.0006**
Aconcentr + (Monitor), - (Pr. Benefits) -0.002 -0.002** -0 .002** -0.0009*
Aconcentr* D mgtJurn + (Monitor), - (Pr. Benefits) 0.004** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.0009*
Str.inv + (Monitor), - (Pr. Benefits) -0.007 0.004
Spread + (liquidity or info costs) 0.238 1.934** 1.76**
TrVoIm - (liquidity or info costs) 0.000 -0.007
%Volm - (liquidity or info costs) -2.396 -2.769* 0.854
OffSize +(inelastic demand) 0.102 0.018
OffSize *DHighSpread +(inelastic demand) 0.081 0.194*** -2.219
Obs 127 127 61 61
Adj. Ft2 0.363 0.354 0.362 0.393
F-Stat. 5.82*** g yg*** 9.38*** 5.71***
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Regarding the monitoring hypothesis (H4.2a), the model reports a small negative 
coefficient of change in ownership concentration (Aconcentr = -0 .002), statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Nonetheless, as mentioned, the change in ownership 
structure (tabulated in Table 4.3) alone cannot be interpreted as activity sign. The 
variable is unable to distinguish between monitoring or entrenchment; the change in
-  124 -
Chapter 4: The determinants o f the discount or premium o f non pre-emptive equity offerings
largest beneficial owners might also suggest changes among existing shareholders 
that do not aim further monitoring. As the coefficient of /sconcenfrDmgl is positive
(0.004) and significant at the 1% level, could suggest small impact o f monitoring 
costs, consistent with the corresponding hypothesis.
Overall, the model supports the third hypothesis (H4.3a) and the view that investors 
require discount to hold an illiquid stock that has downward sloping demand curve 
(Corwin, 2003). Probably, liquidity costs are driven by the level o f asymmetric 
information around the placings. However, the discount does not seem to be driven 
by uncertainty about the issuer value. As a conclusion, the costs to place illiquid 
stock lead investors to require discount as compensation to invest to the particular 
placing. Monitoring has only a small weight.
4.6.2.2. Secondary placings priced at discount
In sequence, models 3 and 4 examine the three testable hypotheses related to the 
discount o f the secondary placings. Both models report the bid-ask spread as the 
variable with the highest coefficient (1.93 and 1.76 for models 3 and 4 respectively) 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that investors need to 
be compensated for the high transaction costs, consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis and asymmetric information. The stock volatility also documents 
significantly positive coefficient of 0.165 and 0.126 for the two models, suggesting 
uncertainty about the stock value. In line with this, the firm value documents small 
but significantly positive coefficient o f 0.009, which implies again asymmetric 
information. Small but significant impact is also documented by the managerial 
turnover interaction term (Aconcentr  * Dmgt lurn = 0.0009*), suggesting small monitoring
costs for which investors require discount.
Therefore, although the secondary placements document lower asymmetric 
information in comparison with the primary shares (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2), it 
appears that the information asymmetry in the secondary offerings plays a greater 
role in the discount set up. These findings propose that investors are uncertain about 
the issuer value, attributable to asymmetric information between them and the sellers. 
This is in line with H4.1b and the view that the insiders might sell overvalued stock
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(Lee, 1997). Hence, the sale o f the secondary stock might signal potential 
overvaluation for which investors require compensation.
These results differ from the prior evidence on secondary placings. Considering that 
secondary placings have been associated with higher activity (Allen and Phillips, 
2000; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Barclay et al., 2001) it suggests expectations 
for value improvements for which significant monitoring costs are pronounced. 
Instead, the secondary placings in the UK appear to consist o f stocks with higher 
uncertainty. This is the dominant detenninant the offered discount.
4.6.3. Placements priced at premium and private benefits
r- Premiums are not affected by the placing type
Having analysed the discount and its determinants for both samples, this section 
investigates the premium and hypothesis H4.4. The findings comply with hypothesis 
H4.4a. If investors aim private benefits and are willing to pay premium, they are 
indifferent with the way they buy the stock. Table 4.2 reports that the difference 
between the primary and secondary discount/premium is statistically significant only 
for the discount sub-sample. No significant differences are reported for premiums, 
consistent with this hypothesis.
Similarly, Table 4.6 applies backwards stepwise regression analysis that examines 
the premium. Three models are run with dependent variable the premium based on 
day prior the announcement t=-l, the day after t=+l and 10 days afterwards t=+10. 
The reason to use the premium based on the market price after the announcement 
lays on the assumption that an investor would not pay more than the market price 
after the information is revealed and incorporated into the market prices, unless 
he/she pursues private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989).
The two placing samples (primary and secondary) are distinguished with a binary 
variable sample .dummy that takes 1 when the placing belongs to the secondary 
offers and zero for the private placements. This variable is not statistically significant 
in any model, consistent with hypothesis H4.4a. This suggests again that the two
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samples are not valued differently because they constitute different placing types per 
se. An investor who pursues personal goals is indifferent by the way he/she buys the 
stock (from the market or from the firm).
Table 4.6: Cross-sectional regression analysis for the premium
The table presents W hite (1980) corrected coefficients o f  OLS analysis, when backw ards stepwise 
regression approach is followed. All variables are initially included into the m odel. In every  step the 
model runs, the least suitable variable is rem oved, ending w ith a model including only the significant 
driving factors (at the 10% level). Explanatory variable is the prem ium  as defined in Table 4.2. All 
variables are as described in Table 4.5. O bservations beyond ±2 error standard deviations are om itted 
to avoid outlier impact. A VIF 10 cu t-o ff point is used for m ulticolinearity.
Variable









Intercept 0.083*** 0.142*** 0.184***
sample.dummy insignificant
Age ( - ) -0.003*** -0 .0 0 1* -0.013*
F.Value ( - )
AD
/ ~'rx p r e - o ff e r ( - )  
or overvaluation
Volatility ( - )
Concentration ( + ) 0 .002*
Aconcentr ( - )
Aconcentr*D mgtJurn ( - )
Str.inv ( + )
Spread ( + ) -0.759** -0.351*** -0.45**
TrVolm ( - ) -0.013** -0 .01 0***
%Volm ( - )
OffSize ( - ) -0.181*
Off Size D H ig h S p re a d ( - ) 0.259**
Obs 39 46 54
Adj. R 2 0.134 0.194 0.026
F-Stat. 6.89*** 6.89*** 2.83*
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
> Premium fo r  stocks with higher uncertainty, no monitoring activities and/or less 
liquidity reflects private benefits
Beyond the sample.dummy Table 4.6 reports significant negative coefficient o f -
0.001 to -0.003 for the firm age. This holds for all three models and suggests higher 
premium for younger firms, i.e. for a stock with higher asymmetric information. 
Model 1 also reports positive coefficient of 0.002 for the ownership concentration, 
significant at the 10%. This suggests again higher premium for a more concentrated 
stock, i.e. for a stock with higher information and monitoring costs. Likewise,
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models 1 and 2 report significantly negative coefficients for the trading volume, o f -
0.01, while model 2 additionally documents a coefficient o f -0.181 for the relative 
offered size. These coefficients suggest that investors are willing to pay more for a 
less liquid stock.
Why an investor would pay more for a stock which is highly concentrated and with 
higher asymmetric information? Although both o f these variables have small 
economic value (as they are close to zero) they suggest private benefits. This 
interpretation is in line with the activity signs o f private placements offered at 
premium reported in Table 4.3 (Table 4.3 suggests dispersion in ownership 
concentration and significant managerial turnovers around the placements priced at 
premium).
Nonetheless, all three models of Table 4.6 report a negative coefficient for the bid- 
ask spread, about -0.35 to -0.76 statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels. This 
implies that the shares priced at premium are subject to lower transaction costs. 
Hence, the negative coefficients of trading volume, relative offered size and age, as 
well as the positive coefficient of ownership concentration possibly suggest that the 
stocks priced at premium are of higher liquidity and lower transaction costs which 
attract premiums.
To fully explore the implications around placings priced at premium and distinguish 
between the possibility that premiums are related to investor intentions to improve 
firm value or to extract private benefits, the study conducts a standard event-study 
with a three-day window around the premium announcements. The market reactions 
are about +3.5%, however normal in terms of statistical significance (not shown for 
brevity). This suggests the market might require some time to understand the signals 
sent; whether investors buy at premium to improve firm value or to purely extract 
private benefits. This interpretation is consistent with the discount paths reported at 
Table 4.2 which reports downward price path by the tenth day following the 
announcement. This is in line with the private benefits hypothesis. Examining the 
differences between the two offering types, they are again statistically insignificant, 
pointing that the placing type is not important when investors have self-dealing 
incentives (Wu and Wang, 2005).
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4.7. Sum m ary and conclusions
This chapter investigates the factors affecting the discount or premium of UK non 
pre-emptive equity offerings. Prior literature attributes discounts o f private 
placements to costs incurred by informed investors to certify the firm value (Hertzel 
and Smith, 1993), to monitoring (Wruck, 1989) or entrenchment costs (Barclay et ah, 
2007). In addition, high liquidity and price pressure due to inelastic demand appear 
important on the discount o f right issues (Armitage, 2007), public offerings (Corwin, 
2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003) and sale-restricted private placements (Maynes 
and Pandes, 2008; Silber, 1991).
However, the extant literature disregards the impact o f liquidity costs on private 
placings without sale restrictions. In addition, little evidence exists for the price 
techniques related to secondary offers, while prior literature avoids examining 
separately offers priced at premium. On that basis, this study contributes by 
investigating the certification, monitoring and liquidity possibilities for these two non 
pre-emptive offering types in the UK (primary and secondary). It additionally 
examines whether premiums reflect private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989).
Table 4.7 summarizes the main findings, as follows. First, having investigated the 
discount or premium, large heterogeneity is observed. A difference o f about 25%- 
30% between the discounts and premiums of the private placings is reported. This 
confirms the large variation in the offered price value in the UK (Armitage, 2010). 
The results advocate that the discount o f UK placings reflects mainly liquidity and 
information costs. The discount o f new placing shares is driven the relative offered 
size and liquidity risks, suggesting inelastic demand. Investors require discount to 
invest to the particular stock due to liquidity risks (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; 
Corwin, 2003).
An alternative interpretation would be that the higher offered size entails larger 
investigation costs for which investors require discount, consistent with the 
certification hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). While both interpretations are 
subject to information asymmetries, the analysis suggests liquidity rather than
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certification because proxies for firm quality such as past-performance and return 
volatility do not significantly affect the offered discount. Instead, the bid-ask spread, 
trading volume and the relative offer size do. Therefore, the study advocates that 
liquidity is a dominant factor in determining the discount in private placings, even 
when no sale restrictions are imposed. This has been disregarded by prior studies.
Moreover, monitoring has only a small weight in explaining the discount. This 
contradicts the suggestion o f Slovin et al. (2000) that external monitor factors are 
likely to improve the firm value of UK placings. While the small weight o f 
monitoring is consistent with the arguments o f Barclay et al (2007), the discount is 
not about entrenchment or other agency issues either. It is mainly about liquidity.
Regarding the secondary offerings, they are also priced mainly at discount. However, 
they are offered at about half discount in comparison with the primary placings (7%) 
and document about half discrepancies between the premium and discount (about 
15%). This suggests that the offerings are subject to lower asymmetric information in 
comparison with the primary sample. This is also plausible, considering that the 
stock is already listed and the market has already assessed its value (Lee, 1997).
Regardless, the analysis attributes the discounts o f secondary offerings to uncertainty 
about the value o f the shares sold. The study advocates that investors are uncertain 
about the stock value for which they require discount. This favours the view that the 
sellers might 'knowingly’ sell overvalued stock (Lee, 1997). In addition, the findings 
are inconsistent with the prior common perception that secondary placings involve 
active investors (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Phillips, 2000; Bethel et 
al., 1998). In such case increased monitoring costs would be observable. Contrary, 
small impact of monitoring expenses is reported, while activity signs are not obvious.
The last focus of the chapter is on placings priced at premium. It suggests that 
premium involve more liquid stocks which might facilitate in pricing the shares at 
higher price. Investors willing to pay premium seem to have self-dealing incentives 
(Wu and Wang, 2005). Finally, the study provides evidence that investors are 
indifferent on how they will buy the stock, directly from the company or from the 
stock market.
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Table 4.7: Summary of main findings of chapter four
The first colum n presents the hypothesis tested, the second the relevant expectations and the third
w hether the results support the s pecific hypothesis.
H ypothesis Prediction for the coefficients to
Consistent results
discount or prem ium Prim ary Secondary
H4.1. C ertification & (+) inform ation asym m etry V V
uncertainty hypothesis (-) past-perform ance X V
(+) return volatility X V
H4.2. M onitoring hypothesis A ctivity signs in descriptive ? ?
(+) activity variables
H4.3. Liquidity and inelastic (+) inform ation asym m etry V V
dem and (+) liquidity V X ?
H4.4a. Prem ium  reflects Insignificant differences betw een V
private benefits prim ary & secondary
regardless o f  the offer N egative m arket reactions at the x  (insignificant)
type announcem ent
H4.4b. Passive investors that Opposite signs that do not fall
pay m ore for illiquid, w ithin H4.1, H 4.2, H 4.3 V
riskier and higher




Chapter 5 : Incentives around Non pre-emptive Equity Offerings. 
Good Timing and/or Earnings Management?
5.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the long-run firm performance surrounding non pre-emptive 
equity offerings. It focuses on the second research objective o f the study (Obj.2) and 
provides an answer to the second research question Q2. It thus examines whether the 
post-offer underperformance is attributed to timing and/or earnings management.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains the motivation and main 
contributions o f this chapter. Section 5.3 reviews the background and relevant 
literature, develops testable hypotheses and explains the empirical predictions. 
Section 5.4 illustrates the research design and methodologies. Section 5.5 describes 
the datasets and characteristics of the sample, while section 5.6 discusses the 
empirical findings. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2. M otivation and m ain contributions o f the chapter
Evidence suggests that firms placing equity privately tend to over-perform their 
benchmarks the years prior the offer but under-perform the years later (see Hertzel et 
ah, 2002; Barclay et ah, 2007). It is in fact typical for issuing firms to under-perform 
relative to their benchmarks few years after the event irrespective o f the offering 
method.37 Contrary, firms participating into transactions with blocks o f already listed 
shares are reported to over-perform their benchmarks few years later (Bethel et ah, 
1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Phillips, 2000 for US evidence). The
37 See (am ong others) US public issues (Spiess and A ffleck-Graves, 1995; M itchell and Stafford, 
2000; Loughran and Ritter, 1997); UK rights (Ngatuni et al., 2007; A ndrikopoulos, 2009), p re­
renounced rights (Arm itage, 2007), open offers (Ngatuni et ah, 2007; Iqbal et ah, 2009), open offers 
accom panied w ith a placing (Ho, 2005). Likewise, underperform ance is reported for D utch right 
issues (K abir and Roosenboom , 2003), Korean SEO (Yoon and M iller, 2002), Japanese SEO (Cai, 
1998) and rights (Kai et ah, 1999).
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rationale o f the over-performance is that, new, corporate and/or affiliate investor 
joins the firm and becomes active in terms of participating in management. This 
monitoring activity eventually positively affects the firm value. Similar arguments on 
US private placements are also reported. Krishnamuthy et al. (2005) and Wruck and 
Wu (2009) argue that when the investor is affiliated with the firm, he/she is an 
insider and/or participate into the management after the placement, 
underperformance is reduced or eliminated. However, the past-performance o f 
secondary offerings is not towards specific direction. Firms chosen by active 
investors underperform prior the event (Bethel et ah, 1998) whereas those chosen for 
corporate alliances and joint ventures overperform (Allen and Philips, 2000). 
Different incentives are involved.
This chapter is mainly motivated by two factors. First, the lack o f (adequate) 
evidence with regards to the long-run performance of particular equity offering types 
for the UK market. Second, contrary to the US evidence that new investors 
participate that might affect firm policies, investors in UK equity offerings are
TO
mainly existing rather than new investors (Armitage, 2010). This provides 
additional potential interest. Given the arguments that models developed based on 
US SEO have not been applicable into the UK (Slovin et ah, 2000; Korteweg and 
Reneboog, 2002, Armitage, 2002), investigating the long-run abnormal performance 
and/or their determinants for the two equity offering types might indicate different 
findings. On that basis, the contribution of the paper is twofold. It provides new 
evidence about the performance surrounding UK non pre-emptive placings o f equity 
and explains the performance path based on the UK settings.
More specifically, the few studies investigating long-run performance o f UK SEO 
focus on pre-emptive offers. Armitage (2007) and Andrikopoulos (2009) examine the 
long-horizon performance following pre-renounced rights and ordinary right issues, 
respectively. Ngatuni et ah (2007) compare the performance following right and 
open offers, while Iqbal et ah (2009) examine the performance around open offers. 
To the best o f my knowledge, the only study that investigates long-run stock
''N Appendix I also identifies the investor identity for the sam ples used in this study. Additionally, 
sections 4.6.1.2 and 4.6.1.3 provide evidence on the lim ited post-offer activity follow ing the two 
samples.
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performance surrounding UK private placings is Ho (2005). However, the sample 
used is accompanied by open offers. He reports little evidence o f post-offer 
underperformance, as results are sensitive to the long-run AR  approach used. Further, 
neither does he examine any factors that might affect the underperformance, nor does 
he try to explain why the patterns observed. To the degree I am aware of, evidence 
on the long-horizon abnormal performance surrounding UK secondary placings has 
not been documented by prior studies.
The main objective of this chapter is to shed some more light on the UK settings 
regarding SEO. Recall that although in the UK right issues used to be the norm until 
midi 980’s, nowadays placings accompanied with open offers are the most common 
method (see Barnes and Walker, 2006; Armitage, 2010). Yet, we have the least 
information about pure placings in comparison with right and open offers. On that 
basis, the contribution of the chapter is twofold. First, it provides new evidence about 
the long-run stock and operating performance surrounding pure UK placings. 
Second, it explains any observed paths by having three main sets o f interests which 
derive by the SEO literature: i) over-optimism, ii) time-varying asymmetric 
information and iii) earnings quality.
More specifically, prior studies assume that placing firms time the offer when the 
stock is overvalued, as performance peaks at the offer year and deteriorates 
afterwards (e.g. Hertzel et al, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Expanding prior 
literature that explicitly advocates for this ‘window or opportunity’ hypothesis, the 
current study additionally considers the UK settings into consideration. Following 
the suggestion o f Hellier (2010) that accounting quality in the UK might influence 
the SEO quality, the study examines whether accounting measures (i.e. trends in real 
sales growth, cash-flow measures, leverage, operating cash-flows, leverage, debt and 
capital expenditures) facilitate the firm to signal growth and expectations for value 
improvements. The analysis reflects corporate fundamentals, whilst it also controls 
for agency problems that might affect the firm’s decision to sell equity (Jung et ah, 
1996). The management might be truly over-optimistic about the future firm value 
rather than deliberately sell overvalued stock (given that investors are existing 
shareholders; Armitage, 2010).
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This hypothesis also complies with arguments about time-varying asymmetric 
information of issuing firms (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk et ah, 1991; 
Dierkens, 1991). Consistent with the earnings quality arguments, it is likely that the 
management also 'helps’ the firm to signal growth by managing accruals the year 
prior the offer. Given that investors are mainly existing shareholders, such possibility 
would suggest internal information asymmetries between the management and 
shareholders. While the literature identifies this possibility for IPO and other SEO, it
39has not documented similar analysis on (private) placings.
Regarding the secondary offerings, the conventional timing hypothesis o f knowingly 
selling overvalued stock could be valid in UK secondary offers. Often, the members 
o f the management or large shareholders sell due to their disagreement with the 
incumbent management or because they had personal reasons to do so.40 The sale is 
initiated from the sellers point rather than the buyers and thus, managerial activity 
following the placing is not expected. On that basis, it is likely that the sellers sell the 
stock at the best convenient time, i.e. when earnings are managed or when the firm 
signals high performance. This is along the lines o f Lee (1997) and Clarke et al.
(2004) who argue that US managers sell overvalued stock and identify a window of 
opportunity, respectively. Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) reports similar incentives 
regarding US insider trading. However, the secondary sample of this study differs, as 
it involves sales of block holdings, not insider trading.
The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and imply that investors do not 
realize the real implications of the offerings. They do not receive the stock over­
performance prior the offer as temporary or illusionary.
5.3. H ypotheses developm ent and em pirical predictions
5.3.1. Window of opportunity
1 iming an equity otter has its basic intuition on the information asymmetries 
between the SEO firm and the market. Insiders are better informed about the future
"’Among others see Teoh et al. (1998a). Shivakum ar (2000). Rangan (1998) for US SEO, Iqbal et al. 
(2009) for UK open offers and Yoon and M iller (2002) for Korean SEO.
This inform ation is extracted from the news reports used for the sam ple collection.
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firm prospects and attempt to sell (relatively) overvalued stock (as implied in 
Akerlof, 1970; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wu and Wang, 
2005). The management is overoptimistic about private information it possess which 
is not incorporated to the market prices (yet). The miss-pricing is revealed to the 
market over time, which leads to long-run post-offer underperformance.
Timing is examined and reported in various ways. Evidence suggests that the 
managers or sellers choose to sell over-valued stock when a preceding event sends 
signals that change the level o f asymmetric information between the firm and the 
market. The asymmetric information is reduced, leading to lower adverse selection 
costs. In other words, there is time-varying asymmetric information (Korajcyk et ah, 
1992). In that way, the firm avoids larger market reactions at the announcement as 
the real firm value is disclosed gradually (Korajcyk et ah, 1991; Dierkens, 1991). As 
an example, equity offering announcements follow increased disclosure activities 
(Lang and Lundholm, 2000), follow information releases related to earnings 
(Korajczyk et ah, 1991) and dividend announcements (Loderer and Maurer, 1992).
Other evidence that support the timing hypothesis documents significant growth or 
over-performance prior the offer which deteriorates afterwards. More specifically, it 
is argued that SEO take place at a suitable time o f the firm business cycle. A 
significant relationship o f the SEO timing and the business cycle is reported (Choe et 
ah, 1993). Likewise, evidence reports increased firm abnormal performance 
preceding the offer (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Iqbal et ah, 2009), high SEO activity prior the offer 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996) and/or increased insider trading (Lee, 1997; Clarke 
et ah, 2004). The increased performance, high activity and insider trading prior the 
offer are followed by post-offer underperformance relative to several benchmarks 
few years later (Hertzel et ah, 2002; Kang et ah, 1999). This implies that the 
management identified a temporary window of opportunity to sell overvalued stock. 
Investors overweight the past-stock performance at the expense o f the future 
performance and overreact at the announcement (Hertzel et ah, 2002).
Loughran and Ritter (1997) report reversal not only returns but also in earnings for 
US SEO. They suggest investors are over-optimistic as they expect continuation o f
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the over-performance. Teoh et al (1998) and Iqbal et al. (2009) report similar 
consistency between earnings and returns for US and UK public offers and open 
offers, respectively. On the other hand, Hertzel et al. (2002) reports that the operating 
performance is constantly negative for US private placings. Regardless of this, they 
suggest that investors expect earnings to follow the returns pre-offer upwards trend 
after the placing. For this reason, the market overreacts at the announcement. Thus, 
even with poor operating perfonnance, investors might be over-optimistic due to the 
stock growing trends prior the offer. This provides the management incentives to 
time the offer when the stock is overvalued. On that basis, the first hypothesis 
examines whether the offer takes place when the stock over-performs.
Nonetheless, investors participating into UK equity offerings are mainly existing 
rather than new investors (Armitage, 2010). It is thus plausible to argue that if  
investors overreact, it is not because the management deliberately sold overvalued 
stock as it is implied by the conventional timing hypothesis. Contrary, it should be 
due to shareholder over-optimism that the firm policies will lead to improved 
perfonnance. The study specifically investigates over-optimism hypothesizing that 
accounting measures beyond earnings such as cash-flows, sales, leverage, debt 
changes, capital expenditure and R&D facilitate the firm to signal high growth. 
Adjusting for over-optimism, the first hypothesis assumes that the stock over- 
perfonnance is associated with growth indicated in the firm financial statements 
beyond earnings. This growth is expected to reverse during the long-run and be 
negatively related to the long-run abnormal returns following the offer.
H 5.1 a: Primary offers indicate stock over-performance and accounting growth prior 
the offer which create over-optimism about the future firm performance
Regarding the secondary placings, evidence also suggests that secondary offerings 
take place at a time when the stock is overvalued. Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) 
suggest that sellers in insider trading have incentives to sell the stock when 
information asymmetries are low: lower levels of asymmetric information help to 
increase stock liquidity and have fewer costs for the potential buyers. Lower costs 
could benefit the sellers as the transaction could take place with higher offer price. 
Likewise, Lee (1997) examines the post-offer performance of firms when top
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executives document insider trading prior an SEO. As the firms severely 
underperform few years later when insiders sell, he concludes that sellers 
deliberately sell overvalued stock. Clarke et al. (2004) also examines secondary 
equity issues and suggests that the sellers identify a window of opportunity to sell 
overvalued stock. The events are timed when SEO activity is high (hot vs. cold 
periods) and followed by underperformance.
These findings oppose other US findings that report improvement in post-offer 
performance of block holdings, suggesting post-purchase managerial activities and 
over-performance (e.g. Bethel et al., 1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and 
Phillips).
The UK secondary offerings used by this study consist o f sales o f holdings that are 
large enough to be announced at the news reports o f the LSE. They do not consist o f 
insider trading. However they are associated with announcements that large 
shareholders decide to sell portion o f their holding for various reasons, such as 
disagreements with the management, expiration of a sale restriction period and 
personal reasons. They are initiated by the seller rather than the buyer. Thus the 
second hypothesis is that the sellers will pursue a ‘good time’ to sell the stock, 
consistent with the traditional timing hypotheses.
H5.1b: The sellers o f  secondary placings identify a window o f  opportunity to sell 
overvalued stock.
Following prior literature, the study assesses the long-run (stock and operating) 
abnormal performance for the ±3years surrounding the offers. It is expected that the 
stock performance will peak at the offer time, irrespective o f the earnings path.
Beyond stock performance, accounting ratios might also suggest timing. The chapter 
tests whether over-optimism is pronounced because accounting measures such as 
earnings, cash-flows, sales and R&D expenditures signal growth. Similar arguments 
are implied for IPO underperformance which is more pronounced when analysts 
forecast high growth (Rajan and Servaes, 1997). Loughran and Ritter (1997) also 
document sales and leverage growth prior SEO in the US. Accounting trends of 
leverage and debt might also signal needs to raise equity to fund potential investment
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opportunities. Overall, if  accounting measures are significantly far from zero and 
significantly related to post-offer underperformance, it would imply that investors are 
over-optimistic about the future firm value, expecting increase in firm performance. 
This holds irrespective of the seller being aware of the over-valuation or not.
5.3.2. Earnings management
A different explanation for the reported AR pattern is that, investors might miss-price 
the stock due to earnings management (e.g. Teoh et ah, 1998; Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000; Kim and Park, 2005; Yoon and Miller, 2002; Iqbal et ah, 2009). 
Evidence suggests that manipulating earnings upwards could signal higher firm 
quality with lower risk and better future opportunities. This might boost the market 
prices and help the firm achieve more successful placings. Contrary, downward 
earnings management could provide tax benefits and/or avoidance of dividend 
distributions.41 Therefore, motivations to manage earnings could vary. Earnings 
management is observed in time periods that firms have specific target goals.
Specifically, when SEO firms aggressively manage earnings, they achieve inflated 
offer prices (Kim and Park, 2005). Teoh et ah (1998) advocate that earnings 
management predicts the post-offer underperformance in earnings and returns for 
SEO firms, while Rangan (1998) document significant earnings management the 
quarters around US equity offerings. Although firms cannot manipulate earnings for 
long periods, earnings true value would not be revealed immediately after the offer. 
The earnings reverse during the two quarters following the event (when the earnings 
management is revealed) and the manipulation could justify the post-offer 
underperformance. Contrary, Shivakumar (2000) advocate due to the existence 
asymmetric information, the market expects issuing firms to manipulate earnings. 
The market cannot distinguish between manipulators and non-manipulators and 
reacts as if all firms engage earnings management and thus, SEO firms manage 
earnings to meet the market anticipations. Yoon and Miller (2002) and Iqbal et ah 
(2009) also report significant earnings management the year prior the Korean SEO 
and British open offers, respectively.
Bagnoli and W atts (2000) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) report significant associations between 
m anagem ent discretion-incentives and firm perform ance.
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Assuming that primary and secondary placings indicate operating perfonnance prior 
the offer which reverses afterwards (as prior evidence on SEO argue), earnings 
management would be equally plausible. The earnings management hypothesis 
assumes that investors fail to recognize the manipulation and miss-value the offered 
stock. Over the time, the market realises its mistake and corrects. This hypothesis 
predicts significant earnings management towards a specific direction the year prior 
the announcement, which can explain the post-offer abnormal performance.
Given that investors in primary placings are mainly existing shareholders (Armitage, 
2010), supportive evidence for earnings management would imply information 
asymmetries between the firm and agency costs. Regarding the secondary placings, 
earnings management is ‘nested’ with the timing hypothesis. The management would 
not manage its accounting items simply because o f specific investor’s desire to sell. 
Contrary, a shareholder that has access to information or he/she is informed about the 
firm financial situation identifies a window of opportunity to sell the stock. The 
earnings management hypothesis is distinguished into 5.2a and 5.2b, for primary and 
secondary placings, respectively.
H5.2: Investors o f  UK (a) primary and (b) secondary placings are misled as the 
management opportunistically manages earnings the year prior the offer
The earnings management hypothesis assumes that investors fail to recognize the 
manipulation and, miss-value the offered stock. Thus, perfonnance turns negative 
few years later. The study examines earnings management signs by decomposing 
accruals based on time and managerial discretion (see Teoh et al., 1998a; b).42
According to earnings management, the discretionary current accruals {DCAC) the 
year prior the offer will be significantly far from zero and, will indicate significantly 
relationship with post-offer AR. The study argues that the accrual sings could be 
either positive or negative, depending on the management specific target. If DCAC  is 
significantly positive, it would imply aggressive earnings management. It would thus 
be expected to be negatively related to the long-run post-offer AR (Teoh et ah,
42 A ccruals involve non-cash accounting am ounts such as revenue recognition, provisions and 
depreciation. N on-discretionary accruals are normal accounting adjustm ents, necessary due to industry 
and/or firm -specific conditions. Contrary, discretionary are accruals not dictated by firm conditions 
but consist o f  accounts that are subject to m anagerial discretion.
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1998a), and vice versa. Long-term discretionary accruals (LD AQ  also suggest 
earnings management, while they are also likely to imply agency problems.43 In case 
that non-discretionary accruals are significantly far from zero, specific adjustments 
necessary for the firm operations would be implied. According to Iqbal et al. (2009), 
significant relation of non-discretionary accruals prior the offer with the post-offer 
AR would support the timing hypothesis.
5.4. Research design and m ethodological details
5.4.1. Stock abnormal performance
5.4.1.1. Buy-and-hold abnormal [BlIAR]
With regards to the stock long-run perfonnance, the study assesses the long-run 
abnonnal returns for ±36 months surrounding the offers. It initially follows a buy- 
and-hold AR approach (BTIAR) with a single firm-matching approach. This approach 
reports less biased results with fewer misspecifications on their tests statistics 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997). BHAR are defined as follows:
Eq. 5:1
N
BHAR lT is the buy-and-hold abnormal return o f the placing firm j  for a period of
±36 months around the placing, t represents the months within the period tested T 
and. r is the start of event window: the 1st day o f the month after the announcement 
or the 36th month prior the event. Rr is the monthly return on the security j  (capital 
gains and dividends) scaled by the market price. E(Rjn) is the expected return 
defined as the return of a single non-placing matching firm i, over the same period.
To identify the benchmark firms i, all UK companies listed in the LSE are potential 
matches (available into Datastream Database (DS)). Finns involved into the placing 
during the years tested are excluded (Jegadeesh, 2000), as well as those belonging to 
financial sectors (that are usually riskier stocks with high betas). Three benchmark
DLAC m ainly reflect non-cash expenses associate with fixed assets, such as depreciation and 
amortization. Hence, significant DLAC  would imply over or under-investm ent problem s.
-  142 -
Chapter 5: Good timing and/or earnings management?
firms are chosen, i.e. 1) based on their market value o f equity (MV), 2) MV and 
industry and, 3) MV and book-to-market ratio (BTM).
More specifically, for the MV benchmark, the chosen control firm i is the one with 
the closest to the event-firm MV (DS item MV). The enlarged MV for the primary 
placings is used, ensuring the new proceeds inclusion (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). 
For MV and industry control, the chosen benchmark is the non-placing firm with the 
closest to the event firm MV adding the restriction that both companies participate in 
the same industry, within the nine main industry sectors (INDM2). For the size and 
BTM benchmark, the control firm is the one with the closest BTM, restricted to firms 
with MV within ±30% of that o f the placing firm. BTM is defined as in Liu (1999),
i.e. book value o f equity (equity capital and reserves (305 DS item) minus total 
intangibles (344 DS item)) divided by the firm MV as at the fiscal year end prior the 
event. The fiscal year end (FYE) of each firm is used to adjust the fiscal year at 
which the event belongs. The announcement day is compared with the FYE day 
within the event calendar year. If the announcement day is before the FYE day, the 
event is considered as part o f the current fiscal year. Otherwise, the event is 
considered to belong to the next fiscal year.
5.4.1.2. Calendar-time abnormal returns [CTAR]
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that BHAR may not adequately 
account for potential cross-sectional dependence in returns. To address this 
possibility a calendar-time portfolio approach is also applied. The Fama and French 
(1993, 1995) three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models are used (hereafter 
FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor model, respectively). The excess return (over the 
risk-free rate) o f an event portfolio p is regressed against the FF-3factor and Carhart- 
4factor models, respectively:
Rp,t ~R U = ap + bp(RMl - R j ,) + spSMBl +hpHMLt +epJ Eq. 5:2
RPJ- R f , = a p + bp(RMl - R f J ) + s pSMB, +hpHML, +PpPR\YR, +epl Eq. 5:3
Rpl is the average monthly return on an event portfolio p  over the month t. The
event-portfolio p  is a portfolio formed in order to include the returns o f all firms that 
had been involved to the offering the past 36 months. It is rebalanced every calendar
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month. Following inter alia Hertzel et al. (2002), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the 
event portfolio is required to include at least 10 firms, to avoid heavy effect of 
heteroskedastic residuals. The significance of the coefficients is also corrected using 
the White (1980) test, for the covariance matrix o f the regression coefficients.
RMl is the average return o f all firms listed in the LSE at the calendar month t 
(excluding the firms involved to the event and those belonging into the financial 
services sectors). RfJ is the risk free rate defined as the 1-month UK Treasury Bill. It
is given in annualized percentage fonn, which needs to be divided by 100 and de­
annualized to get the monthly risk-free rate ,R _ n , UK-Tb,lhmo,„h d/2 » . b is the beta
/J  100
of the event-portfolio p , whereas the intercept a p represents the average abnormal
return (AR) for the T period tested. A positive intercept would indicate over­
performance suggesting the event-portfolio p  has performed better than the pricing 
model, and vice versa.
SMB factor is the value portfolio, measured as the difference between the average 
returns o f the 'sm all’ minus ’big" portfolios, over each month in the period tested. 
HML factor is a growth portfolio, measured as the difference between the returns o f 
'high' minus Tow’ BTM portfolios. SMB and HML are estimated similar to the 
original six Fama and French (1993) portfolios.44 PRIYR is the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor which controls for the positive correlation between AR  in each 
period. The pre-event momentum accounts for the timing possibility. PRIYR is a 
'winners' minus 'losers’ portfolio. It takes short position on the stocks that had the 
highest 30% 11-month returns (lagged 1 month), and long-position on the stocks 
with the lowest 30% 11-month returns. All portfolios are rebalanced every calendar 
year to estimate the monthly returns within the 36-month window tested.
At the I '1 ot July ot every calendar year, the population o f  the com panies is sorted in ascending 
order based on their median MV o f  equity (price*shares outstanding) into small and big stocks. They 
are then individually sorted according to their BTM as at the previous year end (BVfY.t-i/MVji/n/t-i).
I hey are allocated into low, median and high BTM stocks, having the original cu t-o ff points o f  30% , 
40% , 30%. The stocks are then allocated to the six portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M , B/H). SM B is 
the average monthly return o f  the 3 small m inus the 3 big portfolios {(S/L+S/M +S/H)/3- 
(B L+B M+B H )/3}, whilst HML is the monthly return difference between the 2 high m inus the 2 low 
B1M  portfolios ¡(S/H+B H )/2-(S/L+B /L)/2}. The portfolios are rebalanced every 12 m onths. See 
M ichou et al. (2009. 1 able 5) for other studies that use this classification for the UK market.
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Value-weighted portfolios are chosen, as equal-weighted portfolios are sensitive to 
the firm size and, they are biased towards the performance of small firms (see also 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). In addition, CTAR with equal weights ignores the 
frequency o f the events within a month and might not be able to appropriately 
capture post-offer abnormal performance when the management time the offer at 
particular periods (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4). As this involves one o f the main 
interests o f this chapter, value weighting is preferred.
5.4.1.3. Controls for several biases
As long-run AR  are subject to various biases (see section 3.4). this sub-section 
explains the controls taken for more robust inferences. First, recently listed 
companies are reported to indicate very low AR few years after their listing (Ritter, 
1991; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Brav and Gompers, 1997). 
This makes new listed firms inappropriate benchmarks, as they will cause upwards 
bias for the private placements AR. To avoid this ‘new listing bias’, matching 
companies are required to be listed for the same period before as the event firm or for 
at least two years before the event whichever is earlier.
Second, matching firms i, are likely to disappear/delist before the end o f the third 
year. Thus, data for the period tested disappear through time as well, which will 
create rebalancing bias. The matching procedure during the tested period should be 
replicated, to get available data to compute the BHAR for the rest o f the period. To 
avoid rebalancing bias, matching firms are required to be listed for three years or at 
less if  the event firm delists before the three-year period tested, whichever is later.
Regarding the delisted returns, they are replaced with the return o f a corresponding 
reference portfolio based on size and BTM, assuming reinvestment at the control 
portfolio. If for any reason a size and BTM portfolio cannot be chosen, event-delisted 
returns are replaced with the average (equal or value weighted) return o f an industry 
portfolio. The delisted returns of the control firms that combine the portfolios are 
purged, similar to Kothari and Warner (1997), Ritter (1991) and others, after the 
delisted month. As a robustness test, the analysis is replicated by removing the 
delisted event and corresponding control returns similar to Kothari and Warner
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(1997), Ritter (1991) and others, after the delisted month. Results are similar, 
however with fewer observations (see Table 6.3).
Furthermore, 21% of the placings involve companies that have previously conducted 
equity offering (primary or secondary) in a period less than three years. As this return 
overlapping is probably one of the most severe forms of cross-correlation 
dependence in AR (Lyon et ah, 1999), previous researchers exclude firms with 
multiple placings, even when results are reported to be essentially identical to the full 
sample (see Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). The study follows the Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) suggestion (to avoid reducing the observations). As a 
robustness test, return overlapping controls are also taken. The unit of investigation 
is each placing, not each firm. Therefore, only one placing from the same company j  
is investigated in each calendar month. When/if the event company j  gets involved to 
another placing before the end of the three-year period, the new announcement is 
considered as a new placing and removed. The results with the alternative treatments 
can be found in Table 6.3.
Finally, one o f the main problems of BHAR is the assumption of being independent 
and normally distributed. Nonetheless, this assumption fails to hold at long horizons, 
as they are reported to be right skewed and cross-sectional dependent. Barber and 
Lyon (1997) suggest the single matching-firm approach release BHAR from severe 
skewness and normality biases. Lyon et al. (1999) also suggest that BHAR can 
provide valid inferences when reference portfolios are carefully constructed (free o f 
new listing and survivor biases) and thus, conventional t-tests yield well-specified 
test statistics (ibid, p. 192). Based on this, conventional t-statistic and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon) tests are estimated for statistical inference. For robust inferences, the 
skewness adjusted t-statistic is also employed (Lyon et al., 1999; see Eq. 3:10). 
Regarding the CTAR. it automatically accounts for the portfolio variance. By forming 
calendar portfolios the cross-sectional dependence o f event AR  is eliminated. 
Therefore, the distribution is closer to the normal distribution which allows for 
classical statistical inference (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).
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5.4.2, Operating abnormal performance, growth trends and needs for funds
Similar to the stock performance, operating abnormal performance is examined for ±3 
years surrounding the offers. It additionally observes the paths o f cash-flows, sales, 
leverage, debt change, capital expenditures and R&D, always in comparison with a 
corresponding benchmark. Precisely, the operating performance and accounting 
proxies are compared to a single non-event firm with similar characteristics 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1997). The single-control approach is advocated to overcome 
the mean-reversion tendency o f the accounting items (Barber and Lyon, 1996). As a 
robustness test, average industry benchmarks are also used similar to Teoh et al. 
(1998b) and Bethel et al. (1998).
It is common that the chosen benchmark firm to the one with the closest operating 
performance scaled by the book value of assets. As measure o f operating 
performance, previous researchers such as Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel et 
al. (2002) use the income before depreciation plus the Interest Income. The interest 
income is added to control for the possibility that primary equity issuers place funds 
temporarily into interest bearing instruments, prior investing in operating assets. 
However, the interest income is not available on DS for several companies o f this 
study. Thus, a measure o f ROA (retum-on-assets) similar to Bethel et al. (1998) is 
adopted, which equals the EBITDA/Net Assets. EBITDA is the pre-tax income, 
adding back the interest expense o f debt and depreciation, depletion and amortization 
and subtracting interest capitalized (WC18198). Net Assets is defined as the 
difference between total assets (WC02999) and total liabilities (WC03351).
Each event firm is matched with a non-event firm that participates in the same 
industry sector (INDM2) and has the closest EBITDA/Net Assets ratio within a total 
asset restriction o f 25%-200% as at the event fiscal year. The similar but bigger asset 
size captures the inclusion of the placing proceeds (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). If no 
matching company meets these criteria, the industry requirement is waived and the 
assets requirement is adjusted to allow the non-event firm to have ±10% asset size o f 
the event-firm (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). If still there is no matching, the event 
ratios are compared with the average industry ratios. Four sets o f accounting 
measures are examined.
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1. Earnings based ratios: Operating performance is measured via earnings (e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Franks et ah, 2001), defined as the net income before 
extraordinary items, discontinues operations and preference dividends (WC01551). It 
is deflated by assets and sales, resulting to return on assets (ROA) and return on sales 
(ROS). The former ratio has the ability to measure productivity; when scaling by 
assets, the performance is measured as percentage o f firm investments into operating 
and non-operating assets. When scaling by sales, the performance is presented as 
percentage of firm revenues, which does not directly measure productivity. However, 
the ratio is more appropriated matched, as both (earnings and sales) come from the 
income statement (Barber and Lyon, 1996). The ROS indirectly accounts for the 
sales trend.45
2. Cash-Flow based ratios: Cash-based measures are appropriate in cases where 
management might have incentives to manipulate operating items to report better 
operating performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Additionally, cash flow ratios 
capture accounting liquidity and the need to raise equity. Evidence suggests that the 
negative post-SEO long-run AR is related to increased free-cash flow problems 
following the event (Lee, 1997; McLaughlin et al., 1996; Jung et ah, 1996) and/or 
earnings management (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998; Iqbal et ah, 2009). Wu and Wang
(2005) also suggests that increased financial slack (internal funds) aggravates over- 
performance. Operating cash flows (WC04860) is scaled by both, total assets and 
sales (CFA and CFS, respectively).
3. Growth ratios: Growth ratios might indicate future firm potentials and 
expectations for value improvements. Following Lang et al. (2006) turnover ratios 
are used to measure growth in operations such as sales on assets (SALES) and 
percentage o f sales change (SGTH) . Furthermore, capital expenditure and R&D could 
reveal attempts to change firm policies or future plans/strategies. It could then imply 
potential capital investments and future growth. Additionally, it is likely that the 
placing proceeds cover capital expenditures and R&D expenses, suggesting the
4 Variations of operating m easures used by the literature are several accounting item s such as return 
on assets (ROA). return on sales (ROS), return on m arket value o f  assets, retum -on-equity  (ROE), 
Tobin 's-Q . profit margins, m arket-to-book (M TB), eam ings per share (EPS) depending on the 
research questions. For more details please see Healy and Palepu (1990). Barber and Lyon (1996), 
Loughran and Ritter (1997), Hertzel et al. (2002), Bethel et al. (1998), M egginson et al. (1994), Jain 
and Kini (1994). Hanson and Song (2003), and others.
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purpose o f a private placing. Following Hertzel et al. (2002) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) a similar ratio ACTV  is estimated, where the sum o f capital expenditures 
(WC04601) and R&D expenses (WC01201) is scaled by the total assets.
4. Leverage and debt characteristics'. Finally, the capital structure o f the company 
might conceal financial needs to raise equity (Franks et al., 2001). Debt levels might 
also indicate the incentives to sell equity. It is well documented that firms will prefer 
debt to fund a positive NPV project. They will choose equity if leverage is already 
high to the extent that the firm can no longer issue riskless debt (the pecking order 
model; Myers, 1984). Alternatively, regardless o f the debt level, a negative NPV 
project that would not add value to the firm will be funded by equity (Jung et ah, 
1996) (as the present value of the new debt will exit the present value o f the project 
output). Therefore, observing the debt levels might reveal different incentives 
including the possibility that managers seek to maximize their own wealth. 
Additionally, firms with high debt or changes in leverage may manage earnings to 
avoid debt covenants (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991). To investigate these issues, two 
proxies are used: debt-to-equity ratio (LEVR) and change in debt (ADEBT%). LEVR 
is the total debt (long-term and short-term debt; WC03251 and WC03051) to book- 
value o f equity (DS 305). ADEBT% is its percentage change.
5.4.3. Earnings management
To examine the earnings management hypothesis, accruals are decomposed on time 
and management choice, as in Teoh et al. (1998b). Total accruals (TAC) is the 
difference between net income and operating cash flows
TAC t = N It -  OCF  Eq. 5:4
TACt are decomposed based on time into current and long-term accruals, and based 
on managerial discretion into discretionary and non-discretionary. Current accruals 
(CAC) are adjustments in the working capital accounts (in short-term assets and 
liabilities). As examples of such adjustments, consider the conservative/aggressive 
recognition o f revenues and/or expenses, provision for bad and doubtful debts and 
inventory valuation. Contrary, long-term accruals (LAC) are adjustments in accounts 
that involve fixed assets and long-term liabilities. Such amounts could be altered by
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revaluation of reserves, depreciation methods, deferred taxation, realization of 
unusual gains/losses.
Current accruals (CAC) is the change in noncash current assets minus the change in 
operating current liabilities, while LAC are simply the difference between TAC and 
CAC:
LAC, = TAC,- CAC, = TAC,- [A (CA, -  Cash,) -  A( C f -  STD,)] Eq. 5 :4
A CA, is the change in current assets (WC02201) as at the fiscal year t; A CL, is the 
change in current liabilities (WC03101); A Cash, the change in cash and equivalents 
(WC02001); ASTDt the change in current debt included in current liabilities 
(WC03051) and Dep, the depreciation and amortization expense (WC01151). In 
sequence, CAC and LAC are decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary. 
Therefore, four groups for accruals are used: discretionary current accruals (DCAC), 
non-discretionary current accruals (NDCAC), discretionary long-term accruals 
(DLAC) and non-discretionary long-term accruals (NDLAC).
To discriminate between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, the cross- 
sectional modification of Jones (1991) is adopted, where current accruals are a linear 
function of the change in sales. To estimate the NDCAC for the event firm j  (as at 
the fiscal year t), all firms in the same industry (INDM2) as the equity offering firm 
are used, but excluding the offering firm itself. The industry cross-sectional current 
accruals i (CAC,,) are regressed over the industry change in sales (ASales,,) for the
fiscal year t. All regression variables (including the regression intercept) are deflated 




/ A Sales ¡j 
TAU_X j
+ £,, Eq. 5:5
TA,
The estimated coefficients a 0,fi, constitute an ‘industry benchmark’ in the sense that 
they capture the industry loadings. They are used to estimate the non-discretionary
current accruals of the equity firm j  at year t, ( NDCAC j ^
V ;
, by replacing the â 0,â, in
Eq. 5:6, modified as suggested by Dechow et al. (1995):
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NDCACj
/ TAu , J
+ a.
i  ASaleSj, -  A Reie. . , X
TAlj,i-1
Eq. 5:6
A Salesjt is the corresponding sales change o f the placing firm j ,  at year t. A Roxy is
its change in accounts receivable. ARdcJl allows for manipulation o f credit sales by
the equity offering firm to document high revenues prior the offer. Thus, NDCAC.
capture the expected (estimated) CAC based on the industry standards. The 
difference between the actual event-firm CAC , , and the estimated NDCAC , (as
estimated in equations 5.6 and 5.7 respectively) is the discretionary current accruals 
DCACj, (all scaled by T A j ) for the year t:
DCACj, = CACj, -  NDCACj, Eq. 5:7
Discretionary and non-discretionary long-term accruals {DLACj,, NDLACj,) are
measured in similar way. The differences are the addition o f the gross property plant 
and equipment (GPPEt) as an independent variable (which accounts for the long-run
accruals such as depreciation) and, the use o f total accruals (TACt) rather than CAC,








v T V ,’ y
Eq. 5:8
The estimated non-discretionary total accruals o f the event firm j A NDTACj , A 
TA,. ,V y*'-» y
derive













j ,i Eq. 5:9
The difference between total (TAq,) and non-discretionary total accruals (NDT AC),) is 
the discretionary total accruals (DTACj,)• Hence, the discretionary long-term 
accruals (DLACj,) and non-discretionary long-term accruals (NDLACj,) are easily 
estimated, as being the difference between the total and current discretionary and 
non-discretionary current accruals.
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DLA Cj, = DTA Cu  -  DC A Cjt Eq. 5:10
NDLACj, = NDTACj , -  NDCACj t Eq. 5:11
As the earnings management hypothesis predicts significant discretionary accruals 
the year prior the offer, this procedure is repeated for all event firms, for the years 
(-1, +1) around the event.
5.5. Sam ple characteristics
This chapter uses the two sets of non pre-emptive equity offerings publicly 
announced during the period 01/1998-06/2006 (as in Chapter 4). Table 5.1 presents 
some descriptive statistics, after distinguishing the placings based on whether the 
relative offer size exceeds the 5% of the share capital (panels B and C respectively).
5.5.1. Private placements
The primary placings below the 5% cut-off point place approximately 3% of the firm 
share capital, while the conventional placing firms (at least 5% of the share capital) 
offer about 20% - 28% (few cases are subject to reorganisations, which cause large 
deviation in the shares placed; see section 4.5).
Regarding the placings below the 5% cut-off, they indicate a mean (median) market 
value of 5385 (387) millions, contrary to the 239 (24) millions of the conventional 
placing type. The fact that firms placing smaller portions o f their capital are such 
large firms suggests lower asymmetric information compared to the conventional 
SEO placing types and contradicts the traditional view that firms placing shares are 
very small stocks. In fact, several small placings below the 5% of their capital take 
place at London Stock Exchange. Nevertheless, little information is provided with 
regards to their characteristics and implications. Likewise, small offers involve older 
firms, listed for approximately 11 (7) years. This is significantly higher from the age 
of the conventional placings that are younger, listed for about 7 (3.5) years. The 
discount offered by these smaller placings is however about half, 7% (4%) vs. 12% 
(8%). All the differences are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
suggesting lower asymmetric information.
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Although not tabulated in Table 5.1, these small placements (in relative offered size) 
often follow other announcements, e.g. to acquire another firm or other big 
investment plans. This fact is in line with the view that investment opportunities 
might drive the placings or signal growth, ft is also consistent with the view that they 
raise equity to fund their investment opportunities. They might also impose different 
incentives to manage earnings.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Gross proceeds represent the size o f  the placing in actual am ounts, in m illions o f  GBP (shares p laced * 
placing price). M V is the firm  m arket value, defined as the price m ultiplied by  the shares outstanding 
(D ataStream  Item M V). age is the years since the corporation listing. The gross proceeds as percentage o f  
the firm  m arket value reflects the placing value and the num ber o f  the shares placed as percentage o f  the 
share capital reflects the placing size.
Mean Median St.Dev Mean Median St.Dev
Panel A : Descriptive statistics -  full samples_____________________________
Primary placinas (N=230) Secondary olacinas (N=123)
Firm MV (Emillions) 1492 34 9748.1 5323.6 814.2 22165
Firm age (years) 7.97 3.83 9.68 12.24 6.67 12.91
Gross Proceeds (fmillions) 73.01 6.95 374.4 185 59 408.8
Gross Proceeds/MV 0.60 0.12 5.86 0.20 0.07 0.70
Shares Placed /Sh.Cap. 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.12
Discount 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.18 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.10
Panel B: Placings at least 5% of the share capital
Primary placinas (N=174I Secondary placinas (N=87)
Firm MV (fmillions) 238.9 23.51 844.4 1411.7 522.3 3154.2
Firm age (years) 6.94 3.5 8.91 10.11 4.42 12.06
Gross Proceeds (fmillions) 55.8 6.7 332.0 149.4 57.7 309.2
Gross Proceeds/MV 0.79 0.18 6.73 0.27 0.11 0.82
Shares Placed /Sh.Cap. 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.12
Discount 0 .12*** 0.08*** 0.20 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.09
Panel C: Placings below  the 5 %  of the share capital
Primary placinas (N=56> Secondary placinas tN=36i
Firm MV (fmillions) 5385.4 386.7 19313.5 12347.2 2909.1 36017.8
Firm age (years) 11.16 7.00 11.42 17.08 12.46 13.71
Gross Proceeds (fmillions) 126.44 7.10 482.5 272.98 65.7 580.2
Gross Proceeds/MV 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.028 0.022 0.021
Shares Placed /Sh.Cap. 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.023 0.019 0.014
Discount 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.14 0.04** 0.03*** 0.12
Panel D: Sub-sam ple differences
Firm MV (fmillions) -5146.5* -363.2*** -18469.1 -10935.4* -2387*** -32863.5
Firm age (years) -4 2*** -3.5*** -2.52 -6.98* -8.04*** -1.66
Gross Proceeds (fmillions) -70.64 -0.40 -150.50 -123.58 -8.00 -270.96
Gross Proceeds/MV 0.76 0.14*** 6.71 0.24*** 0.09*** 0.80
Shares Placed /Sh.Cap. 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.21 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.10
Discount 0.05** 0.04** 0.06 0.01 0 -0.02
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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5.5.2. Blocks of listed shares
Secondary placings involve existing blocks o f shares sold, initiated by one or more 
existing shareholders. Recall that secondary placings involve mainly larger firms in 
comparison with the primary sample (see section 4.5.2). Additionally, they are listed 
for more years and offered at about half discount. On that basis, as they are subject to 
lower asymmetric information, the long-run abnormal performance of the firms 
involved is likely to be closer to zero. This lays on the assumption that the stock is 
already assessed by the market (as implied by Lee, 1997).
Comparing the placings based on the relative offer size, the small offerings below the 
5% cut-off point are about 3% of the corporation shares outstanding. Contrary, the 
bigger offers (of at least 5%) involve approximately 27% (11%) of the firm. Similar 
to the primary placings, the firms with smaller relative offer size are mainly the 
biggest ones. They indicate mean (median) market value o f 12 (3) billions, contrary 
to 1.4 (0.5) billions o f the larger placings. Likewise, they are listed for approximately 
17 (12) years, contrary to the 10 (4) years o f stocks with larger relative offer size.
As the differences between the finn characteristics based on the relative offered size 
are significant, it becomes apparent that the smaller placings involve firms with even 
lower asymmetric information. The incentives or reasons to sell larger portions o f the 
firms are possibly stronger when the offering is above the 5%. Regardless, the two 
sub-samples are priced similarly, at a discount o f about 3%-5%.
5.6. Findings and discussion
5.6.1. Long-horizon abnormal stock performance
According to the timing and over-optimism hypotheses, the event stock perfonnance 
will peak at the offer time and deteriorate afterwards, irrespective of the earnings 
path. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 graph the BHAR paths on annual basis, for primary 
and secondary placings respectively. As the figures clearly indicate, the performance 
of the offered firms significantly increases the year prior the offer and deteriorates 
the year after, consistent with the over-optimism/timing hypothesis.
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Figure 5.1: Stock abnormal performance surrounding primary placings
The graph presents annual BHAR  o f  the prim ary placings. BHAR  are estim ated as described in Table
Figure 5.2: Stock abnormal performance surrounding secondary placements
The graph presents annual BHAR  o f  the secondary placings. Three non-event m atching firm s are used 
as benchm arks, chosen based on sim ilar size, size and industry, size and BTM  characteristics. BHAR
For simplicity, Table 5.2 presents the AR for the year prior the offer t=-l and for 
three years following the event.
5.6.1.1. Prim ary placings
According to Table 5.2 the mean (median) BHAR o f primary placings for the year 
prior the offer under each of the three different benchmark firms chosen (i.e. based 
on the event market value, market value and industry, and market value and book-to- 
market) is about +13% (+0.3%), + 23% (+10%) and +13% (9%) respectively (see 
panel A). The BHAR are significantly positive under all statistical tests, i.e. the
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conventional t-test, skewness adjusted t-test (Lyon et al., 1999) and Wilcoxon z- 
value. Regarding the CTAR (panel B), the past-offer performance appears normal, 
irrespective of the benchmark (FF-3factor or Carhart-4factor model). The average 
monthly AR during the 12 months before the offer is positive, approximately by 0.4% 
and 0.2%. This translates to 5% and 2% over the 12 months tested [(l+interc<?/?)l2-l], 
respectively. However it is not significantly different from zero. Given the significant 
strong BHAR but the insignificant positive CTAR, someone could argue that CTAR 
might not be completely able to detect abnormal performance, as the intercepts are 
assumed to be constant (but samples cluster by calendar time or industry), yielding 
misspecified test statistics (Lyon et al, 1999; see section 3.4.2).
Nonetheles, the positive (or normal) performance the year prior the offer turns 
significantly negative three years after. The mean (median) BHAR under each o f the 
three different benchmark MV, MV+lnd, and MV+BTM  is -41% (-16%), -26% 
(-12%) and -30.2% (-18%), respectively. The BHAR is highly significant under all 
statistical tests applied. Likewise, CTAR lead to similar conclusions (panel B). The 
primary placing finns underperform on average by -2.8% for every month during the 
36 month period tested under the FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor models. This is 
translated to -63% loss over the total period tested after being compounded at the 
same rate of return (the intercept) for 36 months [(l+interce/?)36-l]. The intercept is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.
As a conclusion, primary placings overperform their benchmarks or indicate normal 
perfonnance the year prior the offer. Nevertheless, they significantly underperform 
afterwards. This pattern is inconsistent with Ho (2005) who reports little evidence for 
post-offer underperformance following UK placings. It is however in line with 
international evidence on private placements (Hertzel et al., 2002; Barclay et ah, 
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5.6.1.2. Secondary placings
As far as the secondary placings is concerned, the results are similar. The mean 
(median) BHAR for the year prior the offer under each of the three different 
benchmarks MV, MV+Ind, and MV+BTM  is 41% (9.7%), 31% (12%) and 26.6% 
(4.2%), respectively. The three statistical tests suggest significance at the 1% and 
5% levels. Regarding the CTAR, both FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor models 
document over-performance during the months (-12-1) prior the event, o f 
approximately 0.6% per month. This translates to approximately 7.3% over the year 
prior the offer, assuming re-investment at the intercept for 12 months 
[(1+intern?/?)12 -1] • This over-performance is statistically significant under the FF- 
3faetor model, at the 10% level.
The performance prior the event is followed by significantly strong under- 
pcrformance. The BHAR are significantly negative under the three different 
benchmarks. Specifically, the mean (median) BHAR under the MV, MV+Ind, and 
MV+BTM  benchmarks are -33% (-23%), -15% (-12%) and -19% (-12.4%), 
respectively. Likewise, the CTAR indicates negative post-placing performance. The 
monthly AR is -1.7% and -2% under the FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor models, 
respectively (panel B). This translates to -45% and -52% holding period AR , 
assuming reinvestment at the intercept rate for 36 months. It is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
These findings do not support the literature regarding secondary placings and value 
improvements (Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Bethel et al., 1998). Contrary, the 
findings are in line with Lee (1997) who report underperformance when top 
executives sell before an SEO. They are consistent with the view that the sellers 
identify a window of opportunity to sell overvalued stock (Lee, 1997; Bayless and 
Chaplinsky, 1996). Hence, the stock performance o f secondary offerings gives 
support to the timing hypothesis (H5.1b).
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5.6.2. Operating performance & trend of accounting items
Accounting ratios might also suggest overvaluation. Based on the predictions o f the 
corresponding hypothesis, accounting measures are to indicate significant growth 
prior the offer. This would imply that investors are over-optimistic about the future 
firm value at the time o f the offer, expecting increase in firm performance. Table 5.3 
examines the relevant possibility.
5.6.2.1. Prim ary placings
Panel A presents the findings for the primary placings. The ROA is significantly 
negative at the year t=-2 prior the offer, however it is normal at the year t= -1. In fact, 
both ROA and ROS are normal the year prior the offer, the event year and the 
following year (-1, +1). This is inconsistent with the stock performance which 
documents significant growth the years before, mainly the year prior the placing. 
However, the ROA becomes negative the years +2 and +3 following the placing, 
consistent with the negative stock underperformance. Therefore, the operating 
abnormal performance turns negative after the offer. These paths differ from Hertzel 
et al. (2002) that document significantly negative ROA during all years surrounding 
US private placings. Despite o f this, the ROA (and ROS) paths give support to the 
view that the market overvalues the stock in comparison with its operating 
performance prior the offer.
In addition, the cash flow based performance (CFA and CFS) follow similar past- 
offer performance. CFA is significantly negative two years before the placing (t=-2), 
while both CFA and CFS are normal at t= -l. Interestingly, CFA becomes 
significantly negative during all the years afterwards, i.e. from the event year to 
three years later (0, +3). Therefore, this suggests that primary issuers face free cash­
flow problems (Lee, 1997; McLaughlin et al., 1996; Jung et al., 1996).
The free cash-flow interpretation is also consistent with the debt growth. The 
ADEBT is significantly higher from the benchmark firms by approximately 1% the 
year prior the offer t=-l and increases to 14% and 18% during the years 0, +1, +2. 
This implies need for the placing funds. It might have been difficult for the firm to 
raise debt without increasing the firm’s cost of debt (and cost o f capital). This is
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suggested by the normal leverage documented by the last column of the table. This 
interpretation is in line with the pecking order model about choices between equity 
and debt (e.g. Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Consistently, the sales turnover is significantly negative in all years surrounding the 
offer. SALES is about -16.5% lower from the corresponding benchmark the years 
t=-3, -1, 0 and about -30% in t=-2. Nonetheless, this gap from the benchmark firms 
is reduced to -7% after the equity placing indicating improvement in sales. Indeed, 
the sales growth (SGTH) is significantly higher for the year prior the offer, the offer 
year and the year after (-1, +1) by 12%, 8% and 14% respectively.
Overall, it appears that operating performance is normal prior the offer but 
deteriorates afterwards. In addition, the firms indicate liquidity needs. While the 
leverage is normal, the debt and sales growth significantly increases from the year 
prior the equity issue and onwards. These amounts might signal growth efforts that 
raise expectations for the future performance improvements, leading investors to 
over-optimistic reactions at the announcement. Figure 5.3 plots the time-series o f 
these significant accounting measures.
Figure 5.3: Trend of accounting items for primary placings
The graph presents the operating perform ance m easures ROA and CFA for the prim ary placings. It
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Table 5.3: Operating abnormal performance and other accounting information
The table presents abnorm al accounting ratios for the years ±3 around the event, i.e. the difference between the 
event firm ratio m inus the benchm ark ratio. Benchm ark is a chosen non-event firm that participates in the same 
industry sector (DataStream  IN D M 2) and has the closest EBITDA/Net Assets ratio, within the total asset size 
restriction o f  25%  - 200%  as the fiscal year end prior the event. I f  no m atching com pany in the appropriate industry 
meets these criteria, the industry requirem ent is waived and the assets requirem ent is adjusted to allow  the non-event 
firm to have asset size w ithin 90%  - 110% o f  the event-firm  assets. I f  still there is no m atching, the event firm  ratios 
are com pared w ith the average industry ratios. ROA, and ROS, are the Return-O n-A ssets and R eturn-O n-Sales, 
defined as the N et Incom e before extraordinary items, discontinues operations and Preference D ividends 
(W C01551) scaled by the firm  total assets (A,= WC02999) and Sales (S,=W C 01001), respectively. CFA and CFS 
are the operating cash flow s (O CF=W C04860) scaled by the total assets and sales, respectively. SALES is the sales 
o f year scaled by total assets and SGTH the percentage change in sales. ACTV m easures the capital expenditures 
(W C04601) p lus research and developm ent expenses (W C01201), scaled by the total assets. LEVR is the total debt 
(Long+Short term  debt; W C 03251+W C03051) as a percentage o f  the book value o f  equity (equity capital and 
reserves). ADEBT is the percentage change in total debt. All values are w inzorized at the l sl and 99th percentiles. 
Wilcoxon test exam ine the null hypothesis o f  zero abnormal ratio medians.________________________________________
Earnings Cash-Flows Growth Debt
FY relative to 
the offer
ROA ROS CFA CFS SALES SGTH ACTV ADEBT LEVR
Panel A: P rim a ry  p lacings, fu ll sam p les (E ven t - 1Benchm ark)
-3 N 88 90 169 154 189 160 89 150 190
Median -0.016 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 -0.165*** 0.014 -0.003 0.055 0.000
-2 N 117 116 194 186 210 186 115 181 209
Median -0.018*** 0.003 -0.054*** 0.027 -0.308*** 0.029 -0.013 0.078 0.000
-1 N 134 134 198 184 217 188 139 186 214
Median 0.007 0.037 -0.003 0.023 -0.168*** 0.123*** -0.007 0.011* 0.000
0 N 150 148 202 195 214 197 148 189 211
Median 0.000 0.009 -0.025** 0.000 -0.163*** 0.08** -0.01* 0.143** 0.000
1 N 136 134 201 190 212 193 139 185 214
Median -0.004 0.008 -0.044** -0.022 -0.074*** 0.142** -0.002 0.185*** 0.012
2 N 120 118 202 191 207 192 121 189 212
Median -0.027*** -0.029** -0.023* -0.023* -0.074*** 0.037 -0.005 0.183*** 0.000
3 N 102 100 167 149 177 155 99 138 188
Median -0.014** 0.016 -0.016** -0.004 -0.062** 0.09** 0.004 -0.054 0.000
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Earnings Cash-Flows Growth Debt
FY relative to 
the offer
ROA ROS CFA CFS SALES SGTH ACTV ADEBT LEVR
Panel B: Secondary placings (Event - Benchm ark)
-3 N 64 62 90 85 96 87 61 86 97
Median 0.012 0.005 -0.003 0.038 -0.022 -0.001 -0.014 0.045 -0.045
-2 N 74 75 103 98 112 102 82 98 108
Median 0.004 0.026 0.018 0.052*** -0.077** 0.004 -0.016 -0.079 0.064
-1 N 84 84 108 105 117 108 90 101 114
Median 0.002 0.045*** 0.012 0.073*** -0.08* 0.023 -0.003 -0.064 -0.004
0 N 86 88 115 110 118 112 82 112 115
Median 0.007 0.015 0.031 0.018 -0.108* 0.048 -0.001 0.005 0.007
1 N 77 79 108 99 110 103 74 93 108
Median 0.001 0.016 -0.017 0.021 -0.064 0.016 0.009 0.021 0.000
2 N 68 70 107 102 106 103 67 105 110
Median 0.009 0.013 -0.001 0.004 -0.047 0.047 0.006 0.039 -0.022
3 N 55 57 83 82 84 82 53 73 88
Median 0.015 0.047 0.022 0.029 -0.043 -0.003 0.015 -0.087** -0.164
*** , **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
5.6.2.2. Secondary platings
Regarding the secondary offerings (panel B), the results are different. ROA is not 
significant in any of the years tested, while ROS is significantly higher from the 
benchmark firms by 5% the year prior the sale. The operating cash flows over sales 
(CFS) is also significantly higher during the two years prior the offer t=-l and t=-2 
by 5% and 7%, respectively. At first glance, the high ROS and CFS suggest growth 
prior the offer, consistent with the stock performance. Flowever, in reality, the higher 
ROS {EBITDA Sales) suggest smaller denominator, i.e. sales. Indeed, the sales 
turnover is significantly negative the years t=-2, t=-l and t=0 by -8%, -8% and -11% 
respectively. In other words, these ratios suggest increased returns and cash-flows on 
sales, while in reality the sales are limited. Apparently, such trends indicate reduced 
sales growth. These accounting trends are possibly justified and consistent with the 
news reports associated with the offers, which state that a few sellers disagree with 
the management and choose to exit their investment.
1 he remaining accounting ratios are not significantly far from their corresponding 
matching firms. Apparently, the shareholders initiated the equity sale observe this
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pattern and sell the stock when its ROS and CFS peak. Therefore, given the high 
stock performance prior the offer, the stock seems to be temporary over-priced at the 
announcement.
Figure 5.4 plots the time-series of these three measures for the secondary placings 
(ROS, CFS, SALES). In addition, Figure 5.4 additionally plots the leverage path 
(LEVR). Although it is not statistically different from the corresponding matching 
Finns, its path indicates large variability from year to year. Interestingly, LEVR path 
after the sale is quite consistent with that of debt growth (ADEBT). The sales 
turnover (SALES) also indicates variability, however consistently negative. Taken all 
together, it appears that the firms involved do not document stability. Contrary, 
someone could even argue about uncertainty and low quality.
As a conclusion, considering the increased AR  prior the offer, it seems that the sellers 
do identify a window of opportunity to sell overvalued stock. This is consistent with 
the timing hypothesis and the view that sellers identify a window of opportunity to 
sell overvalued stock (H5.1b).
Figure 5.4: Trend of accounting items for secondary placings
The graph presents the operating perform ance measures ROA and CFA for the secondary placings. It 
also presents growth m easures such as SGTH, TURNV, D EBT  and A C TV  as defined in Table 5.3.
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5.6.3. Accrual decomposition
Thus far, the findings indicate that primary placing firms are growing prior the offer, 
not only in terms of stock performance but also in terms of sales and debt. Contrary, 
secondary placing firms indicate low operating performance in contrast to the stock 
performance prior the offer. While both equity offers significantly underperform the 
years following the offer (which implies that the stock was overvalued at the 
announcement), earnings management might also “help” in misleading investors.
Table 5.4 examines the earnings management hypothesis. It decomposes accruals 
based on time (short and long) and managerial discretion (discretionary and non- 
discretionary) (see Teoh et al., 1998, Iqbal et al., 2009). Recal that if the earnings 
management hypothesis is valid, discretionary current accruals (DCAC) the year 
prior the offer will be significantly far from zero and, will indicate significant 
relationship with post-offer AR. Discretionary long-term accruals (LDAC) also 
suggest earnings management, while they are also likely to imply over/under­
investment problems. Contrary, significant relation between non-discretionary 
accruals with the post-offer AR would support the timing hypothesis.
Table 5.4: Accrual decomposition
The table presents the accrual com ponents, decomposed based on tim e and m anagerial discretion: 
discretionary current accruals (DC.AC) and non-discretionary (NDCAC'), discretionary long-term  accruals 
(DIAC) and non-discretionary (NDLAC). Current accruals (CAC) equal the change in noncash current 
assets minus the change in operating current liabilities. To discrim inate between discretionary and non- 
discretionary accruals, the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model is adopted where the current 
accruals are a linear function o f  the change in sales. It is modified as in D echow  et al. (1995).














Panel A: Primary placings
-2 158 0.002* 0.004* -0.014 -0.011 0.028*** -0.041** 0.044*** 0.081***
-1 179 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.030 0.020*** -0.069*** 0.012** 0.069***
0 190 -0.002 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.029*** -0.026** -0.011 0.033*
1 175 0.003 0.007* 0.003 -0.002 0.016** -0.040*** 0.002* 0.022
2 147 0.004*** 0.003* -0.011* -0.014 0.023*** -0.060*** 0.013** 0.061***
Panel B: Secondary placings
-2 85 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.042** 0.017
-1 95 0.000 -0.001 -0.012* -0.013 -0.001 -0.029*** -0.032** 0.040**
0 95 -0.001 -0.003 0.008 0.013 0.000 -0.021*** -0.045* 0.039
1 89 0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.015 -0.003** -0.015*** -0.031 0.021
2 68 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 0.013 0.001 -0.018*** -0.052** 0.011
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
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5.6.3.1. Primary placings
According to Table 5.4, the DCAC for the primary placings increases during the 
years prior the offer, however it is not statistically significant. This also holds for 
DCAC at the event year (see panel A). This contradicts the view that firms mainly 
use current accruals to manage earnings (Teoh et al., 1998; Iqbal et al., 2009). 
NDCAC are also insignificant. NDCAC are in fact close to zero for the years tested. 
Thus, current accruals do not seem to drive the abnormal performance or to inflate 
earnings of UK primary placings.
Contrary, long-term accruals are statistically significant. NDLAC are significantly 
positive during the three years -1, 0, +1 around the placing by approximately 2%. 
This implies lower levels o f depreciation in comparison to the industry averages (see 
Figure 5.5 that plots the accrual measures described in Table 5.4). This might 
confirm the underinvestment problems of private placing firms (Hertzel and Smith, 
1993). Likewise, DLAC are also significantly positive for the years around the offer. 
DLAC is also significantly higher from operating-performance matched firms the 
year prior the offer (benchmark adjusted as the Table 5.3 benchmarks)46 Therefore, 
long-term accruals appear of higher ability to affect firm performance than current 
accruals. This contradicts to conventional view that firms manage earnings via 
current accruals (Teoh et al., 1998).
Figure 5.5: Median accruals for the primary placings
46 Interestingly, operating perform ance benchm ark adjusted NDLAC (as in Table 5.3) are significantly 
low er from  the corresponding benchm ark firms, suggesting higher fixed asset investments.
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5.6.3.2. Secondary platings
Examining the accruals of firms involved into secondary placings, the results are 
different from the primary placings. DCAC is significantly negative the year prior 
the offer by -1.2%. This suggests conservative accounting policies and manipulative 
earnings adjustments via current accruals, such as stock revaluation and reduced 
credit sales. Downward earnings management and conservative accounting policies 
might aim tax avoidance or reduced dividend distributions to shareholders. This is 
also consistent with the lower sales reported in Table 5.3, as well as the earnings 
management hypothesis (H5.2b). Interestingly, NDCAC also become significantly 
lower the year prior the offer, while DCAC increases. Figure 5.6 that graphs the 
accrual paths indicate the DCAC ‘jum p’ clearly. This is in line with the earnings 
management hypothesis.
Figure 5.6: Median accruals for the secondary placings
Figure5.6 graphs the accrual measures described in Table 5.4, for the secondary offers.
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In addition, long-term accruals are significantly different from the industry 
expectations. DLAC are significantly negative the years around and immediately 
prior the event. This finding gives support to the earnings management hypothesis. It 
suggests that the firms involved into secondary offerings have higher long-term 
investments. This might also imply agency problems such as investments into 
negative NPV projects (Jung et al., 1996). Such interpretation could justify the news 
reports about disagreement of the sellers with the management and their desire to 
sell. It is further examined in section 5.6.5.2.
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Finally, NDLAC seem normal in comparison with the industry averages. However 
they are significantly lower when they are adjusted based on the operating 
performance prior the offer. This increased depreciation component gives support to 
the timing hypotheses and the view that the firms over-invest. Overall, the findings 
suggest timing, which implications about downwards earnings management and 
agency costs are apparent.
5.6.4. Relations between performance, accruals and accounting growth
5.6.4.1. Aggressive vs. conservative manipulators
This section presents univariate analysis between the accruals, stock and accounting 
abnormal performance. Beyond the BHAR estimated in Table 5.2, the analysis 
additionally use market adjusted holding period returns over a three-year period 
following the placings. The returns are estimated relative to the event month zero, 
with the window starting four months after the previous FYE or the issue month, 
whichever is later (similar to Teoh et al., 1998a; Iqbal et al., 2009). The four months 
lag is to allow investors the time to get the available information from the financial 
statements. The offering firms are grouped into ‘aggressive manipulators’ (the firms 
that have DCAC and DLAC levels above the fourth quartile o f the whole 
distribution) and to ‘conservative manipulators’ (below the first quartile).
>  Primary placings
Primary placing DCAC aggressive manipulators indicate significant mean (median) 
underperformance based on the market adjusted BHAR of -49% (-57%). However, 
the remaining benchmarks suggest lower underperformance which is marginally 
significant. Contrary, the DCAC conservative manipulators indicate significant 
underperformance under all benchmarks. BHAR varies from -48% (-13%) to -72% 
(-54%), depending on the benchmark used. The difference between the post-offer 
underperformance of aggressive and conservative manipulators is statistically 
significant at the 10%. It is t herefore similar to Table 5.4. This finding is 
inconsistent with the view that aggressive manipulators perform worse (Teoh et al., 
1998; Iqbal et al., 2009). UK pure placing firms do not aggressively manipulate
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earnings to the extent that this causes post-offer underperformance. Contrary, 
conservative DCAC manipulators have lower post-offer underperformance.
In addition, firms the aggressively manage long-term accruals perform significantly 
worse that conservative DLAC manipulators. As firms with the highest DLAC are 
those with the less depreciation and amortization expenses, this is consistent with the 
view that primary placing firms do face significant under-investment problems 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993).
Table 5.5: Aggressive vs. Conservative manipulators
The table displays the long-run perform ance o f  the placing firms, after categorise them  into aggresive 
and conservative manipulators. Conservative are those firms whome their DCAC_/ or DLAC.i belongs 
to the first quartily o f  their distributions, while conservative, those w hom e their DCAC.j or DLAC.j 
belongs to the fourth quartily. BHAR (MV, MV+IND, MV+BTM) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
measured as defined in Table 5.2. BHAR (MKT.Adj) is the market adjusted holding period returns, 
over the three-year period following the placing. The returns are estim ated relative to the event month
0, either four months after the previous fiscal year end o f  the issue month, w hichever is later._________
BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR
(MKT.Adj) (MV) (MV+IND) (MV+BTM (MKT.Adj) (MV) (MV+IND) (MV+BTM)
PRIMARY PLACINGS  SECONDARY PLACINGS_______
Panel A: DCAC Aggressive______________________________________________________________________________________________
N 58 58 58 58 15 15 15 15
Mean -0.488*** -0.244* -0.149 -0.256* -0.534** -0.609** -0.533* -0.705**
Median -0.571*** -0.075 -0.101 -0.181* -0.754** -0.486*** -0.239* -0.321**
Panel B: DCAC Conservative____________________________________________________________________________________________
N 57 57 57 57 27 27 27 27
Mean -0.578*** -0.721*** -0.484*** -0.668*** -0.199 -0.385 -0.040 -0.064
Median -0.634*** -0.54*** -0.126*** -0.377*** -0.287* -0.400 -0.046 -0.034
Panel C: DLAC Aggressive
Tj 56 56 56 56
Mean -0.739*** -0.897** -0.282*** -0.455***
Median -0.696*** -0.629*** -0.091** -0.189**
Panel D: DLAC Conservative_________________________________
N 57 57 57 57 62 62 62 62
Mean -0.105 -0.204 -0.205 -0.053 -0.109** -0.100 -0.097 -0.053
Median -0.268 -0.049003 -0.105* -0.009__________ -0.138 -0.182 -0.063 -0.004
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
>  Secondary offerings 
Regarding the secondary offers, the BHAR are negative (market adjusted, MV, 
MV+Ind, M V3 BTM) only for the DCAC aggressive manipulators. When BHAR are 
market adjusted DLAC aggressive manipulators also indicate significant 
underperfonnance. However, the remaining sub-samples indicate mainly normal 
performance.
14 14 14 14
-0.44** -0.331 -0.237 -0.413
-0.602* -0.528 -0.274* -0.686
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This supports the view that firms involved into secondary offerings aggressively 
manage earnings the year prior the offer, which significantly lead to post-offer 
underperformance. This supports the earnings management hypothesis (H5.2b).
5.6.4.2. Correlation coefficients
In sequence, Table 5.6 presents Speannan correlation coefficients between the 
various measures as at the year prior the placings and market adjusted three-year 
holding period AR, MktAdjR+3. The past-offer performance PERFOpas, is also 
estimated relative to the event month zero, with the window starting four months 
after the previous FYE or the issue month, whichever is later. It captures the market 
adjusted returns over the 12-month period preceding the event and it is used as proxy 
for the timing hypothesis.
y  Primary placings
Regarding the primary offers, it is interesting that the long-terms accruals 
(discretionary and non-discretionary) are negatively correlated to the past-offer AR  
(.PERFOpast), earnings (ROA, ROS) and cash-flow (CFA, CFS) performance the year 
prior the offer. Specifically, NDLAC indicate negative correlation coefficients of 
-0.134, -0.366, -0.298 and -0.226 with the PERFOpast, ROA, CFA, ROS and CFS 
respectively. Similarly, DLCAC.i are negatively correlated with PERFOpast, ROA.], 
CFA, ROS and CFS by -0.232, -0.55, -0.575, -0.413 and -0.546 respectively. These 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels and suggest that the 
higher long-term accruals do not signal expectations for value improvements. This 
supports the view that the firms face underinvestment problems.
Contrary, the debt and sales growth the year prior the offer (SGTH, ÀLEVR) are 
positively correlated with ROS. They indicate significant coefficients of 0.115 and 
0.127 respectively. Likewise, the stock past-offer performance PERFOpast is 
positively correlated with the past-offer accounting performance ROA, CFA, CFS. 
These suggest that the accounting growth ratios are able to signal expectations for 
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Nonetheless, the remaining accounting growth ratios do not indicate significant 
correlation coefficient with the past accounting performance. Therefore, the 
correlation coefficients suggest that the stock and operating past-offer performance is 
mainly driven by accruals (discretionary and non-discretionary).
s'Secondary placings
As far as the secondary offers, mainly the discretionary accruals (current and long­
term) indicate significantly negative correlation coefficients with the past-offer 
earnings and cash-flow based perfonnance. Specifically, the correlation coefficient 
o f DCAC with the ROA, CFA, ROS and CFS is -0.21, -0.569, -0.169 and -0.508 
respectively. Similarly, the coefficient o f DLAC is -0.582, 0.505, -0.31 and -0.48. 
The correlations are significant mainly at the 5% and 1% levels and suggest 
conservative accounting manipulation consistent with the findings o f Table 5.4. 
Accruals do not enhance over-optimism about the stock perfonnance prior the offer.
Regarding the accounting growth ratios, they do not seem to be correlated with the 
past-offer stock or operating performance. Only the leverage growth (LEVR) 
correlates with the CFA by -0.157. This correlation is marginally significant at the 
10%. Finally, the past-offer stock performance is positively correlated only with the 
past-offer CFA and not with the remaining operating performance measures. 
Therefore, the correlations coefficients suggest that the accounting ratios of 
secondary firms are not able to signal expectations.
Contrary, discretionary accruals do have negative relation. Although this is 
consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, accruals cannot explain the 
past-offer stock overperformance. It seems that investors over-pay for the stock, 
without real justification that derives from the firm financial situation or accrual 
measurements.
5.6.5. Predicting the post-offer stock abnormal performance
Finally, Table 5.7 explains the post-offer underperformance for the two equity 
offering types. It presents multivariat OLS cross-sectional regression analysis, with 
dependent variable the market-adjusted holding period return, over the three-years
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following the announcement. The models control for the size and BTM effects by 
including the natural logarithm of MV (ln(MV)) and the firm BTM ratio as 
additional explanatory variables. The ln(MV) and BTM are also estimated with a lag 
o f four months after the previous FYE or the issue month, whichever is later. Main 
explanatory variables are the growth of the) various accounting and accrual measures 
the year prior the offer.
Table 5.7: OLS cross-sectional regressions
The table presents W hite (1980) corrected coefficients w ith dependent variable is the m arket adjusted 
holding period returns, over the three-year period following the placing. The returns are estim ated relative 
to the event month 0, either four months after the previous fiscal year end o f  the issue m onth, w hichever is 
later. PERFOlpllsl) is the holding period market adjusted returns for year p rior the event. The D0jjs /z£> = j % is a 
binary variable that takes 1 when the relative offered size is below the conventional 5% cut-off o f  the share 
capital and zero otherwise. The rest variables are defined as explained in Tables 5.1-5.4. O bservations 
beyond the ±2 regression standard errors are omitted to avoid the im pact o f  outliers. A  10 VIF value is 
required as m ulticolinearity test.________________________________________________________________________
PRIMARY PLACINGS SECONDARY PLACINGS





3yBHAR, At least 5% 
of sh.cap
3yBHAR, Full sample 3yBHAR, At least 5%
coeff. o-value coeff. o-value coeff. o-value coeff. o-value
Intercept -1.053 (0.00)*** -1.337 (0.00)*** 0.313 (0.358) 0.617 (0.262)
NDCAC.j -0.245 (0.581) -0.247 (0.603) -2.376 (0.05)** -2.375 (0.048)**
DCAC .j -0.041 (0.843) -0.073 (0.74) -1.039 (0.068)* -1.086 (0.063)*
NDLAC.i -0.132 (0.121) -0.109 (0.225) -0.666 (0.000)*** -0.850 (0.000)***
DLAC -0.259 (0.001)*** -0.237 (0.004)*** -0.739 (0.000)*** -0.709 (0.011)**
SGTH -0.050 (0.030)** -0.054 (0.084)* 0.066 (0.523) 0.139 (0.237)
AACTV.i 0.000 (0.636) 0.000 (0.636) 0.000 (0.352) 0.000 (0.591)
A DEBT% 0.040 (0.074)* 0.046 (0.063)* 0.012 (0.748) 0.016 (0.644)
ALEVR 0.006 (0.551) 0.004 (0.716) 0.001 (0.628) 0.001 (0.68)
PERFO past 0.030 (0.472) 0.010 (0.835) 0.085 (0.246) -0.008 (0.923)
DISCOUNT -0.017 (0.792) 0.090 (0.508) 0.082 (0.285) 0.321 (0.598)
D  OfSIZ£>=5% -0.210 (0.038)** -0.111 (0.321)
In (MV) yes yes yes yes
BTM yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs 2 2 0 1 6 6 1 1 7 8 0
Adj.R2 0 .2 0 7 0 .1 5 5 0 .3 2 3 0 .3 9 4
F-test 5 .4 * * * 3.53*** 2.83*** 2 ~j~j* * *
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
5.6.5. 1. Primary placings
Regarding the primary placings, Panel A suggests that the long-run post-offer 
performance is mainly driven by the DLAC (see models 1 and 2). It indicates a
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negative coefficient o f -0.259 and -0.237 respectively, statistically significant at the 
1% level. This supports the earnings management hypothesis (H5.2a). It is also 
consistent with the view that primary placing firms face underinvestment problems 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993). Recall that DLAC are significantly positive (see Table 
5.4), suggesting reduced depreciation component and other long-term accruals. 
Therefore, the negative DLAC coefficient implies that the underinvestment reduces 
the firm value.
In addition, the models also support the over-optimism hypothesis. The sales growth 
(SGTH) has a significantly negative coefficient o f -0.05**. Recall that SGTH is 
significantly higher than their corresponding benchmark the year prior the offer (see 
Table 5.3). The coefficient suggests that the sales growth eventually reduces the firm 
performance, irrespective of the signals sent at the announcement. Contrary, the 
coefficient ADEBT is significantly positive (0.04*), indicating that the market is 
likely to expect firms to use debt to fund an investment opportunity rather than issue 
equity (e.g. Myers, 1984).
Finally, controlling for the smaller relative offer size, it does not affect the results. 
Model 2 adds a binary variable Dojsize>=5% that takes 1 for the offers above the 5% 
cut-off point and zero otherwise. The coefficient o f the variable is significantly 
negative (-0.21**), suggesting that larger placings (in relative offer size) indicate 
significantly lower returns. This is plausible, considering that firms involved into 
smaller placings in relative offered size are large stocks with low asymmetric 
information. Therefore, they will indicate larger returns. Beyond this, the results are 
not sensitive to the D o js iz e > = 5 %  inclusion (see model 2 that excludes all placings 
below the 5% cut-off point).
5.6.5.2. Secondary placings
Regarding the secondary placements, the results also suggest timing and earnings 
management. All accrual measures (discretionary and non-discretionary) have 
significantly negative coefficients (models 3 and 4).
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Specifically, NDCAC and NDLAC document negative coefficients o f -2.38 and - 
0.67, statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels (see model 3). Both coefficients 
support the timing hypothesis and the view that the shareholders knowingly sell 
overvalued stock (Lee, 1997; Clarke et al., 2004). At the same time, the coefficients 
o f DC AC and DLAC are also negative by -1.039 and -0.739, statistically significant 
at the 10% and 1% levels. Recall that DLAC is significantly negative the year prior 
the offer, which suggests increased depreciation components and over-investment. 
Therefore, both short and long-term discretionary accrual measures boost the post­
event AR. Hereby firms are likely to invest into negative NPV projects that do not 
add value to the firm, suggesting agency costs (Jung et al., 1996). These coefficients 
favour the earnings management hypothesis.
Controlling for placings with small relative offer size does affect the results. Model 3 
includes a binary variable to distinguish the placings of below and above the 5% cut­
off point however the variable is not statistically significant. This suggests similar 
performance paths for both sub-samples. Excluding the small placings does not 
affect the conclusions either (see model 4). Finally, the accounting variables do not 
affect the post-offer abnormal performance at all, suggesting that investors do not 
consider the reduced sales as sign for overvaluation. As a conclusion, the results for 
the secondary placements imply that the sellers have abilities to sell when the stock 
is overvalued, while the firm manages the earnings the year before consistent with 
both timing and earnings management hypotheses.
5.7. Sensitivity tests
The results indicate significant reversal in stock performance, while operating 
performance appears nonnal. Stock performance is consistent with the empirical 
evidence (see Barclay et al., 2007; Hertzel et al., 2002; Kang et al., 1999) and it is 
robust to alternative controls and treatments (see section 5.4.1.3).
Regarding the operating performance, Hertzel et al. (2002) report significant 
negative abnormal ROA in all ±3 around a private placing and higher capital and 
R&D expenditure. Nevertheless, given the similar results between Teoh et al. 
(1998a) and Iqbal et al. (2009) tor US and UK SEO, respectively, one would assume
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that US and UK markets might report similar findings for private placements as well. 
Regarding the secondary placings, results are also inconsistent with the post­
overperformance (Bethel et ah, 1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991), but look 
similar to insider trading. To control for this, the analysis is replicated by using the 
corresponding industry mean for each event firm, as performance benchmark. 
Industry benchmark is similar to Teoh et al. (1998a; b), Iqbal et al. (2009), Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel et al. (2002). The results are similar (not shown for 
brevity). Hereby the operating performance o f primary placing firms does not follow 
the stock path, regardless o f the benchmark. Contrary, the sales and debt growth do, 
which also controls for ‘real earnings management’ (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006).
Additionally, several outlier treatments are used, such us winzorizing the 
distributions at the 1st and 99th percentiles on cross-sectional level for each fiscal year 
tested (-3, +3), cross-section winzorization without annual discrimination (to control 
for false elimination of any abnormal performance in a given year) and, raw medians 
without winzorization. Results remain qualitatively similar.
Finally, although not directly examined by this study, primary placing firms might 
have incentives to report “stable” earnings in order to be able to sell equity to 
institutional investors and fund managers (who are the main buyers; see section 
4.6.1.3). These investor categories avoid investing into firms with volatile earnings 
(Michelson et al., 2000). Smoothing implies managerial incentives to reduce earnings 
volatility in order to signal higher quality (contrary to the traditional earnings 
management that accrual accounts are manipulated towards specific direction). It is 
“the process o f manipulating the time profile o f earnings reports to make the reported 
income stream less variable” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, p.75).47 Smoothing 
policies could be pronounced if different paths between earnings and cash-flow 
based ratios are reported (Lang et al., 2006). Therefore, the fact that primary placing 
firms report negative cash-flow based performance for the event year and the year 
after, but normal eamings-based (see Table 5.3) could be attributed to management’s
47 Ronen and Sadan (1981) define earnings sm oothing as the m anagerial attem pt to signal inform ation 
to financial users. See also Beattie et al. (1994), M ichelson et al. (1995, 2000), O liverio and N ew m an 
( 1997), Nagy and Neal (2001 ).
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'earnings smoothing strategy’ (which could be seen as another form of earnings 
management).
5.8. S u m m ary  an d  conclusions
This chapter focuses in explaining the long-run performance following non pre­
emptive placements of equity, using primary and secondary UK offerings. It 
contributes by providing new evidence about the two equity offering types. It also 
examines the timing (Hertzel et al., 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997) and earnings 
management hypotheses (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998) after taking into 
consideration the UK settings.
Specifically, the literature implies that the management identifies a window of 
opportunity to sell equity and times the offer when the stock is overvalued. The 
placing takes place when other events change the level o f asymmetric information 
such as earnings and dividend announcements (Korajczyk et al., 1991; Loderer and 
Maurer, 1992; Lucas and McDonald, 1990), when performance peaks (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Iqbal et al., 2009; Hertzel et al., 2002) when there is high event activity 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996) or insider trading (Lee, 1997). Nevertheless, the 
long-run post-offer performance deteriorates. Contrary, evidence about secondary 
offerings suggests overperformance following the event, as new, active and/or 
corporate investors participate (Bethel et al., 1998; Allen and Phillips, 2000; Barclay 
and Holderness, 1991). Overperformance is also document for private placings when 
active investors participate (Wruck and Wu, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005).
Similar UK evidence is sparse for both equity offering types. Additionally, the fact 
that investors in the UK are mainly existing shareholders rather than new ones 
(Annitage, 2010) provides additional interest as the performance paths and 
implications might differ. For this reason, this study assumes that primary placing 
investors are over-optimistic about the firm value, rather than knowingly sell over­
valued stock. Hence, accounting characteristics beyond earnings might indicate how 
(and it) any over-optimistic behaviour prior the offer is justified. Accounting growth 
might signal growth and/or value improvements prior the event, facilitating the offer 
timing. Knowingly sales of over-valued stock is however plausible for the secondary
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placings. Both hypotheses (timing and earnings management) imply that investors do 
not understand the real implications o f the placing.
A few important findings emerge, as described in Table 5.8. The findings for the
primary placings support the view that investors are over-optimistic about the stock
value (H5.1a). The firms indicate significant stock over-performance the year prior
the offer, which deteriorates afterwards. Contrary, the operating performance does
not comply with the market valuations but, it is mainly normal the year prior the
offer. This suggests overvaluation at the announcement. At the same time, the firms
indicate increased sales and debt growth before the offer which deteriorate
afterwards. Thus, sales and debt growth indicate similar path to the stock abnormal
performance. These facilitate firms to time the offer by signalling growth. OLS
analysis confirms this interpretation, as the sales growth measures can explain the 
long-run post-U7?.
The findings also support the view that the firms have underinvestment problems 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993). This is reflected by increased DLAC prior the offer. The 
increased DLAC documents significantly negative relationship to the post-offer AR, 
which also supports the earnings management hypothesis (H5.2a). Contrary, current 
accruals are not managed, which does not comply with the view that firms use 
current accruals to mislead investors. Overall, it seems that investors do not 
understand that the stock is overvalued or that the implied growth is temporary. They 
are over-optimistic about the future firm value.
As far as the secondary placings, the firms indicate similar stock performance: over­
performance prior the offer which deteriorates afterwards. This is consistent with the 
premise o f the timing hypothesis. Sellers do have timing ability to sell stock when it 
market overvalued. This contradicts the predominant US evidence on value 
improvements following transactions o f existing block o f shares (Bethel et al., 1998; 
Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Philips, 2000). Contrary, the findings are in 
line with prior US findings about insider trading (Lee, 1997; Clarke et ah, 2004; 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998).
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In addition, the operating performance of secondary offering firms is mainly normal. 
Interestingly, the sales are significantly lower than the corresponding benchmarks. 
Consistely, the analysis detects significant downwards earnings management the year 
before the offer. Downwards earnings management might target tax avoidance or 
reduced dividend allocations. At the same time, the findings imply overinvestment 
problems that eventually reduce firm value. Hereby, considering that secondary 
placings constitute transactions with blocks of listed shares initiated by existing 
shareholders, the findings suggest that the sellers take advantage o f information they 
possess about the firm financial situation and, sell the stock at the best convenient 
time. Such findings are new for the extant literature.
Table 5.8: Summary of main findings of chapter five
The first colum n presents the hypothesis tested, the second the relevant expectations and the third w hether 
the results support a specific hypothesis with regards to the two offering types. AR  is the abnorm al returns. 
DC AC  is the discretionary current accruals, NDCAC  the non-discretionary current accruals, DLAC  the 
discretionary long-term  accruals and NDLAC  the non-discretionary long-term  accruals. The accruals are 
defined in Table 5.4. ROA and CFA are the retum -on-assets and operating cash-flows on assets, respectively.
H ypothesis P red ic tion C onsis ten t resu lts
P rim a ry S econdary
H5.Ì. O ver­ ( + ) AR  prior the event V V
optim ism  / ( - )  AR  afterwards V V
Timing Significant relation between 














Significant DC AC  the year 
before the event
X V ( - )
Significant relation between 
DC AC  & post-offer AR
X V ( - )
Significant DLAC 
Significant relation between
V ( + ) V ( + )
DLAC  & post-offer AR V ( - ) V ( - )
Additional ROA Mainly normal, ( - )  after Normal
Accounting CFA Normal before, ( - )  after Normal
Information Sales growth ( + ) Normal
Sales turnover ( - )  at t=0 ( - )
CapEx+R& D Normal Normal
Debt growth ( + ) Normal
Leverage Normal Normal
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6.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the puzzling reversal of abnormal returns following a private 
placing. It focuses on the fourth research objective (Obj.4) o f the study and answers 
the third, fourth and fifth research questions (Q3, Q4 and Q5). Hence, beyond the 
reversal, it also examines whether the inclusion o f illiquidity as a risk factor 
facilitates in assessing expected returns. This is the second part o f the third research 
objective (Obj.3).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides the motivation and the 
main contributions o f this chapter. Section 6.3 emphasizes on the relevant literature 
and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 6.4 describes the event study 
approaches applied and explains several adjustments in AR  and risk factors that this 
study formulates. Section 6.5 describes the sample and descriptive statistics. Section
6.6 presents the empirical findings and discusses the results, whilst the last section
6.7 concludes.
6.2. M otivation and m ain contributions o f the chapter
This chapter is motivated by a pattern that implies systematic mispricing and market 
inefficiency. Precisely, private placements are reported to cause positive market 
reactions at the announcement.48 These positive reactions are attributed to 
expectations for value improvements as the firm is likely to signal undervaluation 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993), or active investors are expected to improve firm value 
after joining the firm (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009). Nevertheless, the firm 
abnormal performance turns negative few years later (see Hertzel et al., 2002; 
Barclay et al., 2007; Sheehan and Swisher, 1998 for US; Kang et al., 1999 for Japan).
48 See H ertzel and Smith (1993), W ruck (1989), Barclay et al. (2007) for US; K ang and Stulz (1996), 
Kato and Schallheim  (1993) for Japan and W u et al. (2005) for Hong-Kong.
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The most common explanation o f this AR reversal is that investors are over- 
optimistic when the private placement is announced (Hertzel et al., 2002). They have 
high expectations about the firm value and react positively. However, as the 
expectations are not fulfilled, AR reverse. This pattern implies systematic miss- 
valuations of the placing stock. Are private placing investors so naive and do not 
learn from the past? This is the primary question of this chapter.
The fact that the sign o f AR changes over time, raises the question whether the 
announcement reactions are able to capture the impact o f corporate decisions on 
shareholder wealth (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The long-horizon abnormal 
underperfonmance and the overreaction interpretation imply a window of opportunity 
for the firms to sell equity. Supportive arguments suggest the management times the 
offer to take advantage of favourable market conditions (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 
1996). Alternatively, other arguments advocate that firms take advantage o f 
temporary firm growth (Chapter 5), sell shares when the stock is overvalued (Lee, 
1997; Lee and Masullis, 2009; Clarke et al., 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; 
Chapter 5), sell stock after having manipulated earnings (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 
1998; Iqbal et al., 2009; Yoon and Miller, 2002) and/or, ‘hype’ the stock by 
increasing their disclosure activities (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Such arguments 
imply the stock is systematically miss-priced but investors do not realize the miss- 
valuation ex-ante the offer. SEO are overpriced (Pontiff and Schill, 2002), but the 
market realizes the overvaluation with a delay.49
These interpretations imply that few individuals who are aware o f this pattern can 
systematically ‘beat the market’ and yield higher profits. This fact casts strong 
doubts on market efficiency. Nevertheless, Malkiel (2003) observes that when an 
anomaly that provides systematic and significantly higher adjusted returns to specific 
investors comes into light (e.g. the January effect, seasonalities), its effect becomes 
lower as more and more investors try to explore these arbitrage opportunities and,
40 Several studies suggest over or under-reactions to SEO and IPO, e.g. Lougrhan and R itter (1995) 
examines US IPO and advocates for an under reaction argum ent (announcem ent AR are negative and 
become more negative afterw ards). See also other studies that report over- and/or under-reaction to 
corporate events such as Lakonishok and Ritter (1992); Antweiler and Frank (2006); Ikenbery et al. 
(1995); Conrad and Kaul (1993).
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they eventually vanish. This fact provides additional motivation to examine further 
this AR  reversal, questioning the robustness o f this pattern after becoming known.
This study contributes to the extant literature by investigating this reversal in depth. 
It first follows the suggestion o f Fama (1998) that ‘anomalies’ should be received 
with scepticism and out-of-sample cross-confirmations (Fama, 1991; 1998). More 
specifically, evidence on the private placement AR reversal are mainly documented 
for the US market and Japan. Little evidence for the reversal is also implied for 
Norwegian private placings (Eckbo and Norli, 2004). The current study explores the 
puzzle by following out-of-sample tests with recent UK private placements, for 
which evidence is in elementary stage. Hereby, although the current study does not 
directly examine market efficiency, it contributes to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970; 1991).
Beyond the new market, the study mainly contributes by examining several 
alternative explanations on why private placement AR are likely to reverse. First, 
arguments exist against the ability o f the long-run AR methods to estimate the 
variation o f expected returns. Brav and Gompers (1997), Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) and others advocate that the several ‘event anomalies’ that strongly reject the 
efficient market hypothesis, actually reflect misspecifications o f the models o f 
expected performance.50 This raises the question whether the reported performance 
attributed to the event, or the deficiencies o f the event-study approach. As the chapter 
focuses on the AR  paths, the need for robust inferences is fundamental.
This chapter assesses short- and long-horizon AR for periods around the 
announcement, issue day and up to three years following the event. It applies several 
traditional long-run Hi? methods (e.g. Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; 
Fama, 1998), while it makes a step beyond the conventional methodologies and 
measures liquidity-adjusted AR  (Liu, 2006). Additionally, by applying a liquidity 
asset-pricing model (Liu, 2006) the study adds to the event-study literature, as well 
as considers liquidity cost as a risk factor. This test complies with the findings of 
Eckbo et al. (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) who argue that the conventional 
models fail to capture for the liquidity exposure o f issuing firms. Further, the study
50 See the C hapter 3 for further details.
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contributes by borrowing arguments from related areas of corporate finance (i.e. IPO 
and dividend areas) as well as by testing possibilities previously examined for other 
SEO types (e.g. other information at the announcement and investor speculative 
activities).
Precisely, Schultz (2003) examines the underperformance of IPO and argues for a 
'pseudo-timing’ hypothesis that firms sell shares when prices of other firms 
participating to the event are high. The fact that performance peaks at the offer is a 
fact observed ex-post and not ex-ante. The managers being able to time the offer (see 
section 6.3.3). Second, the private placing announcement reduces the asymmetric 
information (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) and it is likely to improve the stock liquidity 
(Leuz and Varrecchia, 2000). If however the benchmark model cannot adjust for 
relative risk changes, the reported AR will be downward biased, as event returns will 
be compared with higher expected returns (e.g. Eckbo et al., 2000). The study 
contributes by testing the contemporaneous changes in the risk factor loadings 
following the event and, whether the reported AR are subject to matching technique 
faults.
A different hypothesis builds upon the evidence that SEO firms release other kind of 
information along the announcement (Korajczyk et al., 1991; Antweiler and Frank, 
2004). Thus, the isolation of the private placing infonnation from other information 
is difficult. This hypothesis argues that the AR reversal is subject to the overall 
information environment around the announcement. Hereby, part of the reported AR  
might reflect the performance o f other events. Finally, the study tests the possibility 
that the temporary increases in share prices derive from speculative activities o f 
specific investors (e.g. Kim and Shin, 2004). As in the UK the placing price is set 
before the announcement and remains fixed until the issue day, investors may aim to 
buy the share at the offered price directly from the firm and, sell it at higher price 
immediately after the issue. Such possibility would imply incentives to manipulate 
the price upwards. Thus, the announcement AR might be illusionary.
Overall, this study adds to the body of knowledge regarding private placements of 
equity and provides insights in understanding this particular puzzle. It also
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contributes to the market efficiency literature, to the long-run AR  methods and 
expected cost o f equity methodology.
6.3. H ypotheses developm ent and em pirical predictions
6.3.1. AR reversal and overreaction
In a private placing, the management agrees to place shares privately with specific 
investors after direct negotiations between the parties involved. The private investors 
need to ‘acquire’ the necessary information about the firm, ex-ante the agreement. 
On that basis, the certification hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) suggests that the 
private placement announcement signals ‘good news’, that the firm is likely to be 
undervalued (it is not a ‘lemon’; c.f. Akerlof, 1970). This causes positive 
announcement AR. Since the market was not aware about the true firm value prior 
the investigation o f the private investors, it is plausible to state that the firms are 
mainly stocks with high asymmetric information (Wu, 2004; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1999).
Without doubts, the firm announcement to place equity privately changes the 
existing level o f information asymmetry between the firm and the market. This 
change affects investor willingness to trade large quantities o f the stock, affecting the 
announcement AR. Nevertheless, unless an unanticipated event changes again the 
level o f asymmetric information, it is unlikely that information alone can explain the 
reported reversal in AR. Based on the certification, if  the market is efficient, long- 
horizon AR  should have been nil as the market prices would adjust for the placing 
infonnation after its public announcement.51
The fact that the sign of AR reverses over time does not ‘fit’ within the notion o f the 
certification wisdom. Hertzel et al. (2002) argue that this inconsistency to market 
reactions is due to market overreaction at the announcement: the market expects firm
51 W ruck (1989) provides a different explanation o f  the positive announcem ent reactions. She 
advocates that the m arket reacts positively due to the intentions o f  the new  investors to m onitor the 
incum bents and im prove perform ance. Similarly, studies exam ining the post-purchase activities o f  
investors, report positive or nil post-abnorm al perform ance when the equity  buyers are active 
investors, affiliated or corporations (K rishnam uthy et al., 2005; W ruck and Wu, 2009). A lthough this 
study does not exam ine this m onitoring argum ent, the analysis controls for this possibility  by  using 
m onitoring proxies into m ultivariate regression analysis.
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value improvements and thus, announcement AR are positive. When expectations are 
not fulfilled the firm value declines. Hence, it implies systematic market reactions 
towards the wrong direction. Investors systematically make the same mistake and do 
not learn from the past.
Although the evidence on UK private placements is unclear, intuition suggest that AR 
reversal is valid. Pure private placements and placements with open offers 
underperfonn few years after the event (Chapter 5 and Ho (2005) respectively). At 
the same time, pre-emptive offers, placings accompanied by pre-emptive offer and 
accelerated book-build placings cause positive market reactions at the announcement 
(Annitage, 2010; Balachandran et al., 2009). Thus, the first hypothesis examines 
these arguments.
H6.1 a: AR following UK private placings are mean reverting 
H6.1b: Investors overreact at the announcement 
H6.1 c : There is a momentum effect in AR
The study examines the reversal (H 6.la ) by assessing the short and long-run 
performance following UK private placements. It applies several methods and 
control for known problems for robust inferences (see section 5.4.1.3). Further, a 
simple test for the overreaction hypothesis (H 6.lb ) is a negative correlation between 
the announcement and long-run AR (Hertzel et al., 2002), while long-run AR  are 
controlled for momentum strategies.
6.3.2. Pseudo-timing
Schultz (2003) provides an interpretation for the underperformance o f IPO and SEO 
firms that could also explain the private placing AR pattern. He advocates that long­
term AR are likely to be negative even when the market is efficient and the 
management does not have the ability to foresee that the stock value will decline. 
Finns go public because they can sell equity at high price similar to other firms, 
without timing ability: the higher the share price, the more likely they will issue. Not 
because firms attempt to sell overvalued stock at that particular time (as implied by
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the known timing hypothesis). The fact that performance peaks around the offer is 
something observed ex-post.
A simple example indicated by Schultz (2003, p. 786) facilitates in understanding the 
premise o f the pseudo-timing hypothesis. Let us make a few simplistic assumptions. 
First, all potential IPO firms earn the same returns as recent IPO firms and, their per- 
share value is the same. At calendar-time zero (CT=0) the IPO price is 100 and one 
IPO occurs. Second assumption, all IPO firms earn the market return plus an excess 
return o f ±10. The possibility o f^ i?  goes up or down is 50% and it is unpredictable. 
Third assumption, if  the IPO price exceeds 105, it attracts three private firms to go 
public. If the IPO price is between 95 and 105 it attracts one new IPO. If the IPO 
price falls to 95 or below, no IPO activity takes place. For simplicity, the example 
measures only the AR for the event-period T following each IPO, T = + l.
_______________ Figure 6.1: A simplistic example of pseudo-timing_______________
CT=0 CT=1 CT=2 Possible paths o f  IPO event-tim e AR-r„+l
As there are only two possibilities for excess returns, there are four possible IPO 
prices and AR  paths until the CT=2, as shown in Figure 6.1. The first path is when 
the IPO price goes up for two subsequent periods (1). When the price becomes 110, 
three new IPO will take place. Hence, the three new IPO will take place after the 
price peaks, rather than deciding ex-ante. Each o f the IPO firms yield ±10% in their 
first event-period (T=±l). The mean event-time ARt=i for the one old and three new 
IPO will be ±10%. The second path (2) shows the possibility that the price reaches
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110 at CT=1, attracts again three new IPO ex-post, however the excess return in the 
subsequent year is negative. Thus, the mean event-time ARj=i for the one old and 
three new IPO will be -5%. The last two paths (3) and (4) indicate the possibility that 
negative AR occur at CT=1. When the IPO price is 90, no new IPO will occur and the 
mean event-time ARr=i will be -10% regardless of the subsequent AR.
Therefore, the example shows that when AR are measured in event-time (each event 
is weighted equally), there are 75% probabilities for negative mean ARr=+i even 
when the expected returns for each individual offer are zero. Contrary, calendar-time 
ARct=i (each calendar-period is weighted equally) are zero. Apparently, from the 
possible four paths only one will happen.
The managers use the ‘trigger prices to determine when to issue’ (Schultz, 2003, p. 
485) and the decision is taken ex-post. According to the pseudo-timing hypothesis, 
the reason o f why firms will issue when the prices are high is not important. They 
might believe they can explore more growth opportunities, avoid large dilutional 
effects, or any other reason. Hence, it is often the case that offerings cluster in 
particular periods. Schultz (2003) suggests that the covariance between AR  and the 
number of future offerings is positive (negative correlation between the number of 
ex-post issuing firms and AR). Using binomial tree simulations, Schultz (2003) 
argues that the probability for negative ex-post event-time AR exceeds 50%, even 
when expected returns ex-ante are zero. However, estimating calendar-time AR, the 
possibility to observe post-underperformance is eliminated.32
On that basis, pseudo-timing could explain the lower CTAR reported by prior studies 
examining IPO and SEO such as Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers 
(1997), Gompers and Lemer (2003). However, studies such as Dahlquist and De 
Jong (2008), Viswanathan and Wei (2008) and Ang et al. (2005) argue that pseudo­
timing assumes stationary event process and could be a potential explanation for 
small samples. Hereby, selling new stock might has nothing to do with the 
management's ability to know ex-ante when the stock perfonnance peaks, or to its 
ability to explore abnonnal gains by selling overvalued stock.
Exactly because CTAR weights hot and cold periods equally. Loughran and Ritter (2000) advocate 
against the CTAR approach. They doubt the ability CTAR approach to detect AR See further discussion 
on this in Chapter 3.
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I ¡6.2: The management does not have timing ability. Rather, the more the placing  
firm s receive by selling the stock the more firm s participate to the event.
A simple indicator for the pseudo-timing hypothesis is to observe whether the event 
clusters in specific time periods. Second, if  the pseudo-timing hypothesis is valid, 
significant CTAR will disappear or become lower in comparison to the reported 
event-time AR.
6.3.3. Liquidity and risk-factor adjustments
This story addresses the puzzle from a different angle and doubts the power o f the 
traditional asset pricing models to adjust for the placing implications. In particular, 
evidence suggests that firms conducting SEO are mainly illiquid stocks (Loderer et 
al., 1991; Barclay and Litzerberger, 1988). For that reason, uninformed investors are 
less willing to trade large quantities o f stock. They undertake higher risks which are 
often associated with the cost o f selling shares (or the cost o f raising equity) and the 
level o f asymmetric information (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Hereby, due to 
difficulty in selling illiquid stock, the firms need to compensate investors with 
discount (Kyle, 1985; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Silber, 1991; Gao 
and Ritter, 2010).
In the same vein, Bowen et al. (2008) consider underpricing as the cost o f raising 
equity (documenting lower underpricing for firms with lower asymmetric 
information). Marquart and Wiedman (1998) imply that the level o f asymmetric 
information is positively related to the cost o f capital. The required rate o f return on 
equity should thus be an increasing factor o f the level o f asymmetric information. 
Indeed, the economic theory suggests that when the information asymmetry is 
reduced, the corresponding component o f the cost o f capital is also reduced 
(Diamond and Verrechia, 1991; Leuz and Varrecchia, 2000).
Considering that the private placement announcement reduces the level o f 
asymmetric information between the firm and the market (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), 
reduction in the cost o f equity is pronounced. This reduction should increase the
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stock trading volume and stock liquidity (to reduce liquidity premium).53 
Consequently, the current stock prices are to rise (Diamond and Verrechia, 1991).
Nevertheless, the fact that AR become negative few years later, implies 
contemporaneous changes in liquidity and/or other risk factors, components o f the 
cost of equity. Hence, it is plausible to argue that the expected rate o f return is 
subject to changes over time.54 Eckbo et al. (2000), Brav et al. (2000) and Eckbo and 
Norli (2005) suggest that SEO stocks become less risky after the offer, as the firms 
have less leverage. As a result, the expected return o f the SEO firms is lower in 
comparison with a benchmark chosen based on pre-event firm characteristics. 
Additionally, Eckbo et al. (2000) document significant increase in stock volume 
turnover related to SEO, which is not reported by the corresponding benchmarks 
(even without including liquidity in their six-factor model). It can therefore be argued 
that, as the stock illiquidity is reduced, the expected returns should be reduced 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). If the model used to measure long-run AR  fails to 
adjust for changes in risk, the reported AR will be biased downward (as the event-/47? 
will be compared with less liquid stocks with higher cost of equity).
116.3: The stock liquidity increases after the placing but the benchmark used to 
measure long-run AR does not properly account fo r  this risk reduction
This liquidity/risk adjustment hypothesis suggests that the stock becomes less risky 
in terms of liquidity after the placing, reducing their expected returns. Nevertheless, 
if the benchmark continues to consist of firms with higher risk, the estimated 
expected returns will be higher, resulting to negative AR. This is consistent with 
Eckbo et al. (2000) who report significantly lower risk loadings (lower exposure) 
following the SEO in comparison to benchmarks. They suggest that the matched- 
technique is ‘by itself likely to generate abnormal performance’ (ibid, p.272). Herby, 
the liquidity hypothesis can by divided into two sub-hypotheses as follows.
H6.3a: Liquidity is a significant factor in AR
"  Sim ilar argum ents are argued by Diamond and V errecchia (1991), K othare (1997), Conrad and 
Conroy (1994).
Such assum ption is plausible even without arguing that the long-term  change in cost-of-equity is 
com pletely driven by the event. Between the announcem ent and the end o f  a long-run event w indow 
for which AR is measured, several events take place that might change the cost o f  capital o f  the stock.
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H6.3b: There are model misspecification problems
To test these arguments the study follows three steps. First, it examines the 
associations between firm-specific liquidity variables (namely the bid-ask spread and 
trading volume) with the AR. Positive (negative) relation to the spread (volume) 
would imply illiquidity premium at the announcement.
Second, as the hypothesis assumes failure o f the pricing model to capture the 
appropriate risk factors, e.g. stock (il)liquidity, the changes in risk factor loadings 
following the placing are examined. Eckbo et al. (2000) suggest benchmark controls 
for leverage and liquidity risk factors, while Boechme and Sorescu (2002) propose 
tests o f risk loadings changes in future long-horizon event studies. The current study 
directly investigates both o f these propositions, i.e. changes in risk factor loadings 
following the placements and, the liquidity as a risk factor.
In particular, regarding the factor loading changes, this study follows an approach in 
a manner similar to Boehme and Sorescu (2002) and Grullon et al. (2001).55 If the 
sample is over-populated with stocks that have changes in risk factors(before and 
after), expected rates of return will reverse. Thus, AR  will reverse (Boehme and 
Sorescu, 2002). This hypothesis, predicts that if  the stock becomes less risky after the 
event, the change in risk factor coefficients will become significantly negative.
Regarding the liquidity as a risk factor, the study applies a ‘liquidity adjusted’ capital 
asset pricing model (Liu, 2006). Similar to ‘traditional’ asset pricing models, 
liquidity-pricing models aim to identify factors that explain the market prices (and 
returns) via liquidity strategies, which are argued to explain and predict future returns 
in the same spirit as a traditional pricing model; e.g. Amihud (2002) measures the 
illiquidity-retum relation over time, documenting positive relationship between ex- 
ante stock returns and expected aggregate illiquidity {AR reflect expected market 
illiquidity). This method facilitates in answering whether illiquidity as a risk factor 
explains the AR  (beyond the traditional size and BTM risk factors). If so, the 
liquidity adjusted AR  will be lower, while the illiquidity risk-factor might be able to
55 Boehm e and Sorescu (2002) and Grullon et al. (2001) exam ine the long-run AR  follow ing dividend 
initiations and resum ptions and, increase in quarterly dividends, respectively.
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explain better the AR patterns. This model also contributes to the on-going debate on 
the proper approach to estimate long-run AR.
6.3.4. Other information at the announcement
This hypothesis relates the AR reversal with agency issues. Previous studies report 
that SEO are followed by other events such as earnings announcements (Korajczyk 
et al., 1991), business cycles (Choe et al., 1990), dividend announcements (Loderer 
and Maurer, 1992), increased disclosure activities prior the offer (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1997), acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 1992; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998 for 
US, Gregory, 1997 for UK). Therefore, someone could argue that other events that 
take place around the equity offering might cause the reported AR, rather than private 
placement. In other words, this hypothesis (H6.4) predicts that pooling together the 
private placing samples without distinguishing based on other events announced 
around the placing, is what causes the reported reversal. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is tested.
H6.4: Controlling fo r  other events at the placing announcement time eliminates the 
reversal.
Based on this possibility, a careful look at the news released around the private 
placing is taken, aiming to identify whether other events take place at the same time. 
Indeed, approximately 43% of the firms announce investment plans or the firm 
intention to expand by acquiring another company. These placements are categorized 
as offers associated with ‘investment news’. Contrary, about 7% of the sample 
reports that the private placing funds are essential for the firm operating activities 
(implying relative distress), whilst few firms announce plans for reorganization 
and/or reconstruction. 36% of the firms state that the placing funds are to strengthen 
the firm financial situation, for working capital purposes and/or make the firm able to 
explore new opportunities, i.e. they do not specify the placing purpose. They just 
imply pure fund raising. Reorganization and pure fund raising are assumed to be 
associated with ‘operating news', as the placing funds seem necessary for the firm to 
continue its operations. Several possibilities around these events might be valid.
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Specifically, if  the ‘investment news’ sub-sample involves investments into projects 
with positive NPV, the market will react positively consistent with the certification 
hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). The prices should be adjusted during the long- 
run, reporting normal performance (H6.4a). However, an exclusive hypothesis that 
the firm invests into negative NPV projects is also valid (Wu and Wang, 2005). If the 
market interprets the offer as overinvestment signal, negative short and long-run AR 
are expected (H6.4b).
H6.4a: The investment news sub-sample involves positive NPV projects that cause 
positive announcement AR.
H6.4b: The investment news sub-sample involves negative NPV projects that cause 
negative short and long-run AR.
Likewise, the ‘operating news’ sub-sample also has two mutually exclusive 
hypotheses. If the market expects value improvements because o f the firm’s plans to 
reorganize itself or to take advantage o f potential growth opportunities, positive 
announcement reactions are to be documented. The long-run AR will also be positive 
if  future opportunities are taken {H6.4c). Contrary, if  the market conceives the fund 
rising as typical procedure for the firm operations, no significant AR  should be 
reported (H6.4d).
H6.4c: Operating news signal future value improvements due to reorganization 
plans, thus positive short and long-run AR are expected.
H6.4d: Operating news conveys that the placing is a typical act fo r  the firm  to 
operate normally (i.e. no significant AR).
Finally, if  the market is unable to understand the relevant implications immediately, 
the reactions will be observed with a delay (H6.4e). In such case, long-run AR  will 
reflect the placing implications and could be either positive or negative (however no 
reactions at the announcement). Hence, each sub-sample predicts different AR paths.
H6.4e: The market is unable to understand immediately the placing implications 
regardless o f  the other news released.
- 191 -
Chapter 6: The puzzling reversal o f private placement abnormal returns
6.3.5. Price manipulation / speculation
Finally, the temporary price reversal might be associated with the speculative 
activities of specific investors. A manipulative possibility consistent with the private 
placement reversal is that, speculators hold long positions o f the event stock. That is, 
they commit to buy the shares directly from the company at the discounted offered 
price (primary market) and sell the stock at the secondary market immediately after 
the issue at a higher price. Hence, they might have incentives to manipulate the 
market price upwards for a short period, consistent with the positive AR. Once the 
shares are issued, they can sell at a higher price, taking advantage o f the positive 
market reactions.
116.5: Private placing investors drive the market price upwards until the issue day 
when they immediately sell at higher price.
Considering that the UK placing investors are mainly institutional and professional 
investors (Annitage, 2010), this hypothesis is plausible. Investors should be able to 
trade large quantities o f a specific stock and thus, able to affect the market prices. 
Thus, they will create a selling pressure for the stock immediately after the issue, 
which can cause AR to reverse.
6.4. Research design and m ethodological details
6.4.1. Market reactions around the announcement and issue day
The initial market reactions are measured following the so called index model 
(Lakonishok and Vennaelen, 1990). AR are defined as the difference between the 
returns of the event firm j  (RJ t) and the market (Rniki t) , over the same day t,
ARj, = Rjj -  R,nku . The cumulative AR over the tested period {CARj r ) is:
T corresponds to the length of the event-window. The path of AR is examined over 
3, 4 and 11-day windows of (-5, +5), (-3, -1), (-1, +1), (+1, +3) around the 
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Lease et al. (1991) suggestion that to capture the market reactions following a 
corporate event, one should examine longer windows. Results do not change.
In addition, selling additional shares at a price different than the market one involves 
a mechanical dilution that changes the market price o f the stock (i.e. the price at the 
day after the event should be the weighted average price between the new and old 
shares; see section 4.4.1). To control for this mechanism, the AR are adjusted similar 
to Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Hertzel et al. (2002):
C A ^ jjj  = m -a)][C A R jJ ]+ [a l{ \-a )W mkl-P pl)IPm̂  Eq. 6 :2
CARadj jT is the price-adjusted CARjT , a is the ratio o f shares placed to shares 
outstanding after the placement, Pmkt is the market price at the day prior the event 
window and, P , is the offered price as stated at the placing prospectus/ news report.
Finally, according to the speculation hypothesis (H5b), the reversal takes place 
immediately after the issue day. Flence, the AR  paths around both days, 
announcement and issue day, are important. Note that the time between the 
announcement and issue day is approximately 3 weeks to 1 month. This translates 
into 15-21 trading days. Although the announcement day is available for each 
placing in the sample, the relevant information about the issue day is available only 
for approximately 75% of the sample. However, even when the remaining 25% is 
excluded from the pertinent analysis, results remain qualitatively unchanged.
6.4.2. Long-horizon abnormal returns and model specification tests
While the five testable hypotheses (overreaction, pseudo-timing, liquidity/risk 
adjustments, other information and speculation) assume AR reverse during the long- 
run, a growing literature on how to measure long-run AR suggests that the reversal 
might be attributed to model misspecifications rather than the event (see Chapter 3). 
This raises the question on whether the AR  reversal is attributable to the private 
placement or to the inability o f the model to assess AR  correctly. Thus, the need for 
several event-study applications and alternative methods for robust inferences is 
essential. This study applies various long-run approaches as follows.
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6.4.2.1. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns [BHAR]
The first long-run event-study employed follows the suggestion o f Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and estimate BHAR for three years after the offer. Three non-placing firms for 
each firm are chosen, having as criteria a similar 1) enlarged market value o f equity 
(size), 2) size and industry and, 3) size and BTM. The null hypothesis o f zero BHAR 
is examined under the conventional t-tests, skweness adjusted t-test (Lyon et ah, 
1999) and Wilcoxon non-parametric z-score values.
} Eq. 6:3
6.4.2.2. Calendar-time-abnormal returns [CTAR]
As BHAR may not adequately account for potential cross-sectional dependence in 
returns (among others see Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), CTAR are 
estimated, which are reported to overcome this problem in non-random samples. 
CTAR also serve the pseudo-timing hypothesis. The Fama and French (1995) three- 
factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models are applied, after constructing equal and 
value-weighted calendar-time portfolios.
R p j  ~ R f j  = aP +bp(RMj - R j - , ' )  +  SpSMB, +hpHMLt + ept Eq. 6:4
RPj - Rf j  = aP +bp(RMj- R f l ) + spSMBl +hpHML, + PpPRlYR, +epJ Eq. 6:5
The method of estimation of BHAR, CTAR and biases o f long-horizon AR  are as 
described in section 5.4.1.56
6.4.2.3. Pre-event momentum adjusted calendar-time AR [Adj.CTAR]
Given the sensitivity o f AR on the methodology employed (see Chapter 3) and the 
evidence that placing firms overperform the years prior the offer (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Flertzel et ah, 2002; Chapter 5), highlight the need to control for pre­
event momentum strategies. This is also consistent with the Fama and French (1996) 
argument that the regression intercept might be biased due to prior momentum 
strategies and, the Chan et al. (1996) finding that stocks with post-event abnormal
1 he only ditterence is the removal ot delisted event-retum s after the delisting m onth, as an 
additional robustness test tor the thesis. Results are qualitatively sim ilar (see Table 5.2 and Table 6.3).
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performance indicate pre-event abnormal momentum. Similar arguments are 
suggested by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) that test the effects o f price momentum 
and trading volume combinations to post-event AR. Boechme and Sorescu (2002, p. 
878) also state that ‘failing to adjust for momentum may lead to misleading 
inferences)
To control for pre-event momentum, the CTAR are adjusted by creating a control 
calendar-time portfolio, where each event-firm is matched based on size and 
momentum in the spirit o f Boehme and Sorescu (2002). The chosen non-event firm 
is the one with the closest momentum, restricted to firms with size limits equal to 
±40% o f the event firm. Momentum is defined as the pre-event holding period 
annual return. Such adjustment controls not only for the momentum strategies, but 
also for the possibility that placing firms time the offering when they overperform. 
The pre-event momentum adjusted CTAR {adj.CTAR) derive by regressing the return 
o f a portfolio that shorts to event firms and long to matched ones, over the FF-3factor 
and Carhart-4factor models.
Rp.t -  Rcontrol,t = a p+ bp(RM, ~ Rf , )  + s PSMB, + hpHML, + ejt  Eq. 6:6
Rp, -  Kontroit = a p+ bp(RM,t ~ R/.,) + 5PSMBt + hpHML, + p pPR\YR, + ej t Eq. 6:7
6.4.2.4. Pre-event momentum adjusted event-time AR
As calendar-time approach assumes the loadings are constant over the tested period, 
whereas they are actually time-varying (Loughran and Ritter, 2000) (the factors are 
rebalanced every month when firms enter and exit the calendar portfolios), the study 
accounts for potential time-variance bias, in manner similar to Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Boehme and Sorescu (2002). A time-series regression against the FF- 
3factor and Carhart-4factor models is run for each event firm, over the tested period 
(36 months following the event). The equal and value weighted cross-sectional mean 
intercept a . represents the abnormal performance. The same procedure is replicated
for each o f the pre-event momentum control firms. The difference between the event 
and control mean intercepts reflects the adjusted AR. The null hypothesis is zero 
adjusted AR.
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6.4.2.5. Liquidity-adjusted abnormal returns (LQAR]
The final approach takes a step beyond the conventional event-study methods. Given 
the evidence that liquidity pricing models have high predictive ability to forecast 
stock returns, the study applies a liquidity-asset pricing model. This could be 
considered as a complementary test for further robust inferences. If indeed liquidity 
risk explains the returns better in comparison with the traditional risk factor 
measurements and event-study approaches, nil (or fewer) long-run AR  are expected. 
Hence, this approach contributes to the ongoing debate on the long-horizon event- 
study approaches. It also examines the liquidity hypothesis (H6.3) and directly 
investigates the arguments that the traditional asset-pricing models fail to capture for 
the reduction in liquidity exposure after an equity placing (Eckbo et al., 2000; Eckbo 
and Norli, 2005).
The Liu (2006) two-factor model is introduced [hereafter LQT-2factor model]. Liu 
(2006) advocates that when the market model is adjusted for liquidity, it accounts for 
the BTM that the FF-3factor model fails to. He also supports that the model captures 
more information on the cross-section variation of the expected returns and account 
for various dimensions o f liquidity such as volume speed, transaction costs, volume 
quantity, as well as controls for firm characteristics such as size, BTM, distress, low 
price and past returns. The LQT-2factor model applied is as follows.
Rj j - Rf j  = aj +bj ( RM,l - Rf j )  + cl j U Q +ejj Eq. 6:8
LIO is the liquidity factor, constructed in a manner similar to SMB and HML. Each 
month starting from July 1st, all firms are sorted in ascending order based on a
liquidity proxy LMV. L M v ={VO + 1 Rturnovern,„ ) .* 252 where VQ ¡g the
Deflator NT
number of days with no trading over the previous 12 months, turnover nm is the sum 
of the daily volume turnover (the number o f shares traded to the number o f shares 
outstanding at the end of day t over the previous 12 months). It is scaled by a deflator
chosen that 0 < 1 /(turnover{lm) ^ j ratj0 252 standardizes the number o f trading
Deflator NT
days within a month. 252 is the average number o f trading days within the 12-month 
' Following Liu (2006). a deflator o f  11.000 is used.
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period (21 trading days used as average by the 12 months o f the year). NT  is the 
actual number o f trading days over the prior 12 months.
The rationale o f LM /2 is as follows. By measuring the days with absence o f trade 
over the previous 12 months, the measure emphasises on whether the stock has 
continues trading, delays or trading difficulties. It thus measures the speed dimension 
o f liquidity and, controls for thin trading and/or locked-in risk. Contrary, the average 
volume turnover captures the quantity dimension of liquidity which ignores the fact 
that investors face higher liquidity risk if  there is no trading. If a stock has zero 
volume on a particular day, the sum of volume turnover will not be affected. The 
turnover is unable to distinguish between frequent and infrequent trading days. 
Hereby, the LM I2 measures the least liquid stocks based on the days with zero 
trading, but identifies the most liquid ones (among the trading days) based on the 
volume turnover. By standardizing with the number o f trading days, the LMX2 
becomes comparable over time. Hence, LMn could be seen as the ‘turnover-adjusted 
number o f zero daily volumes over the prior 252 trading days’ (Liu, 2006, p. 632).
The LMn is constructed for each individual firm listed in the LSE (excluding the 
event and financial stocks) at the end o f each month for the years tested, using daily 
data. All firms are sorted from low to high LM i2 on a monthly basis. As LM i2 
directly captures both, speed and quantity dimensions o f liquidity, sorting the firms 
according to their LM i2 is like having a dependent double sorting, i.e. with the zero 
daily trading (speed) and with the volume turnover (quantity). The LMn is highly 
correlated with other liquidity measures that capture other liquidity dimensions, e.g. 
with that o f Amihud (2002), Datar et al. (1998), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986).58 Additionally, illiquid stocks are mainly small 
stocks with high BTM  (capturing distress). On that basis, Liu (2006) argues that the 
LMV is ‘multi-dimensional’.
A mimicking factor portfolio LIQ that captures the liquidity premium is then 
constructed. Precisely, two portfolios that are rebalanced twice a year are formed
58 A m ihud (2002) uses a retum -to-volum e m easure (price im pact o f  liquidity), D atar et al. (1998) and 
Lee and Swam inathan (2000) use daily volum e turnover m easures (quantity) and A m ihud and 
M endelson (1986) use an average m easure o f  daily bid-ask spread (transaction cost).
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based on the LM/2. The difference between the returns o f the firms belonging to the 
high illiquidity portfolio (above the 35% of LM i2) minus the returns o f the firms in 
the low illiquidity portfolio (below 15% of LM n ) consists o f the monthly risk factor 
LIQ.59 The LIQ factor should be able to capture at least the same information as the 
previous models and it is comparable to the SMB and HML of the FF-3factor model. 
It also accounts for various risk measures. The LQT-2factor model is used as 
benchmark to estimate CTAR, momentum adjusted-C7i4.fi and event-time AR similar 
to the FF-3 factor and Carhart-4factor model applications.
6.4.3. Risk-factors and changes in the expected cost of equity
As all o f the above AR methods estimate the benchmark returns based on pre-event 
firm characteristics, it is likely that the models ignore any post-event firm changes 
(TI6.3). The study addresses the possibility that the methods used do not properly 
account for risk, by decomposing the cost-of-equity into pre-event and post-event 
periods (Boechme and Sorescu, 2002). For each event firm, a time-series regression 
is run over the FF-3factor, Carhart-4factor and LQT-2factor asset pricing models, for 
the period of ±36 months surrounding the announcement month. The pre- and post­
announcement monthly returns are distinguished with the inclusion of a binary 
variable D, that takes one for the event month and onwards, and zero otherwise.
RjJ - R / ' ' = a J +b J(RU j - R f J ) + SjSMBt + h JHMLl + a „ D l £
+ bND, * ( RM j - R f J ) + sAjD, * SMBt + hAJD t * HMLt + ejt ^
The coefficients bAj, sAJ,hSJ gather the main interest o f the analysis, as they capture
the post-event change in the corresponding risk factor loadings. The cross-sectional 
mean coefficient of each of the three change coefficients (h y , s y , hAJ ) reflects the
change in the risk loadings (the null hypothesis is zero cross-sectional mean). If the 
average bAJ, s y ,hAJ are significantly far from zero, e.g. positive, it would suggest
significant increase in the risk factor loadings after the event (and vice versa).
According to Liu (2006. p. 650) the 15% to 35% breakpoints are more or less equivalent to 30%  to 
30% breakpoints used in the FF-3 factor and Carhart-4factor models in terms o f  m arket value into the 
particular portfolios. He docum ents that the perform ance o f  the LIO factor is not sensitive to different 
breakpoints. Indeed, the allocation of the firms within the LIO portfolios in this study is roughly the 
same as in SMB  and HML.
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Assuming the asset-pricing model is able to capture the cross-sectional variation o f 
the expected returns, these three estimated coefficients can be used to assess changes 
in the expected rate o f return on equity. Each o f the three cross-sectional mean 
coefficients (bAJ, s Aj,h Aj), is multiplied by the mean monthly realization o f the
corresponding risk factor [m ean{RM - R f ) ,  mean {S M B ), mean {HML)] during the years
tested (1998-2005). The sum of the three products represents the monthly change in 
the required cost of equity, between the pre- and post-announcement periods.
When the coefficients bAj, s Aj, h Aj for each event-firm (not the cross-sectional mean) 
are multiplied by the mean monthly corresponding factors [mean { R u -  R f ) , 
mean ( SM B  ) ,  mean {HM L  )] and then sum the three products for each firm, it provides 
a distribution o f the monthly change in the cost o f equity. The cross-sectional mean 
of the distribution is the same as using the cross-sectional mean loadings. It however 
allows for tests of statistical significance o f the monthly risk changes and their 
relation to the post-offer A R .
The monthly risk changes are also examined under the Carhart-4factor and LQT- 
2factor models in similar manner. Hence, not only the changes in the size and BTM  
as risks factors are investigated, but also the change in momentum and illiquidity.
6.5. Sam ple
6.5.1. Sample collection
The sample consists o f 230 UK placings announced during the years 1998-2005 (as 
in section 4.5.1). As this period and market have not been examined by prior 
literature, the study also investigates whether the ‘anomaly’ is not market specific. ‘It 
is real if  it is observed in different periods’ (Fama, 1998, p.300).
Recall that the sample is collected after reading line-by-line the announced equity 
placements o f LexisNexis news reports and satisfies the following selection criteria, 
(i) New shares are issued but the existing shareholders do not maintain pre-emptive 
rights to subscribe for the new shares on a pro-rata basis, (ii) Placings accompanied 
by pre-emptive offer or involve financial firms are excluded, (iii) All placements
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involve ordinary shares, (iv) Firms are listed in the LSE or AIM, and are available 
into DataStream database, (v) The placing offered price, number o f placing shares 
and the announcement day are available or assessable from other sources. The 
placing information is cross-confirmed using the announcement lists o f Perfect 
Information database.
Table 6.1: Sample description
The table presents descriptive statistics o f  the private placing sample. The firm size is defined as the 
market price m ultiplied by the shares outstanding. It is the average m arket value during the three m onth 
period following the announcem ent, to ensure the new  share issue inclusion. The proceeds represent the 
total gross proceeds collected from the private placing. It is defined as the placing price m ultiplied by  
the num ber o f  placing shares. The firm size and proceeds are in m illions o f  sterling pounds. ARpre.affer is 
the holding-period return over the previous one year, based on a control non-event firm  w ith sim ilar size 
and industry. The Discount is a percentage o f  the m arket value, calculated as the difference betw een the 
prevailing m arket price as at the day / (t=0 is the announcem ent day) and the placing price (collected 
from the news report/prospectus), scaled by the m arket price. The discount and ARpre.0jfer are exam ined 
under the null hypothesis o f  zero mean and median. OffSize is the relative offered size defined as the 






Panel A : Full sam ple
N 230 230 230 230 207
Mean 1309 73 0.22 0 .1 0 *** 0 .3 8 ***
Median 48 7 0.15 0 .0 7 *** 0 .1 6 ***
St.Dev 8085 374 0.22 0.18 1.44
Min 0.28 0.02 0.0002 -0.42 -2.90
Max 114381 4200 1.50 0.76 7.80
Panel B: In v e s tm e n t  n ew s
N 99 99 99 99 88
Mean 2100 93 0.207 0 .0 9 *** 0 .3 8 ***
Median 81 12 0.157 0 .0 6 *** 0 .2 3 ***
St.Dev 11842 379 0.179 0.17 1.35
Min 0.72 0.14 0.002 -0.42 -2.90
Max 114381 3500 0.848 0.76 5.58
Panel C: O p e ra t in g  new s
N 98 98 98 98 90
Mean 484 63.8 0.258 0 .1 3 *** 0 .30**
Median 31 4.2 0.157 0 .0 8 *** 0.06
St.Dev 2215 427 0.273 0.20 1.36
Min 0.28 0.02 0.002 -0.42 -2.45
Max 19729 4200 1.503 0.76 7.80
Panel D:: In v e s tm e n t  vs. O p e ra t in g
Mean 1616.4 29.2 -0.05 -0.04 0.08
Median 49 .84 *** 7 .8 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.17
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%  and 10% level respectively
6.5.2. Sample characteristics
Tabic 6.1 provides a brief descriptive o f the sample (more details are provided in 
sections 4.5.2 and 5.5.1). The mean (median) size of firms participating to the private
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placement is 1.3 (0.048) billions of sterling pounds, whist the gross proceeds 
collected is 73 (7) millions. The firms place approximately 22% (15%) o f their 
enlarged share capital, at discount o f about 10% (7%). The discount is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and consistent with the SEO empirical evidence (Hertzel 
and Smith, 1993; Wruck, 1989; Barclay et ah, 2007). Firms tend to overperfom their 
benchmarks during the period prior a private placing (Hertzel et ah, 2002). The 
placings document significant mean (median) BHAR for the year prior the offer o f 
+38% (16%). This is again consistent with prior literature.
Given that one o f the interests o f this chapter is to investigate the impact o f the 
information environment around the placing, Panels B and C distinguish the sample 
based on other information released at the announcement. They are classified to 
‘investment news’ and ‘operating news’, as explained in section 6.3.4. Examining the 
characteristics o f the firms participating into the two groups might indicate 
differences in their levels o f asymmetric information and implications related to the 
event. Hence, they might help in explaining their AR  paths.
The ‘investment news’ sub-sample documents mean (median) enlarged market value 
o f 2.1 (0.081) billions, which is approximately 4.3 (2.6) times larger than that o f the 
‘operating news’ o f 0.5 (0.031) billions. Similarly, the proceeds collected from the 
‘investment news’ sample is approximately 1.5 (2.9) times more. This difference is 
reasonable considering the purpose of the placing and the use o f the funds (and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level). The firms belonging to the ‘investment’ 
news are larger, suggesting lower asymmetric information.
6.6. Findings and discussion
6.6.1. Evidence on abnormal performance
6.6.1.1. Announcement market reactions
Table 6.2 describes the market reactions around the announcement and issue day. 
Consistent with the empirical evidence, announcement AR  are significantly positive. 
The mean (median) CAR for the full sample is +3.5% (+0.6%) for the 3-day window 
(-1, +1), statistically significant at the 5% level. Over the longer 11-day window (-5,
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+5) the CAR becomes higher to 4.4%, significant at the 10%. Nonetheless, during the 
three days prior the announcement (-3, -1), the median CAR is significantly -0.06%. 
Although its economic value is small, it could imply sign of information leakage.
When the announcement reactions are adjusted for the mechanical dilution in the 
stock price due to the issuance shares at a price different than the market one, CARadj
becomes higher. Mean (median) CARndj is +10.1% (+2.5%) and 9.5% (+1.3%) for
the (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) windows respectively, significant at the 1% level. Regarding 
the (+1, +3) window, the adjusted reactions are also significantly positive o f +7.9% 
(1.6%). Thus, the market reacts positively to the placement announcement, 
suggesting expectations for value improvements. This is consistent with the 
empirical evidence (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wruck, 1989; Wu et al., 2005).
yInvestment vs. Operating news
Panels B and C distinguish the sample based on the information released along the 
placing announcement. Both sub-samples document significantly positive CARadj
consistent with the view that the market expects value improvements and receive the 
news as 'good’. This implies that the investment sample involves positive NPV 
projects (H6.4a), for which value improvements are expected. Hereby, the 
hypothesis of negative NPV project and overinvestment (H6.4b) is rejected. 
Likewise, the 'operating news’ sample signals expectations for improvements due to 
the reorganization plans of the firms (H6.4c). Therefore, the hypotheses o f the fund 
raising being a typical procedure (H6.4d) and the market being unable to understand 
the placing implications (H6.4.e) are rejected.
Comparing the two groups of firms, the means CARadJ for the 'investment news’
sub-sample is lower in comparison to the 'operating news’. The CARadj for the
'operating news' sample reaches to 14.1% (3.1%) and 13.4% (3%), while the CARadj
for the 'investment news' sample is 6% (1.7%) and 7.3% (2.6%) for the 3-day and 
11 -day windows, respectively.
-202  -
Chapter 6: The puzzling reversal o f private placement abnormal returns
Table 6.2: Market reactions around the announcement and issue day
T
The table presents the AR  around the event. The cum ulative abnorm al returns are estim ated as: CARjT — 'ÿ'ARll >
h
where CARJ T is the cum ulative abnorm al return over the tested period T  tested. A Ijr is the abnorm al return o f  the 
placing stocky, over the day t, calculated as the difference betw een the event return R jr and the m arket return 
over the sam e day. ^   ̂ -  ln( ^ ) • where ln(Fmi.() is the natural logarithm  o f  the m arket value Vmkl over
'mklj-1
the index(FrsEALL), (DS item M V) on day t and t-1 respectively (t=0 corresponds to the announcem ent day). R  . ( is 
estim ated as R where P  is the unadjusted m arket price for each day t ( P  f is its lag) asjj p J ’
r u - \
recorded on the day (DS item  UP). 23 event-firm s have the ex-dividend day close to the private placem ent 
announcem ent, w ithin the (-5, +5) window. Therefore, R . ( are ex-dividend adjusted returns. Div Ju represents the
unadjusted cash incom e dividend paym ent, based upon the dividend at the ex-dividend day (DS Item  UDDE). To be 
consistent w ith the index return calculations, event returns are also assessed using the natural logarithm s o f  the 
prices, R _ [n P, + Div, , but results are qualitatively similar.
"  T,
A djusted CAR are defined as CARadjjJ = [\l{\-a)}[CARjJ }+ [a l{\-a )W mk,- P pl)t Pmkt}- W here, CARadJ JJ  is the discount 
adjusted cum ulative abnorm al return; CARj T is the announcem ent AR ; a  is the ratio o f  shares p laced to shares 
outstanding after the placem ent; Pmkl is the m arket price o f  the event security  j  at the day p rio r the event w indow ;
and P pl is the placem ent price as collected from  the news report / prospectus. CARj T and CARadj y r  are exam ined 
under the null o f  zero m eans and medians. The test statistics and z-scores are presented in brackets.
ANNOUNCEMENT DAY ISSUE DAY
CAR odjsuted CAR CAR
W ind ow : (-5,+5) (-3 ,-1 ) (-1 .+ D (+ l,+ 3 ) (-5,+5) (-!,+!) (+ l,+ 3 ) (-5,+5) (-3 ,-1 ) (-1 .+ D (+ l,+ 3 )
Panel A: Full sam ple
N 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 171 171 171 171
Mean 0.044 -0.002 0.035 0.027 0.095 0.101 0.079 0 .001 -0.004 -0.006 0.004
[t-test] [1.914]* [-0.355] [1.895]** [1.415] [3.452]*** [3.742]*** [3.782]*** [0.105] [-0.671] [-0.963] [0.756]
Median -0 .001 -0.006 0.006 -0 .001 0.013 0.025 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006
[z-value] [-0.36] [-2.453]** [-1.350] [-3.576]*** [-2.56]** [-3.97]*** -3.838]*** [-0.160] [-0.308] [-0.409] [-1.997]**
Panel B: Investm ent news
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 73 73 73 73
Mean 0.004 0.004 0.018 -0.012 0.060 0.073 0.044 0.010 -0.004 0.011 0.015
[t-test] [0.252] [0.727] [1.382] [-1.778]* [1.763]* [3.011]*** [1.907]* [0.88] [-0.378] [1.441] [2.567]**
Median 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.017 0.026 0.018 0 .000 0.002 0.005 0.009
[z-value] [-0.115] [-0.387] [-1.197] [-1.679]* [-1.829]* [-2.848]*** [-1.707]* [-0.160] [-0.308] [-0.409] [-1.997]**
Panel C: O perating news
N 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 80 80 80 80
Mean 0.084 -0 .001 0.041 0.058 0.141 0.134 0.113 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.010
[t-test] [1.867]* [-0.195] [1.239] [1.415] [2.887]*** [2.54]** [2.946]*** [-0.084] [-0.378] [-1.514] [-1.177]
Median 0.004 -0.008 0.009 0.000 0.031 0.028 0.022 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.003
[z-value] [-0.944] [-1.972]** [-0.735] [-2.929]*** [-2.124]** [-2.567]** -3.308]*** [-0.451] [-0.480] [-0.067] [-0.201]
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Similar reactions are noted for the 3-day window following the announcement (+1, 
+3). The CARadj for the ‘operating news’ is 11.3% (2.2%), whilst for the ‘investment
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news’ is only 4.4% (1.8%). These CARadj imply that the market might expect higher
improvements for firms included in the ‘operating news’ sub-sample due to their 
reorganization plans. They might signal ability to explore potential opportunities and 
strength their financial position. However, the difference between the reactions o f the 
two sub-samples is statistically significant only when means are examined, at the 5% 
and 1% levels. Their medians are not statistically far from zero. Whether any or both 
sub-samples document AR reversal during the long-run is tested in Table 6.3.
6.6.1.2. The speculative hypothesis and market reactions around the issue day
The speculation hypothesis predicts that the reversal takes place immediately after 
the issue of the new stock. Hence, significant negative AR immediately after the issue 
day should be reported. Nonetheless, the CAR are not far from zero. The market does 
not expect further value changes. Considering that the market is already informed 
about the placing approximately three weeks before the issue, the new information is 
incorporated into the market prices. Only the ‘investment news’ sub-sample 
documents significant CAR for the 3-day window following the issue (+1, +3), o f 
+ 1.5% (0.09%). However, it is positive rather negative as the speculation hypothesis 
predicts.
As a robustness test, the study follows the Lease et al. (1991) suggestion and 
examines longer windows up to three months following the event. AR do not become 
significantly negative. The selling pressure is also examined by measuring bid and 
ask AR (Lease et al., 1991; Conrad and Conroy, 1994; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2007), 
however they also follow the same path as the reported AR.
Hereby, investors with long positions do not sell immediately after the issue to take 
advantage of the positive market reactions and yield higher AR. There is no selling 
pressure immediately after the issue that could cause reversal in AR. These findings 
reject the speculative hypothesis. Even if speculation does take place, it does not 
seem able cause AR to reverse.
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6.6.1.3. Long-run abnormal performance
Table 6.3 presents the long-horizon performance three years following the placings. 
It controls for several biases associated with long-run AR and, addresses the model 
misspecification problem that long-horizon AR  are sensitive to the methodology 
employed. The table additionally facilitates in examining the remaining hypotheses.
Precisely, the mean (median) BHAR varies from -15.2% (-14.5%) to -35% (-15%) 
depending on the benchmark used (Panel A). The size benchmark provides a -33% (- 
11%) BHAR. The conventional t-test, skewness adjusted t-test (Lyon et al., 1999) and 
Wilcoxon z-score suggest statistically significant underperformance at the 5% level. 
The size and industry matching documents BHAR o f -15% significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels. Having a size and BTM benchmark, the BHAR is -34.6% (-15%).
Underperformance is also reported when pre-event momentum adjusted AR are 
measured for each firm over the FF-3factor, Carhart-4factor and LQT-2factor 
models. Panel B displays the cross-section mean coefficients o f the equal-weighted 
portfolio models. The FF-3factor model documents momentum adjusted AR o f -8.1% 
over the three years following the event, statistically significant at the 1%. The 
Carhart-4factor model suggests deeper underperformance o f -25.8%, however 
statistically insignificant. The LQT-2factor model reports lower AR equal to -4.8%, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Likewise, the value-weighted firm-specific 
AR are also negative (panel C). The FF-3factor documents -6.7%, the Carhart-4factor 
-5.1% and the LQT 2-factor -7.2% AR , all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, although the firm pre-event momentum adjusted regressions document 
smaller long-run AR , they are still negative and statistically significant.
Moreover, panels D and E display the intercept coefficients after constructing 
calendar-time event portfolios, regressed over the three asset-pricing models (FF- 
3factor, Carhar-4factor, LQT-2factor). Specifically, when the portfolios are equally 
weighted, the unadjusted intercept of the FF 3-factor model is -0.5% per month, 
which translates into -17% holding AR over the 36-month period tested, statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The Carhart-4factor documents insignificantly positive 
monthly AR  o f +0.7%. The LQT-2factor also suggests positive monthly AR  o f + 1.1% 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which translates to +49% over the three years.
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Table 6.3: Long-horizon abnormal performance
Panel A presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), for a period o f  3 years follow ing the event, assessed on 
a m onthly basis for the months (0, +36) after the event. BHAR on each event firm j  is the difference betw een its BHRj
and the BHR o f  a benchm ark non-event firm, over the same period o f  time: BHAR,,T = ■ R,
is the m onthly stock return, which equals the monthly price (P,-P:-i) and dividend (DivJ return, scaled by the m arket 
price (P, ). P, is the adjusted market price as at the 151 day o f  each m onth included in the event w indow  (DS item  P). 
Div, represents dividend paym ents granted within the m onth t (DS item DY). Event firms are m atched based on their
market value o f  equity (M V), m arket value and industry (M V+Ind) and, m arket value and book-to-m arket 
(M V+BTM ). The brackets include the conventional t-tests, skweness adjusted (Lyon et ah, 1999) and W ilcoxon z- 
score values. Panels B and C present event-tim e AR. The return o f  each firm  is run against the the Fam a and French 
(1993, 1995) three-factor model [FF-3factor], the Carhart (1997) four-factor m odel [Carhart-4factor] and the Liu 
(2006) tw o-factor [LQT-2factor] asset pricing model. The portfolios are form ed w ith equal and value w eights, for 
period +36 following the event. The cross-sectional intercept o f  each model represents the average AR  for the period 
tested for the event sample. Each event firm is matched with a control firm based on size and m om entum . M om entum  
is defined as the pre-event holding period annual return. The difference betw een the event and m om entum -control 
intercepts reflect the adjusted AR. The implied AR , is the m onthly intercept translated to holding period return, 
[(l+ AR)36-!].
Panels D and E present the calendar-tim e abnormal returns (CTAR) using the three, four and tw o-factor models. An 
event portfolio p  is formed, including the stocks that have been involved to the private placing in the previous 36 
months. The intercept a E reflects the average m onthly AR. To control for severe heterocedasticity at least 10 event- 
firm returns are required in each event portfolio. The adjusted CTAR derive by  regressing the difference betw een the 
m onthly event and m om entum -control firm return, over the two, three and four factor models.
Panel A: Buv-and-hold abnorm al returns (event-tim e BHAR)
"Full sam p le " " In ves tm e n t ne w s" "O p e ra tin g  ne w s"
MV MV+Ind 1MV+BTM MV MV+Ind MV+BTM MV MV+Ind MV+BTM
N 121 121 96 55 55 47 50 50 39
Mean -0.327 -0.152 •0.346 -0.073 -0.210 -0.102 -0.571 -0.079 -0.765
Median -0.107 -0.145 -0.150 -0.080 -0.185 -0.061 -0.221 -0.151 -0.440
[convensional t-test] [-1.96]** [-1.65]* |>2.55]** [-0.309] [-1.122] [-0.531] [-1.888]* [-0.362] [-2.28]**
[skewness adj. t-test] |-2.07]** [-1.10] |[-0.67] [-0.308] [-1.106] [-0.529] [-1.898]* [-0.371] [-2.282]**
[Wilcoxon z-value] [■-2.146]** [-2.428]** |[-1.645]* [-0.327] [-1.642] [-.032] [-2.109]** [-1.688]* [-2.051]**
Panel B: Equal w eighted oreevent m om entum  adjusted AR (event-tim e)
FF- Carhart- LQT- FF- Carhart- LQT- FF- Carhart- LQT-
3factor 4factor 2factor 3factor 4factor 2factor 3factor 4factor 2factor
N 186 186 186 76 76 76 82 82 82
Cross-sectional a -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.001
[t-statistic] [-3.906]*** [-1.442] [-2.843]*** [-2.768]*** [-1.204] [-2.106]* [-1.886]* [-1.576] [0.868]
Implied 3-year AR -0.081 -0.258 -0.048 -0.097 -0.193 -0.066 -0.060 -0.481 -0.019
Panel C: Value w eighted oreevent m om entum  adjusted AR (event-tim e)
N 186 186 186 76 76 76 82 82 82
Cross-sectional a -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
[t-statistic] [-3.413]*** [-2.785]*** [-3.402]*** [-2.547]** [-2.603]** [-2.286]** [-1.346] [0.502] [-1.83]*
Implied 3-year AR -0.067 -0.051 -0.072 -0.101 -0.081 -0.090 -0.029 -0.013 -0.053
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Panel D: Eaual weighted calendar-time abnormal returns (CTAR ew)
FF -3 factor Carhart - 4 factor LQT- 2 factor
Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj. Unadj. Adj.
NObs 114 115 114 119 112 113
R2 0.879 0.331 0.879 0.269 0.848 0.122
Intercept ( a ) -0.0052 -0.0074 0.0071 -0.0233 0.011 -0.0003
[t-statistlc] [-1.74]* [0.59] [0.32] [1.08] [3.93]*** [3.12]***
Implied 3-year AR -0.171 -0.235 0.290 -0.572 0.490 -0.012
Panel E: Value weighted calendar-time abnormal returns (CTAR vw)
NObs 113 111 113 111 110 113
R2 0.418 0.106 0.414 0.120 0.338 0.031
Intercept ( a ) -0.028 -0.018 -0.027 -0.014 0.005 -0.007
[t-statistic] [•-2.34)** [1.13] [-2.31]** [-1.39] [0.63] [1.19]
Implied 3-year AR -0.646 -0.476 -0.627 -0.394 0.218 -0.213
***, ** , * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Nonetheless, weighting equally is biased towards the performance o f small firms 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), and CTAR with equal weights might not be able to 
appropriately capture post-abnormal performance when the management time the 
offer at particular periods (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4). Hence, value-weighting 
should be more accurate. The unadjusted value-weighted CTAR for the FF-3factor 
and Carhart-4factor models are -2.8% and -2.7% per month, statistically significant 
at the 5% level. This translates to approximately -64% and -62% underperformance 
over the three years, respectively. Nevertheless, controlling for the liquidity risk 
factor, the AR  reversal seems to disappear as the LQT-2factor indicates normal 
monthly AR  o f 0.5%.
In addition, when the models adjust for pre-event momentum the significant CTAR 
disappears completely. The traditional CTAR models (FF-3factor and Carhart- 
4factor) do not under-perform when they control for pre-event momentum. Note that 
the liquidity-adjusted CTAR do not support the reversal with or without pre-event 
momentum adjustments. Hereby, as the sings o f AR  are not always significantly 
negative it implies sensitivity to the method used.
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6.6.1.4. Discussion on the AR paths in relation to the predictions o f the testable 
hypotheses
r- The AR reversal in UK
Recall that the announcement market reactions for the full sample are significantly 
positive (Table 6.2). As the conventional long-run AR measurements (e.g. BHAR , 
unadjusted CTAR) document significant AR, this is consistent with the private 
placing reversal puzzle.
'r Pseudo-timing
The fact that the placings in this study cluster by time supports the pseudo-timing 
hypothesis. Specifically, approximately 57% of the sample takes place at years 2004 
and 2005.60 Second, according to the pseudo-timing hypothesis the post-offer 
underperformance should be observable mainly for event-time AR (Schultz, 2003). In 
a calendar-time form, long-run AR are to be lower. Indeed, the event-time BHAR 
(panel A) suggest deeper underperformance in comparison with the traditional 
unadjusted CTAR. Hertzel et al. (2002, Table II) also report lower CTAR in 
comparison with BHAR, following US private placements. This suggests that 
pseudo-timing could explain the reversal rather than overreaction. Thus, pseudo­
timing could be an alternative interpretation of their findings.
When the event-time AR are adjusted for pre-event momentum, they become smaller 
than the traditional CTAR (see Table 6.3, panels B and C). However, they are still 
higher than the adjusted CTAR (see adjusted CTAR\ Table 6.3, panels D and E). Only 
the LQT-2factor adjusted CTAR (equal weights) report small underperformance o f - 
1.2% over the three-year period. However, this is again smaller than the adjusted 
event-time AR ot -10% reported in panel B. Value weighting adjusted CTAR are 
statistically insignificant. These findings are consistent with the pseudo-timing 
hypothesis, while they are also consistent with the view that results are sensitive to 
the methodology and model misspecification problems.
1,0 M ore specifically, 9% o f the placings take place in 1998, 7% in 1999. 10% in 2000, 4%  in 2001, 
4%  in 2002. 18% in 2003, 23.5%  in 2004 and 23.5%  in 2005.
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'P Liquidity and (other) model misspecifications
Deviating from the conventional models o f long-run abnormal performance and 
controlling for the liquidity risk factor, Table 6.3 reports high ability o f the liquidity- 
adjusted pricing model (Liu, 2006) to detect AR. The model reports the lowest AR  in 
comparison with the other models employed (FF-3factor or Carhart-4factor). This is 
irrespective o f the method used and whether AR are event-time AR, CTAR or BHAR.
In fact, value-weighted liquidity adjusted-C774i? are not statistically significant. 
When the equal-weighted liquidity adjusted-CTHi? are adjusted for pre-event 
momentum, they report underperformance which has very small economic value 
over the three-year period (-1.2%). It could thus be argued that the reversal actually 
is eliminated (especially if macroeconomic or other factors suggested by prior studies 
(e.g. Eckbo et al., 2000; Lee and Masulis, 2009) are directly taken into account). The 
findings confirm the Eckbo et al. (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) suggestion that 
liquidity is a significant factor in long-run AR following SEO.
Illiquidity by itself might not be able to completely explain the reversal as the model 
provides some significant AR in event-time form (see panels B and C). Nevertheless, 
the abnormal performance is less in comparison with the other two models. These 
results suggest that illiquidity and pricing models beyond the conventional ones 
should be used in long-run abnormal performance and are able to explain the 
variation in expected returns better.
>  Investment v.v. operating news sub-samples
Panels A, B and C o f Table 6.3 classify the sample based on the additional 
information released along the announcement.61 The BHAR for the ‘investment 
news’ sub-sample are negative but not statistically far from zero. Nevertheless, the 
pre-event momentum adjusted event-time AR document significant three-year 
underperformance of about -10% over the FF-3factor model (equal and value 
weighted), -8% over the Carhart-4factor (value weighted) and -7% to -9% over the
61 The requirem ent o f  at least 10 firms into each m onthly placing portfolio restricts further 
classification into ‘investm ent’ and ‘operating’ news when m easuring CTAR follow ing the private 
placem ents.
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LQT-2factor model (equal and value weighted, respectively). Hence, the ‘investment 
news’ sub-sample appears to be subject to the puzzling reversal o f AR.
Likewise, the ‘operating news’ sub-sample documents significantly negative BHAR 
based on the size and, size and BTM matched firms. It additionally displays 
marginally significant underperformance of -6% over the FF-3factor (equal weighted 
only) and LQT-2factor (value weighted only), at the 10% level.
While both sub-samples are likely to document AR reversal, the results are not clear. 
The AR are not always significantly negative, while the differences between the long- 
run AR o f the two sub-samples are not significant. Rather, they depend on the 
benchmark model. This holds for both, investment and operating news sub-sample. 
This suggests again that the long-horizon AR are sensitive to the approach employed, 




While the reversal and the existence of momentum effect are confirmed (H6.1a and 
H ô.lc), to addresses the question of whether the market overreacts at the 
announcement (Hertzel et al., 2002), Table 6.4 examines the correlations between the 
short- and long-run AR.
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the announcement and long-run AR 
are small and mainly insignificant. The only significant negative correlations are 
between the adjusted AR for the 3-day window after the announcement (+1, +3) and 
the liquidity adjusted AR. The remaining correlation coefficients are statistically not 
far from zero. Normal correlations are also found when Pearson correlations 
coefficients are assessed, as well as correlations between the AR around the 
announcement and issue day (not shown).
This contradicts the view that the market overreacts as suggested by Hertzel et al. 
(2002). Hertzel et al. (2002) do document significantly negative correlations between
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short and long-term returns following US private placements, however only when 
buy-and-hold returns are not adjusted for any risk factor. Announcement CAR and 
long-run BHAR are not significantly negatively correlated to their sample either. This 
implies the overreaction hypothesis might not hold, regardless the reversal o f the AR.
Table 6.4: Correlations between short and long-run AR
The table presents Spearm an correlation coefficients betw een short and long-horizon AR. CAR and CAR,,y  
are the cum ulative abnorm al returns m easured as described in Table 6.2. The length o f  the CAR o r CARadj 
w indow  is noted in the parentheses. BHAR, FF-3factor, Carhart-4factor and L Q T-2factor m odels are 

























CAR annc (_5j+5) 0.114 0.109 0.127 0.075 0.038 0.035 0.086 0.094 0.002
(0.215) (0.236) (0.213) (0.318) (0.615) (0.637) (0.255) (0.213) (0.981)
C A R annc(-3,-l) 0.116 0.099 0.123 0.026 0.01 0.048 0.029 0.066 0.048
(0.206) (0.281) (0.227) (0.73) (0.894) (0.527) (0.697) (0.38) (0.524)
CARannc(-l,U) 0.087 0.114 -0.013 0.094 0.037 -0.043 0.054 0.059 -0.019
(0.342) (0.212) (0.903) (0.212) (0.62) (0.566) (0.47) (0.431) (0.8)
C A R annc{+l,+3) 0.114 0.042 0.051 0.087 -0.018 0.094 -0.051 -0.008 -0.008
(0.214) (0.647) (0.616) (0.246) (0.808) (0.208) (0.499) (0.911) (0.917)
CARadj,annc (-5, +5) -0.078 0.048 -0.074 -0.107 -0.014 -0.115 -0.106 -0.064 -0.091
(0.396) (0.6) (0.471) (0.152) (0.854) (0.127) (0.156) (0.394) (0.228)
CARadj,annc (-1.+1) 0.013 0.093 -0.16 -0.118 -0.059 -0.086 -0.108 -0.065 -0.097
(0.885) (0.312) (0.115) (0.116) (0.435) (0.251) (0.151) (0.386) (0.195)
C A R adj.annc (+1.+3) 0.05 0.115 0.088 -0.097 0.004 -0.153 -0.087 -0.08 -0.185
(0.587) (0.207) (0.39) (0.196) (0.96) (0.041)** (0.247) (0.285) (0.013)**
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
6.6.2.2. Change in cost-of-equity and risk-factor loadings
The main findings thus far support the pseudo-timing (H6.2) and liquidity/risk 
adjustment (H6.3) hypotheses. The results strongly suggest that model 
misspecifications (H6.3b) significantly contribute to the reversal, as AR  are sensitive 
to the approach used. This stresses out the need for deeper investigation on the 
adjustments in risk-factor loadings and improvements in long-run AR methods. Table 
6.5 displays changes in the risk factors coefficients following the event.
>  Full sample
Panel A displays the factor loadings over a long period o f ±36 months surrounding 
the placing announcement. Consistent with the asset pricing literature, the SMB
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factor coefficient fs ) is positive and statistically significant for the models FF-
3 factor and Carhart-4factor. This confirms the positive relation o f size with the 
expected cost o f equity. Likewise, the coefficient o f the illiquidity risk factor LQT 
(q ) is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is in line with
the view that liquidity has significant ability to predict abnormal performance. In 
addition, this is the first time that the model is tested for the UK market, which 
provides additional evidence.
Contrary, the coefficients o f interest for the FF-3factor (b v , sAj, h y ) and Carhart-
4factor (bAj,s v , hy , p y ) that examine the change between the pre- and post-event
periods do not report significant change in risk-factor loadings following the event. 
The models do not indicate significant change on the required rate o f return. 
However, given that AR become significantly lower few years after the offer but the 
individual risk factors do not change implies the change in expected returns is driven 
by factors other than the beta, size, BTM or momentum that the traditional factor 
models capture.
Additionally, panel B displays the mean monthly realizations o f the risk factors for 
the months around the announcement [mean(RM -  R f ) , mean {SMB),  mean(HML),
mean (PRIYR)]. They are significantly different from zero o f about 0.7% for SMB, 
-0.2% for HML and +13% for PRIYR. Panel C estimates the average monthly 
change in the expected cost of equity. Similar to the change coefficients 
(b y , s y , h y , P y ) any change in the expected rate o f return is not significant. It equals
to -0.7% and -2.85% for the FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor models respectively, but 
not significantly far from zero. This finding is inconsistent with the view that factors 
unrelated to the event cause change in the contemporaneous risk factors, which affect 
the firm required return on equity (Boechme and Sorescu, 2002). Contrary, the 
models do not seem to capture any risk change following the event.
Nevertheless, when the analysis involves the LQT-2factor model, the implications 
differ. Not only the risk-factor coefficients o f the model are positive and statistically 
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Chapter 6: The puzzling reversal o f private placement abnormal returns
significant (¿^=-0.345**, ^ .= -0 .7 4 4 * * ). Hence, the risk-factor loadings become 
significantly lower during the post-offer period.
This implies reduction in the liquidity risk which is not captured by the FF-3factor and 
Carhart-4factor models, consistent with the liquidity hypothesis. Moreover, the mean 
monthly realization of the corresponding risk factors for the months around the 
announcement [mean (LM 12)] is 0.49%, statistically significant at the 10% level. Unlike 
the FF-3 factor and Carhart-4factor models, the change-coefficient o f LQT-2factor 
model documents reduction in the cost o f equity by -0.46% per month, for the 36- 
month period following the event (significant at the 5% level).
The findings, thus, comply with the view that the issuers are exposed to less risk after 
the placing which decreases their expected returns relative to their benchmarks (Eckbo 
et ah, 2000; Eckbo and Norli, 2005). This reduction probably derives from the fact that 
firms reduce the debt weight in their capital structure (deleverage) which makes them 
less risky. If the benchmark does not properly control for reduction in post-offer risk, 
the AR will be negatively biased.
y  Investment vs. operating news
Recall that Table 6.3 reports mainly negative post-event long-run AR for the 
'investment news’ sub-sample, while the ‘operating news’ sample reports mainly 
normal post-performance over the three asset pricing models FF-3factor, Carhart- 
4factor and LQT-2factor (BHAR document opposite signs). The differences between 
the two samples are not statistically significant. However, replicating the above 
analysis for the two sub-samples supports the view that any differences in the reported 
AR is probably attributed to reduction in liquidity risk for the ‘operating news’ sample 
and, to sensitivity on the model used rather than other infonnation. Hence, this section 
contributes further to the model misspecification hypothesis, as implied by Table 6.3.
Precisely, when the coefficients examine the change between the pre- and post-event 
periods (b y , s y , h y , p y ) , any change in risk-factor loadings is marginally significant.
The Carhart-4factor model documents reduction in the stock beta for the 'investment
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news’ sample (by = -0.518*), statistically significant at the 10% level. This is the only 
change the ‘investment news’ sub-sample reports.
The ‘operating news’ sample documents similar results in terms o f being marginally 
significant. It however reports bigger changes. The FF-3 factor model reports reduction 
in size risk factor (sAj =-0.914*) and the Carhart-4factor reduction in the BTM risk
factor loading (h^ = -0.934*). The LQT-2factor model also documents significant
reduction in the illiquidity risk factor following the event ( q y  = -0.884*). Interestingly,
this sample also documents change in the required rate o f return o f -0.54% per month 
(see panel C), statistically significant at the 10%. This change is documented only 
under the LQT-2factor model, suggesting that the risk-factor loadings o f the traditional 
asset pricing models cannot adjust for this risk change accurately.
The reduction in the expected rate of return documented by the LQT-2factor model 
strongly suggests that the liquidity component o f the cost o f equity has substantial 
impact on returns and cannot be captured by the traditional FF-3factor and Carhart- 
4factor models. Perhaps the size and BTM factors cannot capture the change in risk as 
they ignore transaction costs involved when attempting to explore an existing 
momentum.62 Contrary, the liquidity-pricing model does capture these costs.
Employing the LQT-2factor model significantly contributes in understanding the AR 
pattern. Previous studies examining AR following private placements ignore changes in 
liquidity risks. Consequently, as the liquidity adjusted AR  report the lowest 
underperformance (see Table 6.3), it appears that only the LQT-2factor model adjusts 
for liquidity risk changes that facilitates in explaining the apparent sensitivity observed 
in long-run AR.
6.6.3. Multivariate analysis
To fully explore the testable hypotheses, Table 6.6 regresses the short- and long-run 
AR  over a set o f explanatory variables that examine the reversal stories. The study uses 
variables that capture any miss-valuation, risk changes and firm timing ability (Hertzel
62 See M alkiel (2003, p .62) which references to findings o f  O dean (1999) and Lesm ond et al. (2004).
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and Smith, 1993; Hertzel et al„ 2002, Chapter 5) such as the discount offered, past 
performance and past ^ -v o la tility . Other variables that have been widely used as 
asymmetric information proxies but also test the stock liquidity such as the trading 
volume and bid-ask spread (e.g. Wu, 2004; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen,
2003) are additionally used. Finally, controls for inelastic demand around the 
announcement (e.g. Loderer et ah, 1991) and monitoring (e.g. Wruck, 1989; Wu and 
Wang, 2009) are essential. Appendix II describes the exact variable definitions.
As similar variables could also partly explain the discount (see Table 4.5), to control 
for multicolinearity a cut-off 10 o f VIF test is used. The maximum VIF among the 
models is 7.06, suggesting no multicolinearity problems. Similar to Boechme and 
Sorescu (2002), Weighted Least Square (WLS) analysis is conducted, which controls 
for auto and/or cross-sectional dependence in AR. WLS compensates for violation of 
homoskedasticity. The AR are weighted with reciprocal o f the residuals obtained from 
estimating the market model. Overall, the multivariate analysis confirms and controls 
for the several implications around the placings such as certification (Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993), liquidity and inelastic demand (Corwin, 2003; Loderer et al., 1991; 
Chapter 4) and monitoring (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009). Controlling for the 
known implications helps in understanding the AR between the short and long-run 
periods. However, as the interest of the study is the reversal rather than the AR driving 
factors per se, these models mainly supplement the previous analysis.
6.6.3.1. Announcement AR explanations
Panel A presents the WLS coefficients with dependent variable the short-run AR 
around the announcement day. Model 1 documents significant negative coefficient for 
the offered discount o f -0.637, statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests 
miss-pricing (overvaluation) o f the offered stock. A plausible question would be, why 
does the market react positively? Negative discount coefficient is also consistent with 
Balachandran et al. (2009, Table 9) for UK placements.
However, neither Balachandran et al. (2009) nor model 1 adjusts for the mechanical 
dilution in market prices attributable to the sale o f stock at a price different than the 
market one (see section 0 tor details and relevant prior literature). To control for this,
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model 2 uses the adjusted discount that controls for this mechanical dilution (Eq.4:2). 
The negative discount coefficient becomes positive (+0.474), statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This supports the view that the discount signals certification (Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993) or monitoring (Wruck, 1989) costs.
To cover the possibility that active buyers join the firm and increase firm value 
(Wruck, 1989), the models uses two ‘agency variables’: an interaction term 
Aconcentr*D  that implies intentions o f the placing investors to be active and affect
the firm performance. The second proxy is a binary variable that captures the 
possibility o f strategic investors (S tr .In v ) .  a concentr*D  appears positive and
marginally significant at the 10% level. The coefficient however is 0.004, indicating 
very small economic value. Hence, there is not real monitoring expectation. This is 
consistent with prior evidence that post-purchase activity o f SEO investors in the UK 
is limited (see Armitage, 2010 and Chapter 4).
In addition, the past-performance reports a significantly negative coefficient o f -0.047, 
implying that the market does not interpret the higher past performance as a good sign. 
The market does not receive the private placing announcement as a signal o f  timing the 
offer when the stock is overvalued. Therefore, the model implies certification o f the 
stock (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). The higher the discount the more positive the 
reactions, as the new investors have certified the stock.
In sequence, model 3 adjusts the AR for the mechanical dilution o f offering shares at a 
price different than the market one (and removes the discount and relative offered size 
from the model). Model 3 indicates significant positive relationship between the 
CARAdj and bid-ask spread. The spread has a positive coefficient o f 0.334, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Given the positive CARAdj (Table 6.2, panel A), a positive 
relation to the bid-ask spread implies that investors require higher return for the 
liquidity premium. As the firms had high asymmetric information prior the offer (Wu,
2004), the announcement changes its information and risk levels.
Hence, the findings suggest that certification and information asymmetries drive the 
announcement AR. These results are robust to model modifications such as the 
inclusion o f the discount and offered size as explanatory variables or exclusion o f the
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monitoring proxies (e.g. models 4 and 5). As a conclusion, the positive announcement 
market reactions are attributed to the reduction in information asymmetries between 
the firm and the market following the placing. The event causes reduction in the 
(liquidity) risk63, while no significant evidence of monitoring can be reported. Hereby, 
the findings also provide behaviour finance interpretations, which are left for further 
research by Brav et al. (2000).
6.6.3.2. Long-horizon AR explanations
Panel B examines the effects o f the control variables on long-horizon AR. Six models 
are run using the AR based on the three pricing models (i.e. FF-3factor, Carhart-4factor 
and LQT-2factor) as the dependent variable. Each model is run twice, to examine 
equal and value weighted AR. Overall, the models suggest that the reduction in the 
monthly rate o f return due to lower liquidity risk (reported in Table 6.5) could explain 
the reversal.
More specifically, the models include an additional explanatory variable (compared to 
the announcement AR regressions) that capture the average monthly change in the 
expected cost o f equity (as estimated in Table 6.5) for each model, i.e. FF- 
Amonth.risk, Carhart-Amonth.risk and LQT-Amonth.risk. The three proxies capture the 
monthly changes in risk factor loadings of each model. Recall that section 6.6.2.2 (that 
describes the monthly changes in cost-of-equity due to changes in risk factor loadings) 
highlights that only the LQT-2factor model documents significant reduction in the 
liquidity risk as component of the cost o f equity. The section suggested inability o f the 
traditional pricing models to adjust for post-offer changes in liquidity risk. Panel B o f 
Table 6.6 strengthens this view.
In particular, when AR derive from the LQT-2factor model, they indicate significant 
negative relationship with the corresponding monthly change in the expected cost of 
equity LQT-Amonth.risk (models 10-11). The coefficient o f LQT-Amonth.risk is 0.06, 
statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels. Nonetheless, with regards to the AR
A lthough not tabulated, direct exam ination o f  the change in liquidity is also exam ined (m easured as 
the average volum e within a 250-trading day w indow before the announcem ent and 250-trading day 
w indow alter). The mean (median) volume turnover significantly increases following the announcem ent, 
by 0.4%  (0.2%). This is in line with the argum ent that liquidity is increased after the offer.
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Chapter 6: The puzzling reversal o f private placement abnormal returns
deriving from FF-3factor and Carhar-4factor models (models 6-9), they do not report 
significant coefficients for the corresponding monthly risk factor changes FF- 
Amonth.risk and Carhart-Amonth.risk. This holds regardless o f the portfolios being 
equally or value weighted. This is also consistent with the Table 6.5 findings. 
Therefore, the multivariate results suggest that the (liquidity) risk reduction after the 
placement affects negatively the reported long-run AR, but only the LQT-2factor 
model can identify this relationship. It is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis and 
the view that liquidity risk is reduced after the event, however the conventional pricing 
models fail to adjust for the risk factor changes properly.
In line with this, the bid-ask spread coefficient becomes negative in all models (vary 
from -0.008 to -0.468), statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels. That is, it 
reverses from the announcement AR  regressions. This supports again the liquidity 
hypothesis, i.e. although the (liquidity) risk is reduced after the announcement, the 
traditional models cannot capture the change, driving downwards the reported AR. 
When the dependent variable derives from BHAR, results are qualitatively similar (not 
shown). BFIAR additionally imply negative relationship o f the ‘investment news’ sub­
sample similar to the findings o f Table 6.3.
Finally, the coefficient o f past-performance ARpre.0ffer is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This holds for FF-3factor value weighted AR  and LQT- 
2factor equal and value weighted AR (models 7, 10 and 11). Although the coefficient 
is closed to zero (i.e. -0.001 to -0.002) and suggests low economic value, it supports 
the timing hypothesis. It implies the possibility that firms place shares when they 
overperform. On the one hand, the significant relationship between the long-run AR 
with timing variables suggests strategic timing o f the offer when the stock is 
overvalued (see also Table 5.7). On the other hand, given the lower CTAR and the 
little evidence for the pre-event momentum adjusted-C7zi/? documented by Table 6.3 
might imply that the issue is a good investment ex-ante because o f the general market 
conditions rather than timing ability of the management. Such interpretation would be 
in favour o f the ‘pseudo-timing’ hypothesis (Schultz, 2003).
The results are consistent with prior evidence that examine the pseudo-timing 
hypothesis with the use of simulated datasets (Dahlquist and De Jong, 2008;
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Viswanathan and Wei; 2008; Ang et al., 2006). These studies argue that pseudo-timing 
could partly explain the post- underperformance. It is however unlikely that pseudo­
timing is able to explain the post-event underperformance. The current study is 
consistent with these arguments, as (pseudo) timing seems significant but with low 
economic value. Thus, the management does not seem to have timing ability, or ex- 
ante knowledge about the stock being overvalued as implied by the literature (e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Hertzel et al., 2002, Chapter 5), which rejects the 
overreaction hypothesis.
As a conclusion, the findings are consistent with the view that at the announcement the 
market reacts positively because of certification and liquidity premium. Regarding the 
long-run AR , the results strongly suggest that liquidity risk is reduced after the event 
(as liquidity is increased). However, the traditional models used to measure long- 
horizon AR do not adjust for the liquidity risk reduction. As a result, the expected 
benchmark returns are higher, causing negative bias to the reported AR. Finally, small 
impact of the (pseudo) timing hypothesis is also noticeable. These conclusions confinn 
the findings of Tables 6.2 -  6.4.
6.7. Sum m ary and conclusions
This chapter attempts to explain why AR following private placements reverse. More 
specifically, private placements cause positive market reactions at the announcement 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wruck, 1989; Barclay et al., 2007), whereas they become 
negative few years later (Hertzel et al., 2002; Barclay et al., 2007; Kang et al., 1999). 
The common overreaction interpretation suggests that investors are over-optimist at 
the private placement announcement but, when their expectations are not fulfilled AR 
reverse (Hertzel et al., 2002). However, do private placing investors systematically 
react towards the wrong direction? There is no doubt that AR  can be achieved. 
However the question is whether there is persistence to the AR reversal. This is the 
main research question this chapter, challenging the common overreaction hypothesis 
(Hertzel et al., 2002).
Chapter 6: The puzzling reversal o f private placement abnormal returns
The study contributes by providing a thorough investigation on why AR  are likely to 
reverse. While this study is the first that directly examines the overreaction hypothesis 
using UK placings, several additional competing stories that have not been tested by 
prior pertinent studies are investigated: the pseudo-timing hypothesis (Schultz, 2003), 
model misspecifications due to liquidity risk changes and inability o f the model to 
adjust for risk changes (Eckbo et al., 2000; Eckbo and Norli, 2005), other information 
released along the private placing announcement (Korajczyk et al., 1991; Antweiler 
and Frank, 2004) and speculative activities o f specific informed investors that take 
into consideration the UK settings.
The main findings o f the chapter are gathered in Table 6.7. They suggest that when the 
long-run AR  are assessed following the traditional long-horizon abnonnal performance 
approaches, the puzzle is observed. Positive announcement reactions o f about 10% are 
documented, which turn into significantly negative long-horizon AR, up to -35%. The 
reversal is consistent with alternative event-study approaches including the BHAR 
(Lyon et al., 1999), CTAR (Fama, 1998), pre-event momentum adjusted AR  in event­
time (Boechme and Sorescu, 2002).
However, the level o f the long-horizon AR is very sensitive to the event-study method 
employed. Although the reversal is apparent following the above conventional 
approaches, liquidity-adjusted AR are lower. This suggests that liquidity is a 
significant risk factor in explaining AR. Likewise, when liquidity-adjusted calendar­
time AR  are estimated, the results do not support the reversal at all. Additionally, when 
the traditional long-run AR  are adjusted for pre-event momentum (Boechme and 
Sorescu, 2002) the underperformance also becomes lower. These findings are line with 
the model misspecification hypothesis and the view that the reported long-horizon AR 
are attributed to model deficiencies rather than the event (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; 
Brav and Gombers, 1997).
In fact, when AR are estimated in calendar-time, they are always closer to zero in 
comparison with event-time AR (irrespective o f the pricing model used; FF-3factor, 
Carhart-4factor, LQT-2factor). This is consistent with the ‘pseudo-timing’ hypothesis 
(Shultz, 2003) which advocates that the offer has nothing to do with the management’s 
ability sell overvalued stock or its ability to identify ex-ante when the firm
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performance peaks. However, the findings document low economic value o f the 
pseudo-timing hypothesis, consistent with the view that it is unlikely to be able to fully 
explain the post-event underperformance (Dahlquist and De Jong, 2008; Viswanathan 
and Wei; 2008; Ang et al., 2006). At the same time, the overreaction hypothesis does 
not seem to hold either, as the correlations between announcement and long-run AR 
are not significantly negative.
Furthermore, the analysis documents significant reduction in liquidity risk following 
the event, consistent with Eckbo et al. (2000), Brav and Gombers, (1997), Eckbo and 
Norli (2005). This reduction justifies the lower liquidity-adjusted AR. Interestingly, the 
FF-3factor and Carhart-4factor models do not report significant changes in risk factor 
loadings following the offer. Only when the analysis involves the LQT-2factor model 
the liquidity risk factor loadings and expected cost o f equity are significantly reduced 
ater the placing. This suggests that the traditional asset-pricing models fail to adjust for 
liquidity risk changes. Therefore, since liquidity is increased, expected returns should 
be lower. Nevertheless, if  the model is unable to adjust for the risk reduction, the AR 
will be negatively biased. Indeed, WLS analysis reports significant negative 
relationship between the post-offer AR and the average reduction in liquidity risk. This 
suggests inability of the models to completely control for liquidity risk changes. This 
is also consistent with the Eckbo et al. (2000, p. 128) implication that issuers are more 
liquid in comparison with their non-issuer benchmarks.
Regarding the remaining hypotheses, the private placements are classified based on 
other information released at the announcement into ‘investment news’ and ‘operating 
news'. They do not indicate significant differences in their AR  paths, which rejects the 
hypothesis that other information can explain the reversal. Speculation cannot explain 
the reversal either, as AR do not reverse immediately after the issue day as the 
corresponding hypothesis predicts.
As a conclusion, the results contradict the overreaction hypothesis and mainly suggest 
model misspecification problems. Considering that the traditional factor models (Fama 
and French, 1993 and Carhart, 1997) fail to adjust for liquidity risk changes following 
the event, the AR reverse due to the failure to control for risk factors other than the 
conventional size and BTM. These findings are consistent with, and extent the work
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of, Eckbo et al. (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005). It appears that using only the size 
and BTM as risk factors, the analysis ignores liquidity (and transaction costs), as well 
as fails to adjust for subsequent factor and cost-of-equity changes subsequent to the 
event. Therefore, the findings highlight the significance o f choosing an approach that 
properly adjusts (to the extent it is possible) for liquidity risk changes.
Table 6.7: Summary of main findings of chapter six
The table outlines the main findings o f  this chapter w ith regards the AR  reversal hypotheses. The first 
colum n presents the hypothesis tested, the second colum n the relevant expectations and the third
w hether the results support the specific hypothesis. The last colum n adds further inform ation.
H ypothesis
P red ic tion
C onsis ten t
resu lts
F u r th e r  in fo rm a tio n
H6.1a. Reversal in 
the UK
Positive announcem ent AR 
N egative long-run AR
V
V
Negative AR under the traditional 
event study models
H6.1b. O verreaction N egative correlation 
betw een short and long- 
horizon AR
X
H6.2. Pseudo-tim ing Only event-tim e AR  are 
significantly negative 
Cluster in specific periods
?
V
CTAR are always lower than 
event-time AR  





Changes in cost-of-equity 
Reduction in liquidity 
Inability o f  the benchm ark 





Monthly change in the required 
cost o f  equity due to reduction 
in liquidity risk 
Change in liquidity risk is 




D ifferent AR  approach lead 
to different conclusions
V AR are sensitive to the 
methodology employed.
When AR are adjusted fo r  pre­
event momentum and liquidity 
risk, the reversal disappears
H6.4. O ther
inform ation
Different AR  patterns for 
the ‘investm ent’ and 
‘operating’ news sub­
samples
X Not clear long-run AR o f  the two 
sub-samples.
Insignificant long-run AR  
differences
H6.5. Speculation N egative AR after the issue 
day
X Normal issue AR fo r  the fu ll  




Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks - What do we learn 
from this study?
7.1. Introduction
This study investigates implications o f non pre-emptive equity offerings. It focuses 
on two types o f UK equity offerings. The first type involves placements o f newly 
issued capital which is not offered first to the existing shareholders on a pro-rata 
basis (primary placings). The second type involves blocks o f already listed shares, 
initiated by existing shareholders rather than the company (secondary placings).
Various reasons to investigate these two UK equity offering types exist. First, 
previous studies that investigate equity offerings by UK listed companies focus 
mainly on the pre-emptive offers such as right and open offers (e.g. Armitage, 2000; 
2002; 2007; Levis, 1995; Ngatuni et ah, 2007; Iqbal et al., 2007). Contrary, the 
evidence on pure placings is limited, while blocks o f already listed stock have not 
been examined at all (to the best o f my knowledge). In fact, very few studies 
investigate UK (private) placings. Few of them define placings similar to the US firm 
commitment offers (Slovin et al., 2000) and others use placements accompanied by 
open offers or right issues (Ho, 2005; Balachandran et al., 2009). Balachandran et al. 
(2009) and Armitage (2010) use pure non pre-emptive placements, investigating the 
choice among flotation methods and the identity o f the parties involved, respectively. 
Barnes and Walker (2006) investigate the choice between right offers and placings. 
The current study explores new questions.
It also adds to the body o f knowledge by additionally presenting evidence on 
secondary placements. It focuses on the offered price, the market reactions around 
the announcement and the long-horizon abnormal performance surrounding the two 
offering types. It attempts to explain the reported patterns, to identify differences 
between the two placing types and, to report whether the findings are consistent with 
the predominant US arguments and models. Overall, the study contributes by
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providing new evidence on UK non pre-emptive equity offerings (primary and 
secondary) for which evidence is sparse. It also reinforces the view that US 
arguments are not always applicable in the UK (Slovin et al., 2000; Armitage, 2002).
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarizes the research objectives 
and testable hypotheses o f the study. Section 7.3 highlights the main findings and 
contributions to the equity offerings literature. Section 7.4 emphasises the study 
contributions and implications to the broader finance areas, theory and methods. 
Finally, section 7.5 discusses limitations o f the study and opportunities for further 
research.
7.2. Sum m ary o f research objectives and testable hypotheses
7.2.1. Objective 1: The discount or premium explanations
The first research objective o f the study (Obj.l) is to identify the main determinants 
o f the discount or premium for the two UK offering types tested. It is well 
documented that the SEO discount constitutes one o f the most substantial costs for 
the firms raising equity (Annitage, 2002; Hansen, 1986, Eckbo and Masulis, 2007). 
In addition, large heterogeneity between the investor valuations in the UK is 
observed (Annitage, 2010). This evidence raises the need to understand the relevant 
implications o f UK placings better. Moreover, evidence on the pricing techniques of 
UK secondary placings sparse, which provides an additional motivation to 
investigate this issue.
To meet this objective, four hypotheses are tested. First, the offered discount reflects 
certification costs due to asymmetric infonnation between the firm and the market 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; see section 4.3.1). Second, 
the discount reflects monitoring expenses occurred by investors aiming to act as 
external monitor factors and improve Finn performance (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and 
Wu, 2009; see section 4.3.2). Third, the discount reflects liquidity costs/risks. 
Evidence on liquidity and inelastic demand involves mainly other types o f SEO 
(Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Loderer et al., 1991; Silber, 1991; 
Maynes and Pandes, 2008; see section 4.3.3) and has not been examined by prior 
studies as an explanation for the discount of the two types o f non pre-emptive offers.
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Finally, the fourth hypothesis focuses on the offered premium. The premium reflects 
agency problems. Investors do not have incentives to pay more than the market price, 
unless they pursue private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989; see section 4.3.4).
7.2.2. Objective 2: Good timing and/or earnings management
The second objective of the study (Obj.2) is to assess the stock and operating long- 
run abnormal performance for the years surrounding the non pre-emptive equity 
offerings and, explain the relevant implications (for which evidence is in elementary 
stage). Prior evidence suggests that placing firms overperform their benchmarks the 
years before, but underperform the following years (e.g. Hertzel et al., 2002; Barclay 
et al., 2007; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). This pattern implies growth in market prices 
prior the offer that subsequently deteriorates. The literature suggests that the 
management/the sellers identify a window of opportunity to sell temporary 
overvalued equity (e.g. Hertzel et al., 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Clarke et al., 
2001; 2004; Lee, 1997). The premise of this hypothesis is that, the sellers have the 
ability to predict the subsequent value deterioration in market prices and, time the 
offer when the firm performance peaks.
This timing hypothesis is examined for the secondary placings. Regarding the 
primary offers, the study contributes by arguing for a different version o f ‘timing’. 
Since the primary investors in the UK are mainly existing shareholders (Armitage, 
2010), then knowingly buying overvalued stock is obscure. If the stock performance 
indeed peaks at the offer and deteriorates afterwards, it would imply real over­
optimism about the stock future value (see section 5.3.1). The study additionally 
investigates whether accounting measures facilitate the signal o f accounting growth 
and expectations for value improvements (Rajan and Servaes, 1997). The second 
hypothesis is that, the firm deliberately manipulates the earnings the year before the 
offer (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998; Yoon and Miller, 2002; Iqbal et al., 
2009). The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and imply that investors are 
not able to understand the real implications behind the offer (see section 5.3.2).
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7.2.3. Objective 3: Long-run abnormal performance methods
The third objective of the study (Obj.3) is to review the debate on long-horizon 
abnormal performance research design and, assess whether including (il)liquidity as 
a risk factor facilitates in assessing expected returns.
Going through the literature, it becomes apparent that none model can be adequate 
for robust inferences (see section 3.8). The important issues to consider are based 
upon i) the ability o f the asset-pricing model to asses expected performance; ii) the 
method o f estimation of the long-run AR (event or calendar-time); iii) statistical tests 
to overcome econometric problems that each approach is subject to and; iv) the 
nature of the sample and research question. In general, the asset-pricing literature has 
failed to provide a single risk-adjusted model, with no biases against which one can 
measure post-event stock perfonnance (see Chapter 3).
Hence, the need to understand the several practical issues is fundamental. The study 
attempts to provide guidance on the choices among the several alternative 
methodologies. It also empirically tests an alternative liquidity-adjusted pricing 
model in order examine whether higher predictive ability can be achieved.
7.2.4. Objective 4: Explanation of the reversal in abnormal returns
The final research objective of the study (Obj.4) is to provide an explanation for the 
puzzling reversal o f AR associated with private placings. That is, the pattern of 
positive market reaction at the announcement (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wruck, 
1989; Barclay et al., 2007; Kang and Stulz, 1996; Kato and Schallheim, 1993; Wu et 
al., 2005) which is followed by negative post-offer long-run abnormal performance 
(Hertzel et al., 2002; Barclay et al., 2007; Sheehan and Swisher, 1998; Kang et al., 
1999). This pattern implies systematic mispricing o f the placing stock. It suggests 
that investors do not learn from the past and systematically react towards the wrong 
direction. This casts doubts on market efficiency.
To meet this objective, live hypotheses are tested. First, the puzzling AR  reversal is 
valid in the UK. As this puzzle has not been tested for the UK market before (to the 
best ot my knowledge) an out-ot-sample examination of the reversal and the
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overreaction hypothesis is necessary to examine the ‘persistence’ o f this ‘anomaly’ 
(see section 6.3.1). Second hypothesis is that the firms do not have timing ability as 
prior evidence suggest (section 5.3.1), but they simply sell equity when the prices are 
high. This pseudo-timing hypothesis predicts that event-time AR are likely to report 
negative AR  even when none exists and the pre-event expected returns are zero (see 
section 6.3.2). The third hypothesis tests whether the liquidity risk is reduced after 
the offer, however the traditional benchmark models used to measure post-offer 
long-run AR  do not properly adjust for the risk reduction (see section 6.3.3). Fourth, 
other events released along the placing announcement drive the reported AR. 
Distinguishing the finns according to other information might eliminate the reversal 
(see section 6.3.4). Finally, according to the fifth hypothesis investors might have 
incentives to temporary manipulate the market price upwards, in order to sell at 
higher price (see section 6.3.5).
7.3. M ain findings and contributions to the equity offerings literature
7.3.1. Private placements
7.3.1.1. Discount determinants
Regarding the first objective (Obj.l), large discrepancies between placements priced 
at premium and discount are observed. The difference between primary placings 
priced at premium and discount is about 25%-30%. This confirms the large 
heterogeneity o f the valuations in the UK (Armitage, 2010). In addition, the US 
evidence about new investors that incur expenses to monitor the incumbents and 
increase firm value (Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009) has only a small weight in 
the UK. Not only normal activity signs are observed (see sections 4.6.1.2 and
4.6.1.3), but also OLS cross-sectional analysis implies a very small real relation 
between ownership and managerial changes with the offered discount (see Table
4.5). Thus, the study cannot support the view that external monitoring will help in 
increasing firm value in the UK (contrary to the suggestion o f Slovin et al., 2000).
While someone could argue that the small weight o f monitoring is consistent with 
entrenchment (Barclay et al., 2007), the study advocates that it is not about
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entrenchment or other related agency issues either. Instead, OLS analysis suggests 
that private placing investors require discount as compensation for liquidity costs or 
risks, while pure asymmetric information is also significant (see Table 4.5). Hence, 
the discount reflects information and liquidity costs (Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003).
Although the discount has been previously linked with the liquidity risks o f other 
SEO types such as public, rights and open offers (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; 
Kothare, 1997; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Armitage, 2007; 2002) 
and with sale-restricted private placings (Silber, 1991; Maynes and Pandes, 2008) 
across countries (e.g. US, Canada, UK; see section 1.3.1.2), this is the first study that 
reports similar findings for pure non pre-emptive placings. This study contributes by 
arguing that liquidity is possibly a common driving factor within SEO types and 
markets. Liquidity costs seem significant regardless o f other related factors e.g. 
monitoring, manipulative short-selling and/or institutional settings. This conclusion 
derives from the finding of prior SEO studies, restricted placings and chapter 4.
7.3.1.2. Good timing and/or earnings management
With regard to the second objective (Obj.2), primary placing firms indicate stock 
overperformance prior the offer which deteriorates afterwards (see section 5.6.1.1). 
This pattern complies with prior international evidence (see section 5.2). Contrary, 
the operating performance the year prior the UK placing is mainly normal (see 
section 5.6.2.1). These findings are robust to alternative sensitivity tests (see section 
Error! Reference source not found.) and suggest that prior the offer the market 
prices are temporary over-priced (consistent with prior international evidence). This 
study additionally contributes by documenting the paths of other accounting ratios 
(beyond earnings) that might help the temporary miss-valuation. Consistently, the 
primary placing firms indicate high sales and debt growth prior the offer. Both items 
deteriorate afterwards similar to the stock abnonnal performance (see section
5.6.2.1), while OLS analysis indicates that such growth measures can explain the 
post-offer AR (see section 5.6.5.1). This suggests that investors observe the higher
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debt and sales growth prior the offer and are over-optimistic about the stock future 
performance.
In addition, the study contributes by providing new evidence that placing firms do 
not use current accruals to manage earnings (see section 5.6.3.1). Contrary, long­
term accruals are significantly positive the years around the event. Recall that long­
term accruals are non-cash expenses associated with the finn fixed assets (e.g. 
depreciation and amortization). Therefore, the reduced depreciation component 
complies with the view that private placing firms face under-investment problems 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993). The study documents significantly negative relationship 
between discretionary long-term accruals and post-offer AR , suggesting that 
underinvestment eventually reduces firm value (see section 5.6.5.1).
Hereby, the findings suggest that the placing stock was overvalued at the 
announcement. However, investors do not seem to realize this miss-valuation or 
conceive the stock and accounting growth as temporary. They seem to have high 
anticipations on the future firm value (Hertzel et al., 2002).
7.3.1.3. The puzzling reversal o f abnormal returns
With regard to the third and fourth research objectives (Obj.3 and Obj.4), this study 
suggests that similar to prior international evidence, in the UK the AR  are 
significantly positive at the announcement and turn negative few years later (see 
sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 respectively). However, this pattern is valid only when long- 
horizon AR  are estimated following the traditional long-run AR  methods such as buy- 
and-hold AR  (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999) and calendar-time AR 
(e.g. Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). In fact, sensitivity to long-horizon 
AR  methods is reported (see section 6.6.1.4).
The current study additionally contributes by directly addressing the possibility of 
liquidity risk reduction following the equity offering (as implied by Eckbo et al., 
2000; Brav and Gombers, 1997; Eckbo and Norli, 2005). With the application o f a 
two-factor model that captures the illiquidity premium (Liu, 2006), the study 
documents reduction in the liquidity risk factor loadings following the event (see
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section 6.6.2.2). The AR reversal disappears when the benchmark model controls for 
liquidity risk changes (see Table 6.3). In addition, WLS analysis reports significant 
relationship between the post-offer AR and the average reduction in liquidity risk 
(see section 6.6.3.2). This holds only when AR are adjusted for liquidity. The 
traditional Fama and French (1995) and Carhart (1997) models do not document 
such relation with cost-of-equity changes, while they are unable to capture the 
liquidity risk reduction. These suggest inability o f the models to completely control 
for liquidity risk changes. These findings contribute to the extant literature that report 
reversal in AR (Obj.4) and also to the on-going debate on long-horizon AR methods 
(Obj.3).
In addition, when the long-run AR  are estimated in calendar-time, they are always 
lower in comparison with the event-time AR (regardless o f the model; see Table 6.3). 
This supports the pseudo-timing hypothesis (Schultz, 2003) which can only partly 
explain the post-underperformance (Dahlquist and De Jong, 2008; Viswanathan and 
Wei; 2008; Ang et al., 2006) and has not been considered by prior private placing 
studies as an explanation of the reversal. However, its economic value is small (see 
section 6.6.3). Likewise, the study contributes by re-examining the timing and 
overreaction hypotheses as explanation of the AR  reversal. In fact, it rejects the 
common overreaction hypothesis (Hertzel et al., 2002), as the correlation between 
the announcement and long-run AR is not significantly negative (see section 6.6.2.1).
Finally, when the calendar-time AR are adjusted for pre-event momentum, any 
reported underperformance is of very small economic value (-1.2% over the three- 
year period). It could thus be argued that the reversal is again eliminated. Overall, the 
reversal is driven by pre-event momentum, liquidity and inability o f the conventional 
models to adjust for reduction in liquidity risk following the event.
7.3.2. Blocks of already listed shares
Having examined the primary placings that few results are consistent with prior 
studies, the results about the secondary placings differ substantially from those of the 
prior literature, regarding countries other than the UK.
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7.3.2.1. Discount or premium
To start with the first research objective (Obj.l), the study reports large heterogeneity 
in the valuations o f the secondary placings (see section 4.6.1.1) similar to primary 
placings. However, the difference between premium and discount within the 
secondary offers is about 13% -l5%, i.e. about half o f the corresponding reported 
levels o f the primary placing discrepancy. In fact, the secondary placements are 
priced at approximately 7% lower discount in comparison with the primary offers 
(see Table 4.2). Given that secondary offerings involve already listed stock that the 
market has assessed its value, lower asymmetric information is plausible (Lee, 1997).
Nonetheless, OLS analysis highlights that uncertainty and asymmetric information 
are the main discount determinants (see section 4.6.2.2). It appears that investors are 
uncertain about the stock value and require discount as compensation for the risk 
they face to invest to the particular stock. Therefore, the UK secondary placements 
are not priced mainly at premium as some prior US evidence suggests (Barclay et al., 
2001; 2007; Barclay and Holdemess, 1989).
Moreover, contrary to existing evidence that new investors join the firm to enhance 
firm value (Bethel et al., 1998; Allen and Philips, 2000; Barclay and Holdemess, 
1991) and might be willing to pay more, investors participating into UK secondary 
placements are mainly existing shareholders. In addition, there are no significant 
monitoring activities (see section 4.6.1.2). While small monitoring expenses are 
implied by the multivariate analyses, their economic value is small (see Table 4.5).
Finally, prior evidence suggests that secondary offers are priced at premium due to 
extraction o f private benefits (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989). This study provides 
supportive evidence that premium indeed reflects private benefits. However this is 
irrespective o f the offer type being primary or secondary (see section 4.6.3). The 
placing type is not important when investors have self-dealing incentives (Wu and 
Wang, 2005).
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7.3.2.2. Good timing and/or earnings management for the secondary placings
Regarding the second research objective (Obj.2), the study contributes by providing 
strong evidence o f timing associated with secondary placings. More specifically, the 
stock performance peaks at the offer year but deteriorates afterwards (see section
5.6.1.2). Contrary, the accounting performance seems normal during all years around 
the offer (see section 5.6.2.2). These findings suggest that the stock is over-priced 
during the offering, consistent with the timing hypothesis; the sellers identify a 
window of opportunity to sell overvalued stock.
These findings oppose the common perception that secondary placings are related to 
post-offer overperformance due to activities o f the new investors (Bethel et al., 1998; 
Barclay and Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Phillips, 2000). It also suggests that 
investors are not active and are not interested in improving the future firm value (in 
line with the Obj.l findings; see section 7.3.2.1). It is thus inconsistent with the US 
view that secondary placings constitute ‘corporate control transactions’ (Barclay and 
Holdemess, 1991; Allen and Phillips, 2000), or that investors participating into 
secondary placings are ‘activist’ (Bethel et al., 1998).
In addition, the study provides evidence that secondary offering firms have 
significantly lower sales in comparison with performance matched firms (see Table
5.3). Consistently, discretionary current accruals are significantly negative the year 
prior the offer, which suggest conservative accounting policies (see section 5.6.3.2). 
Conservative accounting might target tax avoidance or reduced dividend 
distributions. At the same time, discretionary and non-discretionary long-term 
accruals are significantly negative, which suggest increased depreciation component. 
As discretionary long-term accruals are also negatively related with the post-offer 
AR , over-investment problems are implied.
To the degree I am aware of, this is the first study that tests and provides evidence 
that UK secondary offerings precede earnings management, or evidence for timing. 
OLS analysis confirms the above findings (see section 5.6.5.2). Overall, the study 
contributes by indicating that the sellers take advantage of information they possess 
and sell over-valued stock.
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7.4. Further im plications and contributions
7.4.1. Contributions to theory and implications to broader finance areas
7.4.1.1. Contributions to signalling theory
As a SEO conveys asymmetric information between the firm and market, according 
to the signalling theory (see section 1.3.2.1), the negative reactions following various 
types o f SEO announcements (see section 2.3.4) are attributed to adverse selection 
problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Firms sell overvalued securities (Akerlof, 1974) 
and the market receives ‘bad’ signals about the firm value, i.e. ‘the firm is a lemon’. 
However, the positive market reactions to the announcement o f UK placings (see 
section 6.6.1.1) suggest that the placing firms are not ‘lemons’. This is in line with 
prior international evidence on private placings (see section 2.3.4).
Contrary, with regards to the secondary placings or placings priced at premium, it 
seems that investors do not receive any significant signal or they are not confident on 
how to interpret the event (reactions are not statistically significant. See sections 
5.6.1.2 and 4.6.3, respectively). Hence, it is less clear whether a ‘market for lemon’ 
with regard to these two UK placing types exists. This suggests different investor 
perceptions about the implications around the UK placings.
7.4.1.2. Contributions to agency theory
The study contributes to the agency theory in three ways. First, the study complies 
with recent evidence (Armitage, 2010) that investors in UK SEO are not new as 
implied by the prior studies (e.g. Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wruck, 1989; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Barclay et al., 2007; Slovin et al., 2000). Therefore, 
conflict o f interests between the principals and the owners is limited. Consistently, 
the study reports that investors in UK non pre-emptive offers do not appear eager to 
get more active role with the management or to improve firm value in any o f the two 
offering types (see section 4.6.1.2). This contradicts US findings that investors have 
significant monitoring activities and cause value enhancements in private placings 
(e.g. Wruck, 1989; Wruck and Wu, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005) or secondary 
offerings (Bethel et al., 1998; Barclay and Holdemess, 1991).
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However, different agency costs are associated with primary placing finns. The 
findings imply underinvestment problems which reduce firm value, consistent with 
Hertzel and Smith, 1993 (see sections 5.6.3.1 and 5.6.5.1). Likewise, the study 
reports significant downwards earnings management prior the secondary placings, 
and overinvestment problems (see section 5.6.3.2). The firms indicate high 
depreciation components and discretionary long-term accruals which reduce the firm 
value. This suggests investments into negative NPV projects that do not add 
shareholder value. Therefore, conflicts of interest are apparent.
7.4.1.3. Contributions to market efficiency
Fama (1998) suggests that an observed pattern or ‘anomaly’ that rejects market 
efficiency should be re-examined at different time periods in order to capture 
whether it is real. Maybe investors have learned about its existence and explore it to 
the extent that it is no longer observable (Fama, 1991; Malkiel, 2003; Schwert, 
2003). Alternatively, new methodologies that control for several problems and adjust 
for various risk factors facilitate to explain the anomaly. Recall that the market 
efficiency is jointly tested with a model o f equilibrium which is assumed to be able 
to predict expected returns (given that the market is efficient; Fama, 1991).
Motivated by the reversal o f private placing AR  that casts strong doubts on market 
efficiency, this study contributes by examining this pattern in a market that has not 
been examined before (UK) and, by using a more recent dataset (1998-2005). It 
additionally uses an alternative model that is likely to capture the variation of 
expected returns better. These factors might assist in explaining the pattern.
The study advocates that the puzzling reversal of private placing AR that rejects 
market efficiency is valid only if long-run AR are measured under the conventional 
event-study approaches. Hence, traditional models are unable to adjust for risk 
changes and possibly for pre-event momentum (see section 6.6.2.2) which lead to the 
reported reversal in AR. In other words, the reversal is not driven by the inability of 
investors to understand the placing implications or because they systematically miss- 
value the stock. Contrary, the pattern is mainly driven by the model o f equilibrium 
used to measure misspricing. Therefore, the study contributes to the extant literature
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by rejecting the behaviour finance interpretations that the market is not efficient and 
investors systematically react towards the wrong direction when a private placing is 
announcement.
7.4.2. Contribution to methods
A significant motivation to investigate new methodologies is the argument that new 
long-run AR methods that control for known or potential biases, help in providing 
‘normal’ inferences over a specific sample (Schwert, 2003). With regard to the IPO 
literature, Eckbo and Norli (2005) imply that the traditional long-horizon AR  models 
fail to control for reduction in stock liquidity following the offer. Similarly, Eckbo et 
al. (2000) suggest reduction in leverage following an SEO. This study directly 
addresses these concerns by deviating from the conventional long-run event-study 
approaches and applying a liquidity-adjusted asset-pricing model (Liu, 2006) as an 
event-study tool.
The study contributes by advocating that illiquidity is indeed significant factor for 
long-horizon AR and models beyond the conventional ones can explain the AR  (see 
section 6.6.1.4). The findings support the view that AR around several corporate 
events is likely to be manifestation of model deficiencies (Brav and Gompers, 1997; 
Lyon et al., 1999; Ritter and Welch, 2000; Gompers and Lemer, 2003). The study 
strongly underlines the need to improve the long-horizon AR methods to adjust for 
liquidity risk or other risk that causes change in the factor loadings.
In addition, the study contributes by suggesting caution in the concept o f ‘risk 
factors’. Liquidity risk should be considered as a component o f the cost o f equity. 
Failure o f the model to adjust for any change in the risk factor loadings will cause 
bias in the reported abnormal performance. As a conclusion, direct examination of 
the risk changes and relevant controls are maybe necessary. These findings might be 
o f interest not only to the area o f corporate finance, but also in behaviour finance, 
asset-pricing literature and, market based accounting research.
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7.5. L im itations and further research
7.5.1. Problems and limitations
Given the equity offering settings in the UK (see section 2.2), the placings could be 
characterized as a ‘black box’. The accessible infonnation is limited as the disclosure 
requirements do not ‘force’ the placing firms to disclose it. Contrary, information is 
probably gathered by practitioners such as fund managers and institutional investors.
As a result, it was not able to collect accurately specific information related to the 
identity of the placing investors and the parties involved (see sections 4.6.1.2 and
4.6.1.3). Therefore, the number o f observations in the pertinent tests was limited. In 
addition, the issue day and specific ownership characteristics were less clear for 
many firms. Hence, the tests subject to this information could use only the stocks for 
which the relevant information was found. Unavoidably, observations are dropped. 
In other words, although the UK market is small in comparison with the US, the 
opacity makes it more difficult to gather larger samples.
A further limitation is related to the treatment o f various biases o f long-run event 
studies (see section 5.4.1.3). The study sets several criteria to identify the appropriate 
benchmarks o f the event-firm returns that might raise questions whether noise or 
biases affect the estimations. As an example, Chapter 5 treats the delisted returns by 
replacing them with the returns o f a corresponding reference portfolio (based on size 
and BTM, or industry). However, Chapter 6 removes the delisted returns the month 
following the delisting month as an additional control and robustness test. Although 
this latter practice also is followed by prior studies (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 1997; 
Ritter, 1991) and might avoid problems o f having AR biased towards zero, it reduces 
the number of observations. The same problem arises when controls for overlapping 
returns are taken. Nonetheless, despite the relatively small number of observations, 
the use o f various alternative methods and competing procedures of long-run event 
studies suggest that the documented results are robust. It is however interesting how 
many firms 'disappear' during the three years tested following the placing.
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7.5.2. Further research
As this is the first study that investigates UK secondary placements (to the degree I 
am aware of), the findings provide new knowledge about this particular equity 
offering type. Hence, this study ‘opens’ the road for further research. In other worlds, 
although this piece o f work has reached to an end, it could still be seen as ‘work on 
progress’. A few o f the questions initially set are clearly answered, while others 
created further questions that would be interesting to explore. Few thoughts for 
further research are as follows.
7.5.2.1. Primary placings and market microstructure
Placings without pre-emptive rights become more and more common in the UK. 
Thus, existing shareholders might be diluted. However, the automatic imposition o f 
pre-emptive rights in the UK raises the question whether existing investors have 
other means o f protecting their stakes. Having a careful look at the placing 
prospectuses, it is common to include special EGM resolutions with which security 
options are allotted to few existing shareholders (usually directors and their 
immediate families or employees (when ESOP exists)). The options give the right to 
the holders to buy shares at a fix price at specific future time periods. This might help 
insiders maintaining their percentages from dilution. Moreover, the option holders 
might have incentives to manipulate the price upwards so that they can exercise the 
call options they are entitled to at a specific time in future, yielding higher profits. 
Although such possibility is in line with the speculation hypothesis (see section
6.3.5) it is not captured by the analysis.
In addition, while the analysis provided by this study about speculative activities and 
market microstructure is limited, deeper investigation may bring into light further 
implications such as lock-up agreements between the parties involved. The 
prospectuses o f the UK placings do not include such information about selling 
restrictions of the new stock. However, it is not clear whether such agreements are 
‘informally’ agreed with the underwriter before the issue. Such event would have 
significant impact on the stock AR  at the time when the lock-up expires, as selling 
pressure will be observed. Unfortunately, UK private placements fall into a ‘gray
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area’ which makes it difficult to have access to such information. Perhaps asking 
fund managers and/or institutional investors that fundamentally participate into 
private placements would facilitate in investigating this possibility. To my 
knowledge, evidence on lock-up agreements in the UK is scarce.
7.5.2.2. Research related to the broader SEO literature
Although the main objective of this study is to contribute by providing new evidence 
about UK non pre-emptive placings (excluding offers accompanied with pre-emptive 
offers such as right issues, open offers or other SEO types), further research could 
contribute to the broader SEO literature.
As an example, considering the existing evidence that UK open offers manage 
earnings the year prior the offer (Iqbal et al., 2009), it might worth examining the 
earnings management for UK right issues as well (to the best o f my knowledge such 
evidence has not been reported). Comparing the level o f earnings management with 
the market reactions at the announcement of right issues, open offers and placings 
might assist in understanding better the choice among the three equity offering types 
in relation to earnings quality. Such tests might contribute to the evidence about the 
demise of rights as the right offer firms are o f ‘lower quality’ (see section 2.3.2).
Furthermore, based on the findings related to the discounted offered price, Chapter 4 
argues that liquidity is one of the major discount determinants. Nonetheless, this is 
something that could be valid for further SEO types especially in the UK that large 
deviations from the market price (in both directions) take place. Such tests are 
however left for further research.
In addition, Rangan (1998) argues that manipulation is not revealed immediately 
after the SEO but within the second quarter after the event. A possibility for this 
delay is that, investors should maintain the stock for three to six months after the 
placing as there are selling restrictions. Hence, incentives to hide the earnings 
manipulation might be plausible. Such possibility has not been examined either.
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7.5.2.3. Long-run AR, model misspecification methodologies and asset pricing
The findings o f Chapter 6 provide methodological contributions. They suggest that 
AR should be measured after taking into account the illiquidity premium and changes 
in risk factor loadings following the event. It is important to emphasize, that this 
finding is not restricted to the SEO area. It is probably applicable to the broader 
finance literature, i.e. to the measurement o f long-run abnormal performance 
following other corporate events and in other markets. Further research investigating 
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It is worthwhile to understand better the various implications related to the UK non 
pre-emptive equity offerings. Beyond the differences in the institutional settings, 
preferences in issue methods and market reactions mentioned in Chapter 2, the UK 
market also differs as the identity o f investors participating into placings are not new 
as the US evidence suggests (Armitage, 2010). This appendix describes efforts made 
to identify the parties involved into the UK, for the equity offer types used by this 
study.
Specifically, at the beginning o f this study, no UK evidence existed regarding the 
identity o f SEO investors in the UK. Now, Armitage (2010) examines this issue. 
Thus, to understand whether relevant arguments and research hypotheses suggested 
for the US market would be valid for the UK, this study attempted to identify the 
players o f the two UK samples. Such description also helps in understanding better 
the UK market.
To identify the placing investors, a search through Nominus Database was 
conducted. Nominus is offered by Argus Vickers and provides ownership 
information for UK firms, mainly from 2000 and onwards. It typically presents the 
ownership data in three-month gaps, regardless of the dates o f new equity issuances. 
Shareholdings are provided under three headers: ‘fund manager’, ‘beneficial owner’ 
and ‘registered owner’. The beneficial owner for each placing firm is examined by 
this study, similar to Wruck (1989). Nominus provides the names of the shareholders 
without classifying into categories such as institutional, affiliates, or other. It was 
thus difficult to distinguish. Nonetheless, the Google search machine proved to be a 
helpful tool. Investors are categorized into institutional investors, individuals or 
corporations as follows.
Institutional investors are those belonging to the general financial sectors (UK fund 
managers or foreigners). It is relatively easy to detect as they their names are 
accompanied by words such as 'market maker’, ‘trusts’, ‘pension scheme’, ‘inv’. If 
however the owner is an industrial firm, the name is usually related to a website 
which indicates the nature of the company, as not being ‘institutional’. In cases that
A ppendix I -Id en tify ing  the investors in non pre-em ptive offerings
Appendix I Investors in non pre-emptive offerings
the Goggle search was unsuccessful, it was assumed that no official website is 
designed by the specific shareholder. Thus, he/she is classified as an individual/ 
single investor. Individuals include beneficial investors such as managers, directors, 
family members or other single investor.
Individual investors are often indicated by Nominus, as their names are accompanied 
by characteristics such as Mr, Mrs, Dr, Lord, Sir, Esq. Very often, the individuals 
involved to the placings are not new investors. They are existing shareholders that 
increase their stakes. Employee schemes of the placing firm (such as ESOP or EBT) 
were also categorized as individuals, as the corporation employees (which are 
represented by their own trusts) have incentives similar to individuals and higher 
benefits to maintain their stakes. When employee schemes o f other firms (than that 
of the placing company) participate to the placing, they are allocated as institutions. 
Additionally, based on the Argus staff, some holdings of individuals were not shown 
separately but were grouped together under headings such as ‘private clients’ or 
'undisclosed' accounts o f financial firms’ clients. It is therefore plausible to merge 
these categories with ‘individuals’.
As a whole, the majority o f the shares are bought by existing rather than new 
investors, contradicting the dominate US findings that investors in non pre-emptive 
equity offerings are new single (and/or corporate) investors. This is also consistent 
with the findings of Armitage (2010) who investigates not only placings but also RI 
and OO by UK listed firms. Additionally, existing investors are mainly institutional 
and individual (single) owners. When a corporate or large individual placement takes 
place it is usually accompanied with institutional placing.
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A ppendix II -  Variable definitions and em pirical predictions
The table defines control variables used in Chapters 4 and 6. It explains the em pirical relations and 
predications. The proxies are distinguished based on the hypothesis they test, how ever som e 
overlapping cannot be avoided; few variables can be used for m ore than one hypotheses but, have 
d ifferent expecta tions._____________________________
V ariable Definition and predictions
A. Inform ation asymmetries and mss-pricing
Discount The offered discount as percentage o f  the prevailing m arket price. The discount is 
defined as the difference betw een the m arket and actual placing price, scaled by the 
m arket price that constitutes the “accessible” price for any investor: 
(.mkt.price, -  pi.price)  ̂ where pi.price is the placing price collected from  the news 
mkt. price,
reports or prospectuses, mkt.price is the m arket price at the day preceding the 
announcem ent. Unless stated otherwise, the m arket price is the unadjusted share 
prices (DS item UP).
(i) A ccording to the certification hypothesis (Hertzel and Sm ith, 1993), the discount 
level should reflect costs inquired by the private investors to assess firm value. I f  it 
signals certification to the m arket (that the stock is undervalued), the discount will 
be positively related to announcem ent AR  and nil to long-run AR  (the m arket should 
adjust). I f  there is perm anent change in the stock fundam ental values it should be 
positively related to the long-run AR. Contrary, negative relation to the long-run AR  
w ould im ply m iss-pricing.
(ii) A lternatively, the discount represents investor com pensation for the price 
pressure in the m arket price follow ing the announcem ent due to the stock inelastic 
dem and (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Corwin, 2003; A ltinkilic and Hansen, 
2003). In such case, it should be positively related to the relative offered size (and 
the announcem ent AR  unadjusted for the inform ation and price pressure impact).
Adj.Disc.
Age
W hen new  shares are issued at a price different than the m arket one, the m arket 
price is expected to change due to the different value o f  the new  shares. Assum ing 
no inform ation effects, offering additional stock at a price different than the m arket 
one, the subsequent m arket price is expected to be equal the w eighted average value 
betw een the two prices; the m arket price will experience a m echanical dilution. 
Hence, the adjusted discount equals the difference betw een the adjusted m arket price 
m inus the offered placing price: (adjP,^ -  p i price) , where adjP,+i is adjusted for this
adjPM
m echanical effect: adjP,̂  =
N.Oldsllares * mkt price, _ -N.Newslmn,s*pi.price ̂ where N.Old„,
N-Oldsllares+N.Newsllan,s
is the num ber o f  the existing shares, mkt. price,., the m arket price the day prior the 
announcem ent, N.New h the num ber o f  the new  placing shares and pi.price  the 
placing price.
The years since the corporation listing. A positive relationship to the discount 
suggests inform ation costs.
F.Value
A R p re -o ffe r
The natural logarithm  o f  the firm  m arket value (enlarged for the private placing 
sample), (i) Sim ilar to the age, a positive relationship to the discount suggests 
inform ation costs.
(ii) A positive relationship to AR  suggests the reduction in asym m etric inform ation 
due to the event suggests undervaluation consistent w ith the certification hypothesis 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993).
The firm  perform ance prior the private placing. Unless stated differently, AR is
Appendix II -  Variable definitions and empirical predictions
the BHAR based on a control firm with sim ilar size and industry for the 12-month 
period prior the offer (-12, -1); one month prior the event is not included to elim inate 
the effect o f  any leakage about the event.
The variable should indicate firm ’s long-term  ability to produce AR. It is hence a 
proxy to capture the “ im pression” the m arket has on the specific stock, w hich will 
affect the m arket announcem ent reactions accordingly. Assum ing the m arket is 
efficient, no significant relation to the long-run AR  is expected. A  negative relation 
with the post- long-run AR  will be consistent w ith the overreaction and tim ing 
hypotheses (the offer is timed when the firm overperform s, while the m arket fails to 
realize the im plication ex-ante).
Volatility  The average volatility o f  past perform ance. Following A ltinkilic and H ansen (2003)
it is defined as the standard deviation o f  the AR  prior the event. V olatility is defined 
as the variance o f  the stock holding-period AR  for the prior the three years p rior the 
even t(var^  w n): Volatility = ^ v a r^  • ^ (-36.-u is the stock BHAR  for the m onths
(-36,-1), based on a control firm with sim ilar size and book-to-m arket.
Volatility captures the value uncertainly o f  the stock, it riskiness. Thus, the proxy 
reflects the perception o f  the firm about its risk/expected perform ance, or, the 
“ investor heterogeneity” . Stocks with higher investor heterogeneity are expected to 
report lower AR as lower volatility denotes less risk (Loderer et al. 1991; Ritter, 
1988). Significant relationship with the announcem ent or issue day AR  w ould im ply 
change in the stock risk/uncertainty and thus, change on the expected rate o f  return.
Concentr. The ownership concentration. In a m anner sim ilar to prior studies (W ruck, 1989;
Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Kothare, 1997) this study aggregates the portions (as a 
percentage o f  the total capital) o f  the six largest beneficial holders before the 
placing. A ccording to the original m onitoring hypothesis (W ruck, 1989) positive 
relationship to AR  imply m onitor intentions; the discount reflects m onitoring costs 
and the m arket expects value improvements.
News A ‘new s’ variable. It is a binary variable that takes 1 when the stock belongs to the
'investm ent new s’ sub-sam ple, where an acquisition or other investm ents plan is 
announced along the private placing. It takes zero when the firm belongs to the 
‘operating new s’ sub-sam ple, announcing news about liquidity needs, reconstruction 
and/or reorganization along the private placing. The dum m y should capture the 
difference in market reactions between the two sub-sam ples.
B. Monitoring and post-purchase activity
Aconcentr The change in ownership concentration. A ccording to the m onitoring hypothesis 
(W ruck, 1989) a positive relationship to the discount and announcem ent AR  
suggests investors are intent to be active and help in im proving firm value.
Aconcentr 
* D
An interaction term that indicates post-purchase activities o f  the placing investors.
Dmgtjurn indicates changes in top m anagem ent for the ±4 m onths around the event 
(1 lor changes and zero otherwise). It captures pre-placem ent agreem ents betw een 
the firm and the placing investors, suggesting the intention o f  investors to becom e 
active, in terms o f  gain a place among the m anagers and affect firm policies. This 
proxy addresses the concerns that change in ownership concentration does not 
necessarily suggests monitoring, rather investors might entrench the incum bents 
(Barclay et al., 2007).
(i)Positive relationship to the offered discount and AR  imply m onitoring and 
activity intention and (ii) negative relationship suggests private benefits.
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S tr .In v Strategic investor. This is a binary variable that takes 1 when the investor is 
classified as strategic and zero otherwise. Strategic investor is the one who buys 
the whole or substantial portion o f  the placing (20% ) but it is not an institutional 
investor. It could be large existing shareholder, insider, director or other affiliated 
investor. It is also the one who subscribes for such percentage o f  the placing 
necessary to m aintain his/her stake undiluted or, such percentage w ith result to be 
characterized by the LSE authorities as ‘related party ’. Even if  the placing is 
relatively small but significant for the investor w ealth as it can provide him /her 
with bargaining power, to affect firm policies.
(i) N egative relationship to the discount and AR  would im ply m onitoring costs,
(ii) while positive would im ply private benefits.
C. Liquidity
Tr.Volm The trading volum e prior the event. Following Corw in (2003), it is defined as the 
natural logarithm  o f  the m ean volume (DS item VO) w ithin a w indow  o f  250 trading 
days prior the announcem ent (-250,-1): TrVom=\n<fOf)-
(i) The trading volum e is a m easure for existing inform ation asym m etries, as well 
as for the quantity dim ension o f  liquidity (e.g. Wu, 2004; Corwin, 2003). Positive 
relationship to the AR  suggests reduction in asym m etric inform ation and 
enhancem ent in firm liquidity which increases stock prices.
(ii) Second, negative relation to the discount would im ply liquidity costs.
(iii) Finally, m ore liquid stocks face flatter dem and curves and are positively related 
to the stock elasticity o f  dem and. Significant negative relation to dem and elasticity 
w ould contradict the notion o f  perfect elasticity (Loderer et al., 1991) with reference 
to Lippm an and M cCall, 1986).
S p r e a d The bid-ask spread o f  the stock. Following K othare (1997) b id-ask spread is defined
as the average spread w ithin a w indow o f  30 days prior the event. Spread is the
difference in ask and bid prices divided by their m idpoint price:
A skPrice, -  B idPrice,
Spread= --------------------------------------------------— '
(askPrice; +bidPrice[) l  2
The spread is w idely used by the academ ic literature to capture the transaction cost
dim ension o f  stock liquidity as well as proxy for the existing level o f  asym m etric
inform ation (Glosten and Harris, 1988; Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003;
W u, 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; and others). H igher spread suggests less
liquidity and higher asym m etric information.
D. Inelastic demand
O ffSize The new  shares placed as a percentage o f  the shares outstanding: the relative offered 
size. It represents the increase in shares available to the m arket, thus the increase in 
stock supply. Follow ing Corwin (2003), OffSize is defined as 
OJfSize = ShPtaced/Sh.Outst, where Sh.Placed  is the num ber o f  shares placed as stated in 
the new s report/prospectus. Sh.Outst is the enlarged num ber o f  ordinary shares 
outstanding (including the new  shares). The num ber o f  the existing shares is 
collected from the prospectuses ( if  available), Nom inus database, or W orldscope 
(05301).
The OffSize is used to exam ine the slope o f  the dem and curve and how  this might 
affect the reported AR. The new  share issue increases the stock supply perm anently. 
If  the stock has inelastic dem and, it will cause dow nw ard pressure on the m arket 
price.
(i) If  the stock has inelastic dem and, its dem and curve will be dow nw ard sloping. 
In such case, the relative offered size will be negatively related to the offered 
discount and to announcem ent (and/or issue) AR.
(ii) I f  the increase in stock supply causes perm anent dow nw ard pressure, negative
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relation to the long-term AR  should be observed.
P roceeds  A ccording to Scholes (1972), the value o f  the distribution is “another m easure o f  
increased supply” . It is the natural logarithm  o f  the gross proceeds 
[Proceeds=ln(GP)] o f  the placing as collected from the news reports/ prospectus. 
Gross proceeds equal the placing price m ultiplied by the num ber o f  placing shares.
(i) If  the increase in stock supply cause tem porary price pressure, negative (positive) 
relationship to short (long)-term  AR  is expected. As noted, such possibility is 
inconsistent with the overall private placing reversal, how ever the inform ation 
released along the placing announcem ent could change the AR  path for individual 
stocks.
(ii) A positive relationship o f  proceeds with the stock AR, should certify the stock 
offer. Thus, no significant relationship to long-run AR  is expected unless miss- 
pricing is possible.
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